RESEARCH ARTICLE

Tracing social movements' influence beyond agenda-setting: waves of protest, chaining mechanisms and policy outcomes in the Chilean student movement (2006-2018)

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ABSTRACT: The literature on social movements' policy outcomes agrees on the need for an intertemporal perspective that goes beyond a short-term action-reaction logic to account for the effects of mobilization on policies. However, little attention has been given to the causal mechanisms that link different waves of mobilization with related policy outcomes over time. To do so, we propose the concept of chaining mechanisms as a means to connect different iterations of protest, electoral cycles and policy responses within a mid-term perspective. We distinguish between two types of chaining mechanisms, strategic and inertial, and apply this conceptual framework to the Chilean student movement in the 2006 and 2018 period. We assert that its success in chaining different waves of protest is a crucial factor in accounting for the recent major education reform that took place under Bachelet's government (2014-2018). Beyond the case, the concept contributes to the understanding of the complex interactions between social mobilization and public policy.

KEYWORDS: Chaining mechanisms, Chile, Latin America, Policy reforms; Social movements' outcomes

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1. Introduction

At the close of her second presidential term (2006-2010, 2014-2018), President Michelle Bachelet gained parliamentary approval of two laws that ended the most important educational reform carried out by a Chilean government since the return of democracy in 1989: free higher education and the strengthening of state-run-universities. These added to other laws such as the School Inclusion Law (2016), the Teaching Career Law (2016), and the law creating a new National Public Education System (2017). Taken together, these were milestone initiatives in a reform process that affects all levels of the Chilean educational system and, unlike previous changes, altered some structural principles of the market-oriented model that has characterized the country in recent decades. Although the two previous governments (Bachelet 2006-2010 and Piñera 2010-2014) implemented educational reforms in response to two powerful waves of student protest, the modifications under both governments were negligible compared to the package we just described. Why did important policy outcomes not occur during the two governments in which protest was at its peak, but in a third government in which they were minor in comparison?

In this paper, we analysed the period 2006-2018 as a case study in which the existence of chaining mechanisms between different protest waves—which, over time, reinforced the student movement's impact on educational policy—is the explanatory key. Our study responds to the call—emanating from the social sciences in general (Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Pierson 2004) and from the study of social movements in particular (Bosi *et al.* 2016; McAdam and Sewell, Jr. 2001)—for the adoption of a longitudinal perspective that engage with causality in complex social phenomena through the study of specific mechanisms. While the literature on social movements' policy outcomes counts with an important accumulation of studies with a long-time focus (Uba 2009), they mostly rely on quantitative designs that do not account for specific causal mechanisms.

The proposed medium-term approach aims to overcome the "action-reaction" logic that has inspired a large portion of studies concerned with the political consequences of social movements. The focus on a broad time frame makes it possible to identify the effects on public policy of different iterations of protest waves. This perspective not only allows us to track the concrete efforts that social movements make to connect waves of protest between them, but also processes that go beyond their agency. In the case that concerns us, the intertemporal accumulation between successive waves of protest and other political processes managed to supersede the agenda-setting stage of public policy and generated an impact that later materialized in far-reaching educational reforms. To account for this result, we develop the concept of chaining mechanisms and apply it to the case at hand. As we will explain below, we distinguish between two types of chaining mechanisms, strategic and inertial. We identify two specific mechanisms of each kind to account for the policy impact of the Chilean student movement: confrontation, demand refinement, incorporation of former activists, and political commitment.

The article makes several contributions. Theoretically, it proposes an analytical framework that seeks to move beyond the "action-reaction" logic that has prevailed in the study of public policy outcomes of social movements. In a related way, it makes advances in the theorization of intertemporal outcomes, which have been pointed out by several authors as a frontier in the study of the policy consequences of social mobilizations (Bosi 2016; Bosi and Uba 2009; Giugni *et al.* 1999). Empirically, we add to the abundant literature on the Chilean student movements[1], with an original explanation of its intertemporal policy outcome. Studies on the 2011-2013 protest cycle of the Chilean student movement have stressed its limited effects on the educational

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[1] Determinants and dynamics of mobilization have been extensively dealt with for example by Ancelovici and Guzman-Concha 2019; or Disi Pavlic 2018.

policy of the Piñera government (Bellei *et al.* 2014; Carimán Linares 2014; Donoso 2017). By joining the studies that adopt an extended time of analysis, and adding a particular concern for causal mechanisms, we provide a more accurate account of the complex process that unfolded between the cycle of protests opened in 2006[2] and reforms conducted until 2018. It also implies a methodological contribution, to precisely show how chaining mechanisms work, following Beach's (2016) framework.

The work counts with three main sections. In the first section, we review the literature on the policy outcomes of social movements and we answer the call for an intertemporal approach to social movements' policy outcomes by proposing the concept of chaining mechanism. In the second section, we develop the article's research design: we present our mechanism-based single case approach and we justify the case selection; and we lay out our fine-grained qualitative data gathering and analysis strategy. In the third section, we empirically examine the four chaining mechanisms, explaining how they operated to produce the outcome. We conclude with a few observations about the case study and its theoretical and methodological implications.

2. Beyond "action-reaction" models: intertemporal effects, chaining mechanisms, and public policies

As part of this theoretical framework, we first define policy outcomes and review the main advances and challenges in this field. Second, we take up the challenge of incorporating the intertemporal dimension related with the production of these outcomes. Building on previous works which stress the role of mechanisms to explain social movement outcomes (Andrews 2001; Kolb 2007), we propose the concept of chaining mechanism, which allow different protest waves (and their related effects) to be connected in the medium term. As will be seen, this proposal involves differentiating clearly between social movements and protest waves, as well as distinguishing between strategic and inertial chaining mechanisms.

The consequences of social movements have attracted increasing interest in recent years (Amenta *et al.* 2010; Bosi *et al.* 2016), along three main dimensions: biographical, cultural and political (Bosi and Uba 2009; Chabanet and Giugni 2010). In this work, we are interested in the political consequences, which are those that affect the form of government and power relations in a given society in one way or another (Chabanet and Giugni 2010, 147). Within this dimension, we focus specifically on the consequences of the movements on policies.

Students of the links between protest and public policies have assessed that social movements' impact capacity declines as the various stages of the policy-making process unfold (Amenta *et al.* 2010; López Leyva 2012). In this sense, while movements typically enjoy the capacity to change the political agenda, their influence diminishes sharply in the subsequent stages of policy design, implementation, and evaluation. We think that the literature may improve on how it takes into account the delayed effects that can occur later in the policy process, even in the absence of contentious actions. From our perspective, the alleged incapacity of social movements to have substantive impact beyond the agenda-setting phase of public policy should be nuanced, given that it is usually justified by short-term studies linking a specific cycle of protests with their most immediate results. Indeed, much of the work on the political effects of the movements has concentrated on action-reaction models, which emphasize the immediate capacity of protests to grab the attention of elites, public opinion or political actors, and to generate responses (Andrews 2001, 74). This same kind of time-reductionist bias appears in studies that explain policy change through government alternation, leaving out of their explanation earlier events, such as social mobilization that might have significantly affected the electoral campaign, the programmatic offer of political parties and, ultimately, the electoral results. This kind of effort

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[2] Some recent efforts report policy outcomes, but do not focus their analysis on this topic (Donoso y Somma 2019; Olivares-L and Carrasco-Hidalgo, 2020; Paredes 2019).

limits our analytical capacity to capture medium-term effects, which often occur gradually, as a result of different iterations between social and political actors.

To go beyond this short-term view, several authors have suggested considering intertemporal connections between protest waves and their outcomes (Chabanet and Giugni 2010). This perspective, on the gains of a movement over an extended period, coincides with the concern for cumulative effects (Silva 2015, 28). It is, as well, a reminder of the importance of adopting broader time frames (Amenta *et al.* 2010; Bosi *et al.* 2016; Bosi and Uba 2009) which capture the slow-moving processes that lay behind concrete outcomes (Amenta *et al.* 2010, 297) [3].

As already mentioned in the introduction, the social movement's policy outcomes literature counts with important contributions based on long-time analysis (Uba 2009). The quantitative focus of most of this research has proven useful to estimate the effects of mobilization on different outcomes, but is less suitable to unveil the causal mechanisms at play as recognized by leading scholars of the field (King et al 2007, 1228; Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1483). In this work, we propose an approach that develops thinking on intertemporal effects by connecting different and successive protest and public policy cycles through the notion of chaining mechanism.

We base our definition on Hernes's (1998, 74) conceptualization of causal mechanisms. According to this author, a mechanism "is a set of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of them. A mechanism is not so much about 'nuts and bolts' as about 'cogs and wheels' – the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced". Consequently, we define chaining mechanisms as those series of events that operate both inside and outside a given social movement, and allow different protest waves (and their associated effects) to be inter-temporally connected with each other. We distinguish two main types of chaining. The first we call *strategic* chaining mechanisms. These refer to actions of the movement that serve to connect different protest waves. These mechanisms contribute to the movement's continuity, with relevant effects such as maintaining the demands of previous waves and analysing past strategies when in the process of defining concrete present-day steps. The second type of chaining goes beyond the agency and strategic decisions of the movement itself, but is linked to those effects of a protest cycle that may affect political process *a posteriori*, whether or not social actors are still mobilizing. We call these mechanisms *inertial* chainings, because although they originate in the actions of the movement, they later unfold independently of them.

This conceptual proposition fits into the broader frame of political mediation, which has gained weight in the literature when it comes to explaining policy results (Amenta 2014; Giugni 2004; Giugni *et al.* 1999). This perspective discards explanations in terms of the direct effects of movements on public policy, and has called for the abandonment of claims to having found factors that ensure a capacity to impact any given situation (such as strategies, political contexts, forms of organization, etc.), while promoting a focus that combines these types of variables with the general political context (Amenta *et al.* 2010, 296). Through the analysis of chainings, it is possible to combine and connect movements' internal elements with more general aspects of the political system in a time-sensitive perspective that allows the causal mechanisms explaining intertemporal policy outcomes to be revealed. In this way we hope to achieve a thorough understanding of the policy outcomes, which takes into account how they are largely tributaries of previous mobilizations, even when it does not appear to be so from a reductionist temporal perspective.

The literature highlights the relevance of causal mechanisms in understanding the political impact of movements' outcomes. Kolb has argued that "any substantial theory of social movements and political change" needs to consider causal mechanisms to explain how social movements' activities can lead to social change

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[3] Unlike the literature that has dealt with spillover effects between movements (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), our interest regards the interrelated effects of different cycles of protest within a single movement.

(Kolb 2007, 3). Previously, Andrews had insisted on the importance of transcending the short-term to consider the long-term consequences of social movements (Andrews 1997) as well as to unveil the mechanisms that account for social movements' influence on political institutions (Andrews 2001). Our proposition builds on their work but transcends it by incorporating delayed effects that connect to movements' actions but are beyond their control (due to inertial mechanisms).

The concept of chaining mechanism also builds on previous relevant efforts on social movements' continuity. In her seminal work Taylor recognized three different sorts of actions that allow movements to maintain linkages between different moments of upsurge: "…through promoting the survival of activist networks, sustaining a repertoire of goals and tactics, and promoting a collective identity that offers participants a sense of mission and moral purpose" (Taylor 1989, 762). This framework has inspired different researchers that have dealt with phenomena related to our strategic chaining mechanisms from different perspectives, such as the movements' organization, memory and narrative analysis (Polletta 2006; della Porta *et al.* 2018; Tilly 2002).

For the inertial chaining mechanism, we build on the "eventful protest" literature, which underlines the relevance of important events on later developments (Della Porta 2008; Moore 2011; Sewell 1996). This agenda has been mostly concerned with the "… cognitive, affective and relational transformative impacts on the very movements that carry them out (Della Porta 2008, 27)". Our proposition aims to look beyond the scope of social movements when scrutinizing the delayed consequences of past contentious actions, bringing into the analysis the delayed effects on policy outcomes.

3. A time-sensitive case study research design

After framing the research question theoretically, we design a time-sensitive case study that allows us to highlight the medium-term causal processes that led to policy outcomes attributable to student mobilization in Chile. We follow the standard steps in research design: research strategy, case selection, description of empirical materials, collection and analysis.

As for research strategy, the existence of several occurrences of protest waves and policy outcomes since the Penguin Revolution of 2006 could be considered an advantageous setting for a comparative analysis related to the consequences of the different waves. This would be the most adequate methodological decision from an action-reaction perspective. However, it would be misleading to consider the cases as independent, and to split apart early mobilization and later outcomes. On the contrary, our strategy of a single case study allows us to create an analysis combining earlier episodes of mobilization with outcomes that could otherwise appear unconnected. This medium-term design enables us to track down the early instances in which a complex sequence, which would eventually lead to policy outcomes, is set. The single-case research design is also the most adequate for a mechanism-based approach (George and Bennett 2005). The in-depth analysis, performed through different techniques, allows us to trace the events that compose each mechanism, and thus to unfold the complex path through which mobilization as an independent variable produces its policy outcome.

The results of the student mobilizations in Chile are particularly appropriate for developing the concept of chaining mechanism. The education reforms of Michelle Bachelet's second government constituted a major, multi-level change to the Chilean educational system, substantially different from the previous amendments taken since the return of democracy. A significant number of laws were approved during this period on the initiative of the Executive branch[4]. Together, these initiatives represented an increase in public spending on

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[4] The most important were Laws No 20,835 and No 20,832 on pre-school education (2015); the Law on School Inclusion No. 20,845 (2016); the Teaching Career Law, No. 20,903 (2016); the law creating a new National System of

education to the order of 2% of GDP, financed for the most part by tax reform (Ministerio de Educación 2017). While some researchers have underlined the limits of these reforms (Guzmán-Concha 2017), they certainly represent a policy change of exceptional scope. This is striking since the literature on the Chilean policy-making process has shown a reform-adverse orientation (Olavarria-Gambi 2016). In this context, the transformation of education policy beyond institutional gridlock is an exceptional outcome, which makes it particularly suited for exploratory theorizing (Seawright and Gerring 2008). The case is also a good test for chaining mechanisms because it concerns students. Student militancy is by definition short-lived; therefore, these movements face major challenges in terms of agency being oriented towards intertemporal accumulation. Prone to policy stability and unfavourable to the presence of chaining mechanisms, the case may offer lessons for investigations of this phenomenon in other areas and contexts.

The period under study must be precisely considered in order to undertake an intertemporal analysis of our hypothesis and the alternatives. The time frame of recent literature on the Chilean student movement has varied, largely due to differences in research questions. Studies of the student movement in Chile have included the entire post-Pinochet democratic period starting in 1990 (Bidegain 2017; Donoso 2017; Palacios-Valladares 2017), while others have focused on the 2011-2012 protest cycle (Bellei and Cabalin 2013; Tricot 2012, 201). Faced with these long or short interval alternatives, we define the relevant period for this study as being from 2006 to 2018. In 2006, the protest cycle known as the "Penguin Revolution" took place, marking an important precedent in terms of its magnitude, organization and protest platform (Donoso 2013). We hold that this protest cycle is the starting point for the causal sequence that led to the results observed ten years later, during the second presidential term of Michelle Bachelet.

Regarding data collection, we combined primary and secondary sources. We conducted more than 50 interviews between 2013 and 2018 with relevant political and social actors during the study period (2006-2018). At the political level, we interviewed high level decision makers that were directly involved with the Education field and the political answers to the student protests and demands. For instance, we interviewed three education ministers (from the 2002-2006, 2006-2010 and 2014-2018 periods), two high ranking Education Ministry advisors (from the 2010-2014 and 2014-2018 periods), the President of the 2006 Presidential Advisor Council for the Quality of Education, and several parliamentarians involved in education matters. The selection of political figures respected the political diversity of the Chilean party system, including members of the whole political spectrum. Regarding the student activists, we interviewed university and secondary leaders involved in the different waves of protests. We took care of counting with the point of view of the main political streams of the movement (from partisan groups to autonomous ones) as well as representing the territorial diversity of the country. Regarding the latter, we interviewed leaders from the capital city (Santiago) and from other nine regions of the country, from North to South (Atacama, Antofagasta, Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Maule, Bío Bío, Araucanía, Los Lagos and Magallanes). On addition to the recorded interviews, we conducted non-participant observation in demonstrations and student meetings during 2011-2013, sharing numerous informal interactions with student activists. Besides this, we performed an extensive secondary source review in order to gather additional relevant material. This review included documentary production related to the student movement (press releases, minutes of meetings, etc.), party actors (political programs, for example) and government documents (reports, briefings, etc.). These sources were complemented by an exhaustive scrutiny of the press over the course of the study period.

Public Education (No. 21,040, 2017); the Higher Education Law (No 21,091, 2017), and the Law of State Universities (No 21,094, 2017).

The collected material was analysed through the qualitative data analysis software NVivo, in order to identify sequences of events and mechanisms leading up to the outcome, the 2015-2018 reforms. To turn this empirical material into evidence for our argument, we were guided by classic principals of qualitative work. We triangulated information through multiple sources and followed the standard saturation principle when analysing our data and upon building our explanation of the case. This analytical approach allowed us to avoid the risk of reproducing biased accounts usually present in various actors' points of view.

When laying out the chaining mechanisms in our empirical analysis, we complemented our narrative with a stylized presentation of the causal mechanism. In this regard, we follow the framework of Beach (2016, 15), who correctly argues that "… it is very difficult to trace systematically if there is evidence of the process when we are not told what the process is that is being traced".

In the next section we lay out our account of the case, based on four chaining mechanisms, that link the student movement's successive waves of protests with the policy outcomes of Bachelet's second government.

4. Chaining mechanisms in action

In this section, we present the layout of the four chaining mechanisms we identified and the empirical evidence that sustains our claim. By doing so, we produce a narrative - analytic rather than chronological - that highlights the causal determinants of the policy outcome resulting from student mobilization. We do so while keeping in mind that our main "challenge is to determine when an observed change is still considered the result of protest activities" (Bosi and Uba 2009).

We distinguish between strategic and inertial chaining mechanisms. Specifically, we identify two of each type in the case study. Confrontation refers to the adoption - based on previous experiences - of a position closed to negotiations with party actors (both government and opposition) during the protests of 2011-2013. Demand refinement goes beyond the simple aggregation of the demands of different waves of protest. Through demand refinement, the movements articulate the demands of different waves of protest, elaborating complex set of demands and propositions. This mechanism led to a comprehensive educational proposal, which promoted a new relationship between state and market. It explicitly embraced and deepened many demands of the 2006 protest cycle, connecting them with the 2011 University student demands. In terms of the two inertial mechanisms, we propose the incorporation of former activists and political commitment. The former considers the incorporation of ex-student leaders into political institutions, bringing an agenda heavily influenced by their experience as student activists. The latter deals with the political commitment adopted by Bachelet in her 2013 presidential candidacy, as well as during her second government, moved by what she experienced in her first administration and the profound impression caused by the 2011-2012 protest cycle.

The causal process that led to Bachelet's educational reforms is represented below (Graphic 1). Three waves of protest are indicated, the first massive but short-lived, the second massive and extended, and the third more fragmented, although relatively extended. The first two led to reactions from the political authorities, but the most important policy outcome by far, the reforms of the second Bachelet government, occurred after a significant time lag. They were in fact the result of the chaining mechanisms referred to above, and not a reaction to the cycle of protest at the nearest point in time. In the development of each one of the mechanisms, we give more details about this process through an analytical narrative which operates like zooming in Graphic 1.

Figure 1 - Protest waves, chaining mechanisms, and policy outcomes in Chile (2006-2018)

Source: Elaborated by the authors

4.1 Strategic chaining mechanism 1: Confrontation

"We didn't trust Piñera or anybody, that was the point.
The *Concertación*[5] betrayed us in a certain way.
From the right we expected to be screwed much more.
And we weren't going to trust the Concertación again
since they had already screwed us. It was obvious."

President of a university student federation in 2011
(personal interview, August 2013)

This quote illustrates one of the most remarkable characteristics of the cycle of the student protests of 2011-2013: the student movement's deep distrust of all the political parties that had parliamentary representation. This sentiment turned into one of the movement's strategic positions, that of total opposition to any agreement or alliance with the different party actors, whether from the ruling party or the opposition. Moreover, even

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[5] The *Concertación* (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) was the center-left political coalition that governed Chile between 1990 and 2010.

when open to dialogue, the position of the student leadership was to discuss without "lifting the occupations" of education buildings or suspending other protest actions. This strategy of sustained confrontation is directly linked to the experience of the student protests of 2006, in which the movement stopped its protest actions to start a dialogue with the government, without achieving relevant policy outcomes. This situation led to major frustration which later oriented mobilized students toward defining their courses of action from 2011 onwards.

At the peak of the Penguin Revolution of 2006, with hundreds of high schools occupied throughout the country, President Bachelet called a Presidential Advisory Council to analyse the students' demands and generate inputs for an education reform bill. Summoning a council like this is a typical short-term policy response towards social mobilization. In this case, the government's offer demanded that the students return to classes, an issue that divided the movement. While some factions perceived the government as a potential ally, others believed that it had no genuine will to reform (Bidegain 2015; Donoso 2013).

Finally, the position favouring participation in the dialogue panel and halting the protests prevailed. However, towards the end of their working period, the students withdrew from the council, noting that its report did not address demands for structural change in the system. The subsequent disappointment would fuel the memory of betrayal explicit in the quote which opens this section. The report was used as input by the Chilean Congress and in 2009 a new General Education Law was approved and enacted. The students considered it a superficial reform that failed to address the most important, structural demands of the movement. As a result, broad sectors of the student population – well beyond the leaders involved in the Presidential Council - experienced the process as a "betrayal" by Bachelet's government (von Bülow and Bidegain 2015).

After this experience, the Chilean student movement created and sustained a narrative which kept this memory alive in its collective discourse and which was influential to their strategic decision-making in the protest cycle that began in 2011. Dozens of interviews we conducted with student leaders of the 2011 protest cycle and the analysis of the meeting minutes of the Confederation of Students of Chile (CONFECH) assemblies reveal a widespread feeling of distrust towards politicians of different stripes, a sentiment anchored in the betrayal of 2006. For instance, according to a leader of the Universidad de la Frontera "This is not a fight against Piñera, it is a fight against the political class, from Pinochet to the Concertación, which endorsed this model"[6]. This distrust resulted in a confrontational stance towards the authorities and in a strategic decision: any step taken toward dialogue would not involve the cessation of protest activities, unlike the experience of 2006. The difficulties of resuming the protests in 2008, and thereby influencing the parliamentary debate of the General Law of Education, served as a lesson for student militancy which later affected its positions in 2011. The thoughts of a secondary school leader exemplify this situation:[7]

> When we were invited to the first dialogue table [in 2011], (we said) 'go fuck yourself' literally. We are not going to lock ourselves in. Because they told us: 'Stop the occupations now and we'll sit down here to talk, and we'll talk about everything'. But wait, in 2006 we did the same thing, and now we're not going to play their game. So they can go back where they came from, with their proposals, and we're going to continue with our mobilizations.

The analysis of the interviews conducted, as well as the analysis of 50 meeting minutes of the 2011 and 2012 CONFECH assemblies, makes clear that this kind of thinking was widely spread within university and secondary students who participated in the protests that took place between 2011 and 2013 and constituted a

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[6] Unpublished meeting minute of the CONFECH Assembly of June 16th, 2011. This assembly took place in La Serena, Coquimbo region.
[7] Personal interview, August 2013.

sort of "common sense" between students. In the case of the quote transcribed above, it should be noted that the interviewee was a secondary school student, so the "learning" cannot be attributed to a generational factor but to the agentic capacity of the student movement to connect past and present protest waves of protest.

Throughout the cycle, the options which prevailed were those of protest-based confrontation, maintaining distrust of the negotiation opportunities, and, if participating in dialogues with political actors, continued mobilizations. As one interviewee pointed out, the "ghost of 2006" was always present in the student assemblies when discussing whether to accept or not the authorities' invitations to negotiate:

> 2006 was a ghost that everyone referred to. When debating if to accept the governmental invitations to dialogue, I assure you that every five interventions, at least one was as follows: 'Dude, they are not going to screw us like in 2006'. It was a general feeling, a transversal feeling, the feeling that we failed in 2006 due to joining this Presidential Advisory Commission. The consequence was an absolute mistrust. If you cannot even trust to sit down and talk… In what can you trust?[8]

The strength of the memory of the 2006 cycle of protest, strategically cultivated by the student organizations involved, allowed the mobilization to grow stronger, which was decisive for its final policy outcome.

Table 1. Radicalization chaining mechanism

Causal Condition (X)	Part 1: Betrayal	Part 2: Collective Memory	Outcome (Y)
2006 Penguin Revolution	President Bachelet calls a Presidential Advisory Council which is later analysed by the students as a manoeuvre to end the mobilization without promoting real change.	Student movement creates a narrative to keep this memory alive in its collective discourse (and make decisions on this basis).	A widespread feeling of distrust towards politicians of different stripes fuelled the second cycle of protest (2011-2012) and influenced decisions during this period and later in the process, closing the possibility of negotiating with politicians.

Source: Elaborated by the authors

4.2 Strategic chaining mechanism 2: Demand refinement

The second strategic chain highlighted in this study refers to the student movement's ability to generate a platform of demands that led to a coherent, credible alternative to the dominant views of educational policy (Bellei and Cabalin 2013; Kubal and Fisher 2016; Somma 2012). By criticizing the market-oriented educational model established under the Pinochet dictatorship, from 2006 onwards the student movement

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[8] Personal interview with the General Secretary of a 2011 University Student Federation, conducted on June 2013.

pushed a series of demands that sought to redistribute the relative weight of the state and the market in educational policy.

The Penguin Revolution of 2006 highlighted the need for structural educational reform in primary and secondary education. It was an ambitious platform that rapidly exceeded the circumstantial demands with which the protests began. Its main points were the repeal of the Constitutional Organic Law of Education, the elimination of the full school day, the removal of education from the municipal mandate and the banning of profiteering by publicly funded establishments.

As we have already seen, the legislative reform that resulted from the Penguin Revolution (the General Education Law of 2009) did not meet the mobilized students' expectations. With the outbreak of the 2011 protest cycle, the student movement raised the flag of the 2006 demands once again. In this new protest cycle, this time led by university students, demands for structural change in higher education—free education as a social right and co-government, among others—were added (Bidegain and von Bülow 2021). Together, these secondary and university-focused demands constituted an encompassing program of educational reforms aimed at changing the structure of the educational model.

The accumulative elaboration and refinement of these demands was largely due to organizational efforts within the movement, which kept the debate alive even in moments of low mobilization. Following Taylor's framework, the linkage between waves of protest was achieved through the sustainment of activist networks that fostered shared goals and strategies (Taylor 1989, 762). A landmark event exemplifying this type of effort was the organization, in 2009, of the National Congress for Public Education. According to one of the organizers of the Congress, the objective of the Federation he presided was to "make visible some propositions, to switch from a reactive logic to an offensive one based on propositions"[9]. This initiative, led by the university federations, brought together secondary school students, teachers, education officials, parents, etc., and involved the previous holding of local and regional preparatory assemblies[10]. In a concluding document, the 2006 demands were restated and deepened, and included an end to profit-making in state-funded establishments, the termination of co-payment, and university-level demands that gained strength and depth in 2011. The latter included free education for the three poorest quintiles—during the protest cycle the demand would grow into free education for all—, enforcement of the ban on profit-making in universities, legally recognized three-tier administration for higher education, etc.

The Piñera government's policy responses to the protests that took place in 2011 and 2012 were not significant changes, as the general logic of the system remained intact (Kubal and Fisher 2016, 231). However, the core of demands consolidated through intertemporal accumulation made its way – as we will see next – to the second Bachelet government, which designed reforms inspired by the 2006 and 2011 student claims (Palacios-Valladares 2017). This demand refinement process would not have occurred without a strategic effort from the most organized of student movement actors.

4.3 Inertial chaining mechanism 1: Incorporation

The trajectory of student movement leaders who later took up positions within the political system, either in the Administration or in the Chamber of Representatives, was crucial to shaping and passing the reforms. While these appointments or elections were largely due to the activist and media capital they had accumulated in their capacity as student leaders, they did not belong to a movement strategy. On the contrary, the movement distanced itself from those who took this step. For example, in the case of the parliamentary elections, the

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[9] Personal interview with a 2009 University Federation President, conducted on August 2013.
[10] Source: *Biobiochile.cl*. Available at: https://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/2009/09/06/profesores-dicen-que-exito-del-congreso-de-educacion-confirma-que-lge-no-cuenta-con-apoyo-social.shtml/ [Accessed August 15, 2018].

Confederation of Students of Chile (CONFECH) came out with an explicit statement that "the student movement has no candidates."[11] Even so, the participation of these leaders forms an inertial yet decisive link connecting the protest with the policy outcomes. Their access to these positions is the product of an accumulation of biographical achievements and in the end influenced the policy outcomes of the student movement.

Table 2. Demand refinement chaining mechanism

Causal condition (X)	Part 1: Building demands	Part 2: Foster and extend the platform of demands	Outcome (Y)
2006 Penguin revolution	Protesters build and broadcast a platform of demands.	Student actors organize and elaborate programmatic reflection (for example in 2009 with the National Congress for Public Education).	The 2006 demands were re-stated and deepened, and can be traced until the 2014-2018 reforms.

Source: Elaborated by the authors

Individual and collective trajectories emerged out of the student movement and gained stability in the electoral arena. The most relevant collective project were Democratic Revolution (RD) and Autonomous Left (IA). RD originated within the student movement and became a party that claimed more than 10,000 members in 2016 (García Castillo 2019). Up to 2017 it was primarily known for its major figure, Giorgio Jackson, who was one of the main leaders of the 2011 student movement. Smaller, not yet a political party, IA operated as a platform for its most visible member, Gabriel Boric, also a former student leader. Both were elected as representatives in 2013. Although the public recognition of the two and their campaign teams sprung directly from the student mobilization, these candidacies were not strategic decisions of the student movement. The same is true of representatives Camila Vallejo and Karol Cariola, both student leaders and Communist Party activists.

The presence of these representatives was critical to pushing the student issue through the policy process. As Giorgio Jackson said:

> The truth is that without the mobilizations of 2006 and 2011 we would not be currently debating any of these issues. The inclusion law that is currently being discussed in its final stages is historic because it begins to mark the change in Chilean education that we have been pushing for since the student mobilizations.[12]

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[11] Source: http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/2013/11/06/como-enfrenta-el-movimiento-estudiantil-las-elecciones-del-17n/ [Accessed August 28, 2018].

[12] Source: Radio UChile. Available at: http://radio.uchile.cl/2015/01/27/valentina-saavedra-esta-no-es-la-reforma-demandada-por-el-movimiento-estudiantil/ [Accessed August 15, 2018].

Some might argue that the quote above is evidence of the agenda-making power of the social movement. But the fact that it was pronounced in 2015, nine years after the events of 2006, invites another interpretation. Here we observe a political actor contextualizing the movement's present (2015) actions over a much larger time span. We have to consider this action as the actualization in present time of past events, and pay attention to this inertial process that contributed to putting pressure on the government, no longer coming from the streets but from inside the political system.

Alongside the action of these representatives, the inclusion of former student leaders in Bachelet's administration also played an important part in achieving policy outcomes. As for the former student leaders' candidatures, it was not a strategy of the movement, but an executive branch decision aimed at empowering the teams devoted to the preparation and passage of the reforms. We identify two modalities of participation. The first was "critical collaboration," a term coined by the Democratic Revolution in an attempt to preserve some ambiguity regarding its role. In applying this concept, RD decided to support the Bachelet government in the latter's carrying out of reforms, even though it was not formally part of the government coalition. Gonzalo Muñoz, one of the RD advisors at the Ministry of Education describes critical collaboration as follows:

> We were available to our people in collaborating the promotion and execution of a set of reforms that we understood were going to be in dispute. Beyond the fact that the New Majority government had announced a set of important reforms, we knew that the key would in the end be in the details and in the manner in which they were implemented. We first had to stake it all on framing the reform according to our vision.[13]

The second form of participation was more traditional and corresponded to the Communist Party's (PC) formal inclusion in the "New Majority," Michelle Bachelet's campaign coalition. As in the previous case, former student leaders also took up positions within the government. These individuals played an important role in the preparation of the contents, and paid particular attention to making sure they reflected the demands previously made by the student movement. From the government's perspective, the aim was to appease at least part of the student movement in order to avoid massive protests. As Nicolás Eyzaguirre[14] says, "If we had not had a strong dialogue with RD and the strong involvement of the PC, the student movement would have made our lives much more complicated."[15] As the former Minister of Education recognizes, without the integration of these former student leaders into the Administration, student protests would have been stronger. This possibility would have opened a flank with potential hindering consequences to the governmental capacity to plan and implement the reforms. It is safe to assume that without the protest cycle that initiated in 2011 the RD and communist former student activists wouldn't have been invited to integrate the Ministry. Moreover, it is clear that the four former leaders that were elected deputies in 2013 (all in their twenties) would not have had such a meteoric political career without the preceding protest cycle. Since they had a very important role in the legislative debates and the other former students played important roles in the Executive, the inclusion of student movement figures was an inertial chaining that allowed public policy outcomes to occur, as they finally did at the end of Bachelet's second term.

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[13] Personal interview, November 2017.

[14] Minister of Education from March 2014 to June 2015, Eyzaguirre continued to be involved in the passage of the bills of interest in this study in his later capacity as Minister Secretary General of the Presidency and Minister of Finance.

[15] Personal interview, May 2018.

Table 3. Incorporation chaining mechanism

Causal condition (X)	Part 1: student protests affect the elections	Part 2: former student leaders enter the political system	Outcome (Y)
2011 cycle of protest	The largest cycle of protest in Chile in decades makes education one of the main issues in the subsequent 2013 national elections.	Several former student leaders are elected deputies in the legislative elections and other former student leaders are included in by the elected president in the Education Ministry team.	Former student leaders promote educational reforms from within the political system.

Source: Elaborated by the authors

4.4 Inertial chaining mechanism 2: Commitment

The second inertial chain consists of the impact that the student mobilizations of 2006 and 2011 had on those who pushed through the changes in education already described—primarily, President Bachelet and her closest collaborators. The Bachelet government's reaction to the 2006 protests was meagre compared to the expectations of the movement, but the mobilization made an impression on the President that accompanied her through to her second presidential campaign in 2013. In that sense, they certainly were "eventful protests", in a way that has not been envisioned by the literature, which has focused on the effects on movement members (Della Porta, 2008; della Porta et al., 2018). The mobilizations of 2011 shocked the political system and had a strong impact on Bachelet's second presidential campaign, both in content—education being a key reform—and support. At the beginning of her 2013 campaign, she credited the students for making the country "aware of how indispensable a quality education reform is", acknowledging that it was "in part thanks to the students, who were on the streets for almost a year, gaining support from many people"[16]. This recognition is related to the 2011 student mobilization, which altered the public's perception of the matter and led to a different scenario from that of 2006-2008[17]. She also admitted that "reforms were left undone" in her first term.[18] Thus, there is an explicit recognition on the part of the candidate as to the role of the student movement in positioning the educational issue in the political agenda, and in this case, in her legislative program. In this context, Bachelet took the decision to channel the student demands for education politically by including the issue as a major campaign commitment.

[16] Source: *La Tercera*. Available at: http://www.latercera.com/noticia/bachelet-defiende-la-gestion-en-educacion-de-su-gobierno-y-afirma-que-entiende-la-desconfianza-de-los-estudiantes / [Accessed August 15, 2018].

[17] Public opinion poll data show that the number of Chileans that considered Education as the country's main problem jumped from 2,6% in 2010 to 10,15% in 2012. Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org

[18] Source: *La Tercera*. Available at: http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/bachelet-defiende-la-gestion-en-educacion-de-su-gobierno-y-afirma-que-entiende-la-desconfianza-de-los-estudiantes / [Accessed August 15, 2018].

The accumulation of these sequenced events— Penguin protests; criticized reform; 2011 protests—led Bachelet to commit to education reform. In addition, It should be noted that Bachelet and her team's strong feeling of responsibility regarding this issue went beyond their history with student protests and poor education reform. It also resonated more deeply, as stated by Nicolás Eyzaguirre:

> President Bachelet and many of her closest allies (...) we always understood that we had unfinished business (…) not only from an ethical imperative perspective, but also looking towards the country's development. So beyond what students brought up, (…) the diagnostic was the same.[19]

These deep roots in the choice to make education at the centre of her second term was key to the first wave of reforms in the first 18 months of her government, but above all to the final push in the last six months of her term, when reforms seemed to have stagnated.

In August 2013, as part of the electoral campaign, she met with current and former student leaders at the Museum of Contemporary Art, using the occasion to present the main education-related bills that she wanted to implement during her– eventual– next government. In her speech the president acknowledged her debt to the movement:

> I imagine that among many of you, you do not have a reason to trust me[20] . Probably many of you will have said several things about me, and, therefore, will have carried placards with my name – so to speak. And I want to tell you this, because I haven't come here to make jokes. I have come to tell you what my desire was in returning to Chile, and about my will to turn the fight against inequality into fundamental priorities."[21] (Michelle Bachelet, speech in meeting with student leaders, August 2013).

This frank recognition of the reasons for distrust, echoing the deep feelings of the leaders who mobilized in 2006, illustrates the intertemporal and inertial dimensions of the process. The commitment made in 2013, which became key to the finalization of the reform bills during the presidential mandate, originated in events that took place between 2006 and 2008. The way they were brought to the present in this interaction between Bachelet and former protesters played an important part in future policy outcomes.

This commitment acquired by Bachelet was key to the final production of policy outcomes despite political difficulties of all kinds that affected her mandate. Her daughter-in-law was accused of influence peddling, and her political heir and Minister of Interior (Chilean chief of Cabinet) Rodrigo Peñailillo had to resign in the middle of accusation for illegal financing of electoral campaigns (Gamboa and Segovia, 2016). Politically weakened, she had to appoint as Minister of Interior the conservative Christian-Democrat Jorge Burgos, a critic of her reform plan. However, at the end of her term, after another change in her cabinet, she was able to push for completing the education reform she had committed to. As a presidential adviser confirmed:

> She was the one who pushed constantly for all the commitments that had been made to the citizens. So, the fight was between the president's will to comply and those real,

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[19] Personal interview, May 2018.

[20] One of the researchers conducted non-participant observation in this meeting and noted that the distrust among large sectors of the students that attended to the activity was still palpable.

[21] Source: *The Clinic*. Available at: http://www.theclinic.cl/2013/08/09/video-inedito-del-encuentro-de-bachelet-con-camila-vallejo-y-lideres-estudiantiles/ [Accessed August 15, 2018]

technical-political complexities related to how we were progressing, and the less sincere complexities that had to do with defending particular interests or lack of programmatic conviction in what was being proposed[22].

These commitments, as we showed before, were the product of the two protest waves and their derivatives. They were particularly decisive for the final bills of the reform package, passed at the very end of the mandate. Without her personal intervention, it's highly probable that at least the last two bills of the package, voted on in 2018, would not have passed.

Table 4. Political commitment chaining mechanism

Causal condition (X)	Part 1: Unsatisfaction	Part 2: Commitment	Outcome (Y)
Reaction to the penguin mobilization	During Bachelet's first presidency, mobilizations generate a short-term reaction that left several *Concertación* politicians (including Bachelet herself) unsatisfied.	When planning a second presidential candidacy, after the 2011-2012 protests, Bachelet decides to put education at the center of her program.	Bachelet is determined to carry out the reforms she committed to, and played a decisive role in the policy outcome, against part of her coalition.

Source: Elaborated by the authors

5. Conclusion

In this study we have shown how to deepen our understanding of how social movements can affect public policy from an intertemporal approach that links protest waves and policy outcomes. For this purpose, a medium-term view was adopted that allows the interaction between social and political actors to be captured during successive government periods. This effort seeks to improve on those short-term perspectives that concentrate on an action-reaction logic in explaining the effects of protest on public policy. Theoretically speaking, it responds to recommendations in the literature calling for attention to be paid to intertemporal dynamics when accounting for the outcomes of social protest.

The research makes a conceptual contribution and applies it to an empirical case. We proposed the concept of chaining mechanisms and applied it to the case of the student mobilization in Chile and its lasting effects that led up to the landmark educational reform during Michelle Bachelet's second government in Chile (2014-2018). As we argued, to thoroughly explain this policy outcome, the different iterations of protest and public policy the country witnessed between 2006 and 2018 must be taken into account, and special attention must be given to the strategic and inertial chains that connected the different protest waves and their political consequences. We can draw various implications from the application of our conceptual framework to the case study that suggests paths for future research.

First, this approach allows us a deeper understanding of how the effects of social movements are politically mediated. Robust narratives that are not necessarily linear can unveil causes that have relevant weight but are sometimes hidden in short-term analyses. This is also a fruitful perspective to capture the interrelation of

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[22] Personal interview, April 2018.

different type of effects (biographical, cultural and political) that can operate with relative independence for some time and conjugate in specific moments, increasing the chances of policy change.

Second, the study suggests that social movements have the capacity to transcend the stage of public policy agenda-setting. However, as is clear from the case study, this requires the capacity to successfully link different protest waves. From the social movement and particularly the student movement point of view, this finding is important as social actors often experience frustration with the partial or non-existent policy outcome in response to a protest cycle. The temporalities of protest waves and public policy cycles are distinct, and this study shows that despite this situation, protest sustained over time can, under certain conditions, generate significant changes in public policy.

Third, the distinction between strategic and inertial chaining mechanisms allows us to incorporate nuances that are relevant to the study of the effects of protest waves on public policy from a novel and heuristic analytical perspective. On the one hand, we can distinguish between effects that are directly associated with social movement choices, and others that although linked to previous protest waves are beyond the movement's volition. From this perspective it becomes possible—using a broader conceptual framework more suited to complex social phenomena—to distinguish analytically between the consequences of strategic choices the movement makes and the consequences of previous actions that do not respond to the agency of social movement actors in the present.

Finally, the work leaves open various lines of research for a better understanding of elements that were beyond the reach of this first attempt at the proposal of new concepts and their application to a specific case. First, one might ask if there are social movements with greater capacity to successfully chain their different protest waves and associated consequences. Second, comparative studies would be an important step to further test the scope of this approach. A comparative perspective could help us discover other types of strategic and inertial chainings, as well as identify mechanisms that are more or less successful. Extending the universe of cases could help us significantly explore how different mechanisms operate in diverse political, economic and social contexts. Analysing chaining mechanisms in dissimilar situations could be a contribution to debates in the literature about how different mechanisms are linked to different contexts.

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