RESEARCH ARTICLE

(Il)liberal Organisation? Internal Party Democracy on the European Radical Left

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ABSTRACT: The relationship between the European radical left and democracy has come into attention due to the electoral surges of some such parties and their participation in government. Its scrutiny, however, remains ambivalent, at a time contemporary democracies are experiencing historic disruptions affecting how people engage with parties. This study offers an organisational perspective of the European radical left in order to map out and elaborate on patterns of democratic practice in this party family, as measured against a broadly liberal benchmark. Using a modified version of the internal party democracy (IPD) index developed by Rahat and Shapira (2017), the study compares fifteen parliamentary radical left parties (RLPs) from eleven European countries – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain – across the dimensions of participation, representation, competition, responsiveness and transparency. Specifically, the study outlines patterns across the IPD dimensions and investigates the extent of variation within the party family, juxtaposing it against ideological and structural distinctions among RLPs.

KEYWORDS: internal party democracy, liberal democracy, party ideology, party organisation, radical left parties

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1. Introduction

Recent scholarship offers mixed signals about the relationship between contemporary European radical left parties (RLPs) and liberal democracy. In an attempt to empirically specify interpretations of the left's relationship with democracy from an organisational perspective, this article responds to the following three research questions: What is the fortune of internal party democracy (IPD) in today's European radical left parliamentary parties and what kind of

variation exists among them? Do ideological (versus structural) features matter in accounting for this variation? How do theoretical dimensions or principles of IPD play out on the European radical left and why? These questions in turn arise from the relevant debates on left radicalism and aim to clear some of the ambivalence about RLPs among analysts, by articulating the organisational side of the story.

Contemporary European RLPs are those to the left of mainstream social democracy, with a Marxist or post-Marxist heritage, espousing an egalitarian, internationalist, largely anti-neoliberal or anti-capitalist orientation (March and Mudde 2005). In addressing them, authors call attention to left-wing populism as an 'illiberal democratic' force with a personalistic appeal embodied by a charismatic and powerful leadership voicing demagogic discourse (e.g. Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Mudde 2015). Many comparativists also treat parts of the radical left – the revolutionary and orthodox communist left – as an 'extreme left'. This party family is also often categorised as 'anti-establishment parties' (Abedi 2004), which are mostly critical but sometimes subversive and transformational opposite liberal democracy (March 2011). Caamaño and Casal Bertoa (2020) argue that 'the higher the strength of these parties, the lower the level of liberal democracy'.

Many analyses however emphasise the pluralism, openness to social movements and internal democracy in some RLPS – notably the most recent electoral spearheads, such as the Greek SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) before its incumbency and the Spanish Podemos (We Can). It is argued that this boils down to their often special relationship with social and protest movements, their radical democratic imaginaries and their emancipatory aim (e.g. Chironi and Fittipaldi 2017). Some authors identify certain RLPs as 'Populist Radical Left Parties' and emphasise the centrality of inclusion in its politics (Katsambekis and Kioupkiolis 2019; Damiani 2019). In attempting to 'democratise democracy', these parties are considered as hesitant towards representation. Rather seeking to reclaim sovereignty and instill communal decision-making as a fundamental practice in democracy (Damiani 2019, p. 303).

Similar claims were made about left-libertarian parties in the 1970s and 1980s, which operated on the intent to democratise the socialist movement and infuse it with the New Social Movements' spirit (e.g. Kitschelt 1988). Particularly voters on the left who are young may exhibit disregard for the typified features of bureaucratic operation and the delegation of representatives, seeking direct and fast political gratification (Polletta 2014). Others highlight instances of left populist discourse in history which have been de-centralised as well as personalistic, movement-based, union-based or party-based; thus qualifying the category of a new populist strain that is more inclusive (Charalambous and Ioannou 2019).

At the most basic level, how does this tension-ridden and disputed relationship of radicals with democracy as recorded in the literature translate today in terms of the conduct of their own partisan affairs? The intention here is a contribution to the above debates about the radical left and democracy, through an investigation not of the discourse, programmatic profiles, or the voters of Europe's RLPs, but rather their own organisational practice. Above all, we aim at showing if and how so the various manifestations of illiberalism exhibited by RLPs manifest themselves in party organisation. IPD is an instantiation of democratic practice within the format of political parties. Parties are the 'primary organisational vehicles of electoral democracy' and thus 'are themselves judged in terms of their democratic character' (Carty 2013, p.11). This character then, should entail and be judged upon the very principles of the electoral process.

Our contribution can clarify various issues at stake in discussions on the pathologies and enemies of democracy: populism as a new phenomenon on the radical left, suspected tensions between representation and participation, organisational narratives of democracy and parties, and social movements as alternatives to politics as usual. To advance research in this direction, the core argument here is three-fold: the radical left is not an illiberal political force in party operational terms; there is some variation in terms of IPD that mostly has ideological roots; dynamics between principles of IPD among RLPs are also largely explained by ideological features and there is no evident conflict between participation and representation. To arrive here,

a modified version of the IPD index developed by Gideon Rahat and Assaf Shapira (2017) was applied to fifteen European radical left parties from eleven countries – the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain – across the dimensions of participation, representation, competition, responsiveness and transparency.

The next section formulates four hypotheses that drive the empirical analysis and investigate the overall degree and extent of variation in IPD within the radical left in Europe. Next, the study presents and justifies a slightly modified form of the Rahat and Shapira index. The following, empirical section lays out the data, inspecting the hypotheses. The conclusions summarise the findings and briefly consider the implications of the analysis.

2. Theory and hypotheses: Internal party democracy and the radical left

The research questions – the fortune of IPD among RLPs, the relationships between IPD principles and potential explanations for these –, tap directly into debates over party organisation and its relevance in empirical and theoretical writings about democracy; particularly, a generalised investigation into patterns and conditions of IPD (see Bolin et al. 2017). To formulate hypotheses out of our research questions, thus requires connecting the theory of party organisation and IPD with radical left ideology and diversity up to today.

Initially, democracy figured prominently in communist theory. Lenin's *What is to be done* (1902) was precisely about this at the level of the revolutionary party. Accordingly, intra-party democracy is indispensible when conditions allow it to fully and fruitfully develop, but it can be tampered, constrained and modified, if it is not possible in revolutionary conditions. Above all, intra-party democracy, according to Lenin always entailed free ideas and arguments, unconstrained by petty interests and superstition. both In the 1970s, Eurocommunist argumentation valorised democratisation of the state and society (see Balampanidis 2019). The political milieus of the left are also mobilised via attitudes towards democracy; for example, the political instincts of RLP voters are aroused by authoritarian practice and heritage (Visser et al. 2014). In *Political Man* (1960), Seymour Martin Lipset posited that across the two types of political values –economic liberalism opposite convervatism and authoritarianism opposite libertarianism – the working class is economically conservative but liberal in non-economic terms. Concurrently, manifesto data suggest that socialist and communist parties pay lip service to democracy more often than rightwing parties (Volkens 2001, 106).

High variation in IPD across the party family, in terms of overall degree and across dimensions, would reveal a group of actors where the overarching ideological core does not guarantee a high or low level of democracy or a specific type of democracy. In other words, ideology would not be reflected in organisation, in accordance with Robert Michel's famous 'iron law of oligarchy' and subsequent research (Bolin et al. 2017, 164-165). Radical left ideology and thought would not carry the legitimacy of an organisational framework tying together the whole of the party family and under which democracy is guaranteed to the same extent or in the same way. Ideological schisms of a historical nature or the structural characteristics of the party body may direct variation across typological divides.

Due to the universe of RLPs being relatively plural in terms of organisational practice historically speaking, we expect multiple differences between parties in terms of degree of IPD, both in total and in particular dimensions. But given RLPs have diachronically been parties which operate for many decades now in established liberal democracies, frequently sought government office, posit democracy as one of their central ideological features, and have been influenced by

social movements and their bottom-up perspectives on politics (Smith 2016; Della Porta 2013), we can hypothesise that:

H (1) While RLPs exhibit variation between them in IPD, they are on average a significantly democratic party family, in accordance with the predominant standards of liberal democracy.

Engaging with the resonance of party ideological and structural features raised in the literature as potentially conditioning variation in IPD, our next hypothesis addresses whether and how the ideological/ideational and organisational/structural 'determinism' supported by some theories of intra-party politics yet rejected by others, holds explanatory power in the case of RLPs (see Scarrow and Webb 2017, 15). Still, to transpose intra-family ideological or organisational distinctions to the domain of IPD, one can differentiate between principles (or the dimensions) of democracy. Participatory and responsive procedures have never really divided leftist thought and practice, it was rather centralisation (not measured directly in this paper for reasons explained further down) representation and competition. Primarily, it is here that there exist distinct schools and traditions within the left.

In the whole of the radical left family, responsiveness has been a constant, especially if procedurally narrowed down to decisions about policy and government, and frequent representative bodies' meetings. Both the communists and the reformed or new left parties have held intense internal debates about government participation, which often involved the party members as well (see Olsen et al. 2010). As concerns transparency, Marxism-Leninism was conspiratorial and therefore somewhat non-transparent. On the other hand, all RLPs have diachronically published their materials and deliberations. For example, the class and demographic composition of newly elected central committees in communist parties have been systematically published in their Congress proceedings. Moreover, both participation and responsiveness have never been a theoretical problem for radicals, as an inherent feature of their worldview is militant engagement with politics. Party congresses in the broad socialist tradition have been key moments of deliberation, intellectual fervent, as well as power struggle, often ritualised and celebrated subsequently.

At the same time, RLPs, especially those of the communist type, do not adhere to a model of 'descriptive representation', whereby representatives ought to reflect those they represent demographically. In the communist tradition this is not seen as necessary for ensuring substantive representation. That is, the regulated presence of women or young or immigrant representatives does not condition policy in their interests (see Lovenduski and Norris 2003). Competitive behaviour has also been diachronically suppressed in the communist tradition especially, which dismissed it as a bourgeois ideological principle, useful for dividing the working class. Instead, comradeship was said to necessarily guide socialist struggle. Democratic centralism denoted internal discussion and contestation, to be followed by submission to the majority once concluded. This, however, could easily slip into unchallenged leaderships or expelled reformers; communist leaders enjoyed long tenures and (often) unquestioned obedience (e.g. Waller 1981).

For red-green, democratic socialist and other New Left formations, the point was different: that left-wing politics is 'a continual process', which necessitates 'collusion' and 'alliances', 'a praxis of micro-power', as opposed to the development of macro-strategies revolving around the party as the chief agent (Tormey 2005). The libertarian ethos and post-materialist perspective (known as 'new politics') of many on the New Left since the 1960s valued competition greatly, and thought it to be a chief distinguishing element of alternative organisational practice compared to the archetypical, 'monolithic', communist or socialist party. Competition also manifested into critiques of democratic centralism and the male, communist leader, among other attributes of established (western and Eastern) communism.

A more pluralist organisation would be more reflective and representative of the diverse opinions among citizens with socialist allegiances, rather than allowing for the easy imposition of

a common framework. And given diversity and pluralism the party should also be, by nature, sufficiently competitive. The legacy and fault lines of the 1960s and 1970s generated left-libertarian and democratic socialist forces. Activists in these parties embraced 'thinking for oneself instead of becoming enslaved to a particular line' (Tormey 2005). Our hypothesis in terms of factors conditioning differences in IPD among RLPs is, therefore, ideologically (and historically) specified rather than generalised across the various aspects of democracy:

H (2) The ideological heritage and profile of RLPs, especially the distinction between orthodox parties and democratic socialists (new left or red-green), is associated with differentiated levels of IPD, specifically representation and competition.

The research questions posed here also tap into debates over political party organisation and its relevance for IPD. Membership strength, for example, has been assumed to influence IPD. One can argue that the oligarchic tendencies identified by scholars like Robert Michels (1962 [1911]), can more easily prevail 'in larger organisations', where 'the need for large-scale bureaucracy is more pressing' (Bolin et al. 2017,166). To manage the activity of diverse members and ensure a certain degree of internal cohesion, leaderships of large and strong parties may have incentives to centralise power around them, effectively limiting various manifestations of internal democratic practice, such as competition, or even transparency. By contrast, small memberships may enrich the participatory and deliberative aspects of IPD. This may be because smaller groups of members may enjoy the opportunity to engage more extensively and meaningfully in party life (Allern and Pedersen 2007). But the outcome will likely be determined also by the space afforded to the base by the party elites.

On the other hand, both small and large RLPs would have incentives, like most parties, to get across to the public a democratic image (see Young 2013, 72-74), especially today that the mass party is gone. Parties with similar membership sizes operate via different party models, which influence IPD accordingly. Also, organisations of small or large sizes (for example as measured by membership strength (density)) are witnessed in both the 'more democratic', reformed or new, RLPs, and the 'less democratic', traditional communist parties. Membership size is being largely shaped by meso- and macro-level environmental factors, such as apathy, de-politicisation or the pre-eminence of the cartel party (Van Haute and Gauja 2017).

Another feature of parties that may influence IPD is the structure of the party body – unitary or coalition/factional party. Factions and tendencies in political parties perform functions, including mobilising participation in party affairs, the articulation of issue-oriented interests and the representation of certain groups (Beller and Belloni 1978). Nevertheless, as per H(2), factional and coalition parties have been the product of particular, ideological responses to political developments (see Balibar 2017). By the turn of the 1980s, parties which explicitly rejected Soviet socialism and revised or abandoned the Leninist version of the revolutionary party were more open to diverse bodies and engaged in processes of 'refoundation', 'renewal' and national roads to perestroika. By the late 1990s, the coalition or factional party became very popular among newly established forces, but it has been vehemently rejected in the Marxist-Leninist parliamentary parties. Altogether, we arrive at the following, two-fold hypothesis, concerning the influence of party structural features on IPD on the European radical left:

H (3a) Membership strength is not likely to be associated with IPD in RLPs.
H(3b) Whether RLPs are unitary or coalition parties is not likely to be associated with IPD, but rather with ideological traditions.

On the radical left, ideological traditions are loosely associated with particular strategic perspectives and in turn connect to the structural characteristics of party organisation. Coalition

parties are de facto ideologically more libertarian than unitary parties, organisational culture derives from ideological tradition. Marxists diverge foremostly on organisational questions, whether how to address nationalist movements, as concerns unions or for parties. At bottom this has been the schism between the Anarchist versus Social Democratic traditions. Here lies a tension between horizontal or vertical lines of thinking mobilisation (see Prentoulis and Thomassen 2020, 345); inclusive-cooperative collectives with distinct-undivided partisaship, or autonomous partisanship respectively.

Lastly, we are interested in the relationship between different dimensions of IPD and by extension the potential conflict between distinct democratic values on the European radical left. For national-level democracy, dimensionality is a complex issue with a long history that begins with the designation by Robert Dahl (1971) of polyarchy's two dimensions – contestation and participation. Overall, research literature has suggested repeatedly that IPD dimensions may come into conflict between them. Rahat et al. (2008) found empirical evidence that parties are unlikely to maximise inclusiveness, competitive processes and representativeness. In particular, they found that the most inclusive parties exhibited less capacity of representation and indicated only medium levels of competition. Participation in candidate selection can inhibit pluralist representation (Rahat 2009). As Rahat et al. (2008, 667) explain the mechanism in operation creating a reverse relationship between participation and representation, unlike party members who exercise individual preferences in their vote of nominees, 'members of a party committee are asked to construct the overall list of candidates that they think have the best chance of maximising the party's vote'.

By contrast, Rahat and Shapira (2017) in their empirical study of Israeli parties found that parties can be simultaneously democratic in various dimensions, including participation. At the same time, based on more detailed findings, the authors theorised that participation, competition and responsiveness are dimensions that reflect power distribution between different structures within the party (or between the leadership and the rest). While representation and transparency, on the other hand, are not expected to feed into the contestation of leadership power and should be less related to the other dimensions than these other dimensions are related between themselves (Rahat and Shapira 2017, 99).

IPD dimensions can come into tension for RLPs for similar reasons as for all other parties. Our general expectation is thus that RLPs can be more democratic in some dimensions and less democratic in others. But as already explained different historical strains of radical left thought faced certain principles of democracy from their own distinct viewpoint. The New Left which emerged in the 1960s and upon which the majority of contemporary RLPs have gradually come to model their internal practices, combined the radical democratic spirit of the critics of representative institutions back then – which promoted wider participation (sic. inclusion), direct democracy and criticism of centralist structures –, with the feminist appeal that supplanted radical organisations with a heightened sensitivity over the issue of women's representation and identity politics. Hence, non-orthodox, or non-traditional RLPs did not view representation as something which would be damaged by wider inclusion, and did consider competition (at base, pluralism) an important driving mechanism for representation. Meanwhile for the communists competition would damage working class interest representation and could breed 'opportunism' into the party or fuel instability, while minority rights were not ideologically inscribed in their doctrines and quotas would limit flexibility by the leadership.

Consequently, the relationship between separate IPD dimensions can also be connected to specific strains within the party family. Assuming that ideology is important in this respect of inter-dimensional relations in IPD, we thus expect, as our final hypothesis, that:

H (4) The operation of RLPs does not preclude being more democratic in one or more dimensions and less democratic in the others, but any associations between dimensions is likely to reflect differences between ideological sub-groups.

3. Operationalising IPD: Measurement and data collection

As democracy itself is still a contested concept both within and between distinct ideological traditions, there naturally exist competing approaches towards the operationalisation of IPD. The Rahat and Shapira index, which is utilised in this study, is built on the basis of distinct democratic principles as reflected in key procedures:

- Participation: Without participation in the affairs of a state or party, the organisation will lack legitimacy because it will manifest only limited inclusiveness and so breed elitism rather than polyarchy (Dahl 1971). The participatory school teaches that parties are instruments for member activism; democratic citizenship is not only about voting, but also about taking part in decision-making and debates within the contours of democratic organisations (Pateman 2012). With participation comes also a greater sense of belonging and commitments to rights as benefits that are fundamental for citizenship (Bellamy 2001), what Dahl (1998) called 'enlightened understanding'. Through the index, three procedures through the public or party members can or cannot influence decision-making are examined: candidate and leadership selection as processes for selecting the chief decision-makers (e.g. Verba et al. 1995); participation in ideological discussions, about policy, identity or ideology; and the exercise of influence on the party election platform (Gauja 2013).

- Representation: With the starting point being that delegation of authority is unavoidable in any reasonably sized group, as well as desirable for shared interests (Landemore 2017, 59), representation is a mechanism through which the various groups in society are offered access to government. For parties, representation reflects an organisation's tendency to include in its key positions a variety of social groups. A key indicator in the literature concerns women's representation, but one can also search beyond gender and into other social groups as well, such as the young, immigrants, senior citizens, or residents of a geographical periphery (Schmitter and Karl 2001).

- Competition: An idea rooted in the Schumpeterian conception of democracy is that voters can choose between several alternatives (see Schumpeter 1942). Competition is traditionally attributed great importance in the literature about state-level democracy because it contributes significantly to other democratic principles, such as responsiveness and accountability (Rahat 2009; Schmitter and Karl 2001). The index measures this dimension by asking if a party maintains competition for key positions: specifically, party leader and parliamentary nominees.

- Responsiveness: Being responsive to voters or members is a prerequisite of bottom-up democratic practice, which assumes that all legitimacy lies in the demos (the people) (Powell 2004). Hence, representatives serve the function of delegates and need to be responsive to the demands of the represented (Hazan and Rahat 2010). A systematic way to gauge party responsiveness is to 'address the ability of the party institutions to influence the party's representatives in the legislative and executive branches'. In this vein, the index examines how frequently the party representative bodies meet and their influence in important matters: namely, selecting cabinet ministers, joining and leaving the government and policy-making (Rahat and Shapira 2017).

- Transparency: Only by having information about their representatives can a public hold them into account, cast a rational vote, and be interested in public affairs (Hollyer et al. 2011; Dahl 1998). Transparency as measured in the index captures the online availability of information about the party, its composition and its activities and deliberations – either on the party's website or its Facebook page.

Each IPD dimension as identified above was ascribed weight that reflected its relative significance in the literature on state-level democracy – 30 points for participation, 20 for representation and competition, respectively, and 15 for responsiveness and transparency, respectively. Since this choice, as Rahat and Shapira (2017, 95) noted, is somewhat arbitrary, the index was recalculated under the assumption that all dimensions carry equal weight. Like with Rahat and Shapira, the overall results are not much apart from the initial findings. Therefore, the proceeding analysis would not have been significantly different if equal weight was attributed to all dimensions.

A score was given to items for each dimension, totaling an aggregate score between 0 points (the complete lack of IPD) and 100 points (the highest possible level). The index was nevertheless not utilised as given. An expert survey, intended as a pilot study, was carried out based on a slightly modified form of the Rahat and Shapira index. The initial modification was undertaken in order to make the index applicable to a multiplicity of settings, beyond the Israeli case, to which the index was initially applied. The pilot study asked experts/informants (academics who have published on the party and/or are/have been involved in the party) to provide a score for each question and any comments they consider necessary.

Two or three experts were used for each party in this phase. Out of the disagreements, questions and comments that emerged, the questionnaire was adjusted and the scoring method was recalibrated. Indicatively, experts' disagreements, comments and information led to specifying further the scoring for several items, which was done by the original index: for example, factoring in types of gender quotas, scoring for allowing party friends to participate in internal, organisational procedures and considering the various types of policy and ideological debates in which party members and others can participate. The final version of the index is summarised in Table 1. The full wording of the items, scales, sources and scoring specifications are presented in the online Appendix A.

The process of data collection was based on the modified questions and primary research was undertaken for each party. Research involved a variety of sources: secondary literature; the constitutions and statutes of the parties, databases such as the PPDB (Political Party Data Base); the parties' websites and media reports, national or party newspapers and parliamentary websites. Each party was assigned a score as of 1 May 2019. The judgment of some of the experts was overridden when the empirical information collected overall pointed to a different score than that of the expert during the index pilot test. Sometimes, the primary data collection included second (and third) contact with experts, to inquire for further insights. All scores were assigned by the author, according to the criteria specified in the online Appendix A. Table 1 also reports the specific sources upon which coding for each item was premised.

The choice of this index, as opposed to other existing ones such as that of the PPDB (see Von dem Berge and Poguntke 2017), was made for three reasons, both particular to this study's research questions and generic. First, the index reflects a broadly liberal understanding of party democracy, thereby allowing us to address the argument about an 'illiberal left' by measuring 'performance' against liberal democracy's own standards. In treating the index as a liberal measure (and reasoning) of IPD, which diverges, for example from radical democratic traditions, such as the Bolshevik, the Fabian, the anarcho-syndicalist, or the post-structuralist, the theoretical assumption at the core of the authors' index is key. As they write: 'in a democratic party, the relationship between the public, the party institutions and the party's representatives in the

government branches … are founded upon principles that are similar to those on which parallel institutions of the democratic state are based' (Rahat and Shapira 2017, 86).

Table 1 Outline of the (modified) Rahat and Shapira (2017) IPD index

Participation (30 points)	Representation (20 points)	Competition (20 points)	Responsiveness (15 points)	Transparency (15 points)
Consultation and decision in leadership selection (10 points)	Percentage of women elected in last elections (5 points)	Competitive elections for leader(s) since penultimate election (10 points)	Is there an elected representative institution/Has it met once past 2 years (5 points)	Availability of information on party website/Facebook page (15 points)
Consultation and decision in candidate selection (10 points)	Percentage of women elected in second last elections (5 points)	Competitive elections for party institution(s) during the last four years (10 points)	What can party institutions do (select cabinet, , support, join or leave coalition, conduct policy debates) (10 points)	
Consultation and decision for electoral platform (5 points)	Special mechanisms (soft and strong) for social groups (10 points)			
Participation in party ideological debates (5 points)				

Strictly based on defining the degree of IPD by the inclusiveness of key procedures, the authors identify a sub-category of 'open plebiscitary intra-party democracy (OPIPD)', which translates into the ideal of non-members participating in party decisions. This variant of IPD departs from the dominant approaches to party democracy driven by conceptualising the party as an organisation with clearly defined boundaries; as in the Leninist and Gramscian traditions, for example. Accordingly, RLPs are assessed against the strictest standards of liberal democracy. This allows one to rigorously test the claim of 'illiberalism' from an organisational perspective. But it also raises several qualifications as regards the relationship between RLPs and IPD (or democracy) *writ large*.

Secondly, the Rahat and Shapira (2017) index is multi-dimensional, with dimensions corresponding to the key principles of democratic theory as they translate into procedures. This avoids the reductionism entailed in conceptualisations of IPD based exclusively on inclusiveness in internal decision-making procedures, such as candidate and leadership selection. Focusing only on inclusiveness would reflect excessive emphasis on certain democratic theories (e.g. direct democracy or deliberation) at the cost of other values (Borz and Janda 2018, 4). Third, it would also not allow addressing the puzzle of whether different principles of democracy can be simultaneously achieved, or if (and how) they collide. The index addresses issues of both formal rule as found in statutes and other documents, and actually experienced organisational practice. In this way, it achieves addressing issues of responsiveness and transparency, which cannot be gauged by measures relying on statutory provisions alone.

The comparisons are based on 15 cases and although the universe of parliamentary RLPS in Western Europe is not much bigger than that, the selected parties are still a sample of the total population. The sample selection of RLPs was based on the guiding research questions and more specifically intended to cover the radical left political space in its entire breadth and thus cater for

variability in terms of party ideological and organisational profiles as these tap into the theoretical distinctions drawn out in the previous section: ideological ones, including an alleged populist profile, and diverging party organisations in terms of size, structure and unity. The sample also includes countries from all regions of Europe so that any regional patterns can be implicitly considered.

4. An empirical analysis of IPD among fifteen European RLPs

This section of the study outlines and seeks to explain patterns of IPD inside European RLPs. The final scores are presented in Table 2, which ranks the parties under consideration according to their IPD scores, from highest to lowest and Table 3 which shows the scores per party by IPD dimension and in total. Looking at the figures there is support for the first hypothesis (H1). With the classification of Rahat and Shapira (2017) in mind – parties that receive scores ranging from 61 to 100 as 'democratic', parties scoring 30–60 points as 'partly democratic', and parties below 30 points as 'non-democratic' – the European radical left is comfortably a democratic group. Its average (76.7%) is well above the minimal point of the top category). Although these parties are often suspect of illiberalism, they themselves share liberal democratic organisational principles. Hence, this party family is certainly not an illiberal democratic force in terms of partisan practice. Applying to this space epithets such as 'extreme' sounds out of place inasmuch the very operation of RLPs manifests the widely common procedures of liberal democracy at the state level.

European RLPs score high on average across participation (average=83%), responsiveness (average=83%), transparency (average=86%) and competition (average=83%), and low in the dimension of representation (average=54%). The latter score is largely due to the absence of soft or strong quotas on immigrants, senior citizens, the youth or (sometimes) women; across various parties, it also reflects low levels of women representation inside parliament. RLPs overall exhibit limited sensitivities in what concerns the representation of: a) integral groups for all parties, such as senior citizens and (to a lesser extent) young people; b) prominent social groups that deserve representation in the political system, such as, immigrants or ethnic minorities. The counter-weight of identity politics (as we will see further down) has played into the opposite direction within parties of the New Left type, but on average, descriptive representation among RLPs is not impressive. Where it is strong, it does not usually go beyond two or (rarely) three groups, at least in terms of formal quotas. In any case, however, the index provides a very strong test for representation that very few parties across the world pass with excellent scores. So while RLPs do not perform highly in the index, it is unlikely that they lack behind in relation to most parties in other party families.

Also in accordance with the first hypotheses (H1), there is some variation among the parties. A total of nearly 30 points separates the first from the last party and a total of 26 points separates the average of the first three parties from the average of the last three parties (s.d=9.2%). Evidently, to an extent the diversity of the European radical left (e.g. March and Mudde 2005) is partly an organisational issue. A close look at Table 2, suggests that most of this variation revolves around the dimensions of representation and competition. Some parties exhibit a very low tendency of crafting representative electoral lists, while others a very high one. For some parties there has not been a competitive leadership contest since the penultimate general election. Across participation, responsiveness and transparency, there are fewer differences between the parties under consideration. Variance is much lower and the average much higher. These are the principles of IPD that 'unite' RLPs.

Table 2 IPD ranking of fifteen European radical left parties (as of 1 May 2019)

Party	IPD Score (%)
VAS	90.5
Red-Green Alliance	90.5
Die Linke	89
Podemos	88.9
SV	84.5
IU	81.5
Left Bloc	81
PCF	80
KSCM	79.5
SP	74
SYRIZA	69
AKEL	66
KKE	65.5
PCP	63.2
PG	62
Average	77.7
S.D	10.3

		Participation (out of 30)	Representation (out of 20)	Competition (out of 20)	Responsiveness (out of 15)	Transparency (out of 15)	Total Score (%)
Cyprus	*AKEL*	24.5	5	10	15	11.5	66
Czech Rep.	*KSCM*	24.5	10	20	11	14	79.5
Denmark	*R-Gr. All*	24	15	20	15	14.5	90.5
Finland	*VAS*	26.5	14	20	15	15	90.5
France	*PCF*	24	10	20	11	15	80
	PG	22	8	10	11	11	62
Germany	*D. Linke*	24.5	15	20	15	14.5	89
Greece	*SYRIZA*	25	11	10	11	12	69
	KKE	24.5	5	10	15	11	65.5
Netherlands	*SP*	24	7	20	8	15	74
Norway	*SV*	24.5	12	20	15	11.5	84.5
Portugal	*PCP*	24.5	6	10	11	12	63.5
	Bloco	24.5	13	20	11	12.5	81
Spain	*IU*	26.5	15	20	11	10	81.5
	Podemos	28.4	15	20	11	14.5	88.9
Average		24.8 (83%)	10.7 (54%)	16.7 (83%)	12.4 (83%)	12.8 (86%)	77.7
St. Dev. (%)		3.7	18.5	24.5	17.6	11.3	10.3

Table 3 IPD among 12 European radical left parties, in total and by dimension (as of May 2019).

Source: The table is constructed on the basis of the index questions and scores have been assigned in accordance with the criteria described in Appendix A.

Table 4 allows us to consider whether and how ideological and structural distinctions can account for the above mentioned variation. For the purposes of analysing the relevance of ideology, or rather ideological tradition within the broadness of left radicalism, as formulated in our second hypothesis (H2), two existing typologies of RLPs were utilised; those by Escalona and Vieira (2012) and Gomez et al. (2016). Based on Escalona and Viera (2012), one can distinguish between left of social democracy, red-green, and orthodox, communist (Marxist-Leninist) parties (respectively Die Linke, IU, PG and SP; SYRIZA, VAS, SV, Bloco and Red-Green Alliance; AKEL, PCP, KKE), effectively juxtaposing an 'orthodox' logic with two more ideologically 'modernised' ones. Similarly, Gomez et. al.'s (2016) distinction between 'traditional' RLPs (KKE, AKEL, PCF PCP, SP, SYRIZA) and 'new left' parties (IU, Podemos, VAS, PG, SV, Red-Green Alliance, Die Linke and Bloco) argues that a key division within the party family is emphasis on so called 'post-materialist' issues. Empirically driven towards their definition, the authors analysed 19 CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project) items to argue that RLPs differ between them mainly on 'new politics'.

Table 4 IPD on the European radical left and party-level characteristics (in %)

	Ideology		Organisation	
	Red-Green/Left of Social Democracy/Orthodox, Marxist-Leninist parties*	New Left*/Traditional	Party coalitions/Unitary parties	Membership strength**
Participation	83.8/81.6/81.6	83.7/81.4	85.4/81.1	-0.083
Representation	**65/61.2/36.6**	**68.3/40.7**	**70/39.4**	-0.278
Competition	89.3/87.5/50	94/71.4	91.7/75	0.094
Responsiveness	86.6/75/82.2	86.6/78.8	84.8/80.8	-0.133
Transparency	83.8/84.2/76.6	86.3/86.1	88.6/84.2	0.264
Total	81.7/77.9/65.4	83.7/71.5	84.1/72.1	

Note: In **bold**, non-overlapping 95% CI for bootstrap samples means. In grey, slightly overlapping 95% CI for bootstrap sample means. The analysis of bootstrap confidence intervals is available upon request.
*The parties included in the first two typologies (first and second column) are only those addressed in the typologies used: Escalona and Vieira (2012) and Gomez et al. (2016), respectively, plus the KSCM for the latter typology.
**Pearson's Correlation, p, 0.05. Membership strength is calculated by dividing the number of party members by the number of total party members in the country. Data from Chiocchetti (2017), except for the Red-Green Alliance and SV, see Van Haute and Gauja (2017). Podemos is excluded due to near non-existent membership boundaries.

We can see from Table 4 whether the above-mentioned distinctions are relevant if there is a significant difference between the means of each identified radical left party type. To validate that the differences between the averages in the comparisons of Table 4 have not occurred by chance, bootstrap confidence intervals (CI, 95%) are used in the analysis (given the distribution of the respective samples and populations is not normal) (Wood 2005).

Overall, there are no significant differences between RLPs as regards total IPD scores. The major differences are to be found in the IPD dimensions of representation and (and to a lesser extent) competition, although for competition the relationship is strictly speaking not statistically significant. Communists have not traditionally mobilised upon the logic of representation but rather on the vanguardist logic of leading the working class and the people in their struggle. Their social milieus and leaderships were certainly less exposed to the feminist wave and identity politics that came to define the New Left and has traditionally been less associated with Marxism-Leninism. In terms of competition, this is limited in all three communist parties – AKEL, KKE, PCP –, essentially, because they score low on the criterion of having had competitive elections for the party leader since the penultimate elections.

Again, there is a discernable historical pattern here: leadership alternation was always a relatively uncommon practice in west European communism, as well as, evidently, in Soviet politics. Yet, a low score on competition is not an exclusive element of the communist type of RLP. The same situation is also exhibited by parties such as SYRIZA (in government at the time of scoring, thus with disincentive, perhaps, to change its leader). Or the PG, where leader, Jean-Luc Melenchon's persona and electoral strategy has been effectively unquestioned since the organisation's establishment; and especially after its involvement in the creation of France Insoumise, the mobilisation platform in support of Melenchon's presidential candidacies in 2012 and 2017 (see Tierno 2018).

On participation the differences between the two groups appear to be minor and in this sense, Marxist-Leninist parties, diachronically accused of centralised, bordering to tyrannical, leadership, lacking transparency and constantly under threat for policy drift, are even by mainstream standards democratic parties. In empirical terms, therefore, being Marxist-Leninist in 2019 and operating through democratic centralist organisational practices is considerably in line with the basic standards of liberal democracy; although it can certainly not be reduced to, or fully explained by, these standards. A note of caution is that centralisation is not fully taken into consideration by the index. Some scholars suggest that it shouldn't because inclusiveness can be combined with centralisation to the extent that these two elements of party organisational practice partly involve different types of procedures (Borz and Janda 2018). At the same time, the democratic centralism of traditional communist parties has mostly been manifested in terms of informal practice, corruption by secretive apparatchiks, or through strict disciplinary mechanisms, or many member commitments, which do not necessarily counteract on participatory politics, responsiveness or a transparent organisation in a formal procedural sense.

Another qualification is that the location of agenda-setting and veto powers does not affect the score, so far as the members' right to participation and their right to decision-making in a given process are not negatively affected. If one was to address where agenda-setting powers lie in such processes as deciding the party platform, then there are important differences between Marxist-Leninist parties, such as the KKE, AKEL, SP and PCP[1] and parties, such as VAS in Finland[2]. The differences, however, do not affect the right of members to consult or cast a final vote on the platform and thus do not change the degree of formal inclusiveness. Yet they do determine how essential and substantive members' input is opposite the final outcome. Overall, the index 'saves' some parties from lower scores (such as the KKE, AKEL, SP and Podemos), while 'downgrading' others, such as the Scandinavian cases. Accordingly, distinctions across the typologies would be modified with alternative conceptualisations of participation. Nevertheless, CPs are still differentiated from others beyond the issue of centralisation. Finally, the observed patterns of participation have to be nuanced also in the light of research suggesting that privileges

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[1] Where, typically, in drafting the electoral platform, for example, the central leadership prepares a draft, which is then amended or approved by the Central Committee, sent to the party branches for discussion and returned to the Central Committee or Congress to be finalised.

[2] For example, the manifesto for the April 2019 elections was prepared at several public meetings arranged in different parts of the country and was perceived as the product of a largely bottom-up process.

to members may be manipulated by leaderships (Ignazi 2018, 4). If this is the case then more rights for members or blurred membership boundaries may signal more leadership autonomy (Scarrow 1999).

Responsiveness and transparency are less markedly different across the sides of the first typology. Across the traditional/new left distinction, responsiveness is differentiated the most. The numerical difference between the averages can be explained by the very high scores on responsiveness by parties which emphasise new politics issues (the Red-Greens and New Left). Such issues include democracy of course, and (as in the Scandinavian parties) frequent debates over party statutes looking for democratic innovation are the norm. Otherwise, it shouldn't make a difference if a party is orthodox or not as to how transparent and responsive it is. Overall, H(2) is partly confirmed as ideological differences are associated with some dimensions of IPD (participation and less so competition) but not others (representation, transparency and responsiveness).

As per alleged populists opposite non-populists, we can already observe that the distinction does not hold. The Scandinavia RLPs are equally democratic as Podemos, which embodies also hierarchical/vertical structures that endow the leader with control over the party (Gerbaudo 2019). While SYRIZA, considered as an archetypical case of left populism, scores slightly higher than the CPs, but its internal organisation has been affected by government office (Spourdalakis and Eleftheriou 2019). Even on the principle of inclusion through participation rights, so called populist RLPs differ between them. SYRIZA, for example, scores quite lower than Podemos, while inclusiveness is more consistently higher among red-green formations. The SP typically considered populist as well, ranks below the 'new left', but above the communists and SYRIZA, since its organisation carries a Maoist, mass party structure. Indeed, the CPs, although ranking below the rest, score high on participation. Overall, there are no grounds to strictly associate Populist Radical Left Parties (PRLPs) as identified in the extant literature with intra-party democracy.

In Table 4, organisational differences are also considered. Specifically whether a party is a unitary structure (AKEL, PCP, KKE, PG, PCF, SP, SV, KSCM), or formed as a coalition party (with subsequent trajectories of either retaining the parties or maintaining factions; VAS, Die Linke, Podemos, IU and Bloco, the Red-Green Alliance, SYRIZA); and a party's membership strength, defined as its share of the total number of party members in a country. As expected by the third hypothesis (H3a), membership strength is unrelated to IPD, both on average and in terms of each of the IPD dimensions, which suggests that democratic deficits are not greater in RLPs with high party membership. In this sense, at least on the European radical left, the declining of party membership is probably not a cause of potentially higher or lower IPD than before.

In table 4 one can also see that the intra-radical-left distinction between unitary parties and party coalitions is significant only in the dimension of representation. Unitary parties are much less representative, on average, and to a lesser extent less competitive, than party coalitions or parties with factions. There is good reason to believe, however, that whether a party is unitary or not cannot be clearly associated with its representative capacities. Certainly, factions in political parties perform, among other things, the articulation of issue-oriented interests and the representation of certain socio-political and sectoral interest groups (Beller and Belloni 1978). But most of the non-unitary parties are also RLPs of the 'new/reformed' or 'red-green left', broadly the democratic socialist strain and most of the unitary parties are 'orthodox' or 'traditional', or 'left of social democracy' RLPs, which have not typically followed logics of descriptive (demographic) representation. As far as the argument goes, whether strong or soft representational quotas are used or not (which is what the index measures) appears to be related to a party's guiding ideas about substantive equality and representation and only by this relation to the structure of the party body. Although not statistically significant, competition could also be directly linked to ideological pluralism; given more voices about ideas and policies, there is more

political ground for competitive electoral processes. In sum, there is interplay between ideology as a conditioning factor of IPD and party body structure as an intermediary variable, entrenched itself in ideology. Hypothesis 3b is largely corroborated.

Turning to the issue of dimensionality, do the conceptual distinctions between the five dimensions of IPD hold empirically? The relatively weak Pearson's correlation coefficients indicate that the sub-indices tap into separate dimensions, in line with the argument that all dimensions need to be included when measuring IPD. Clearly the five dimensions of IPD are largely unrelated to each other on the European radical left, with the exception of representation-competition and transparency-competition. Radical left organisational practice does not preclude being more democratic in some dimensions and less democratic in the others. The relations between the IPD dimensions, as provided in Table 5 showing Pearson's correlations, cannot be interpreted through existing theories about IPD in general[3].

Table 5 Relationships between the five dimensions of IPD in European radical left parties (Pearson Correlation, p, 0.05)

	Participation	Representation	Competition	Responsiveness	Transparency
Participation		0.511	0.374	0.282	0.107
Representation	0.511		0.721**	0.186	0.323
Competition	0.374	0.721**		0.049	0.595*
Responsiveness	0.282	0.186	0.049		0.010
Transparency	0.107	0.323	0.595*	0.010	
Membership	-0.083	-0.278	0.094	-0.133	0.264

Note: Computed correlation used pearson-method with listwise-deletion
*Statistically significant results with asterisk

Neither is participation significantly related to representation, competition and responsiveness in a negative way, nor are transparency and representation related between them more than to the other dimensions. The logic of inclusiveness as hindrance to representative lists does not appear to stand. Parties such as VAS and Podemos or IU embrace participatory politics and ensure high levels of representation (as measured by the index) at one and the same time. Their espousal of left-wing libertarianism leads them to support both top-down, direct democracy and pursue an agenda of descriptive representation and minority rights. Indeed, the observed patterns of the little association that exists can perhaps only be rationalised by considering, not parties in general, but RLPs and ideology in particular; while factoring in diverging preferences on representation and competition, between different types of RLPs. In support of the fourth hypothesis (H4), this rationalisation can account for the positive association observed between representation and competition, since the orthodox parties have lacked in both, while their critics and reformers have provided both.

5. Discussion

This study has sought to lay out and explain patterns of IPD inside the European radical left, positioning RLPs against typical standards of liberal state-level democracy, as captured and

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[3] Due to the small sample, the correlations should be interpreted cautiously.

measured by the Rahat and Shapira (2017) index. Three underlying research questions have driven the study, about the standing and variation of IPD in today's European radical left, the inter-play between the theoretical dimensions of IPD and potential explanations therein.

One can ascertain that on average the European radical left is not an illiberal force from an organisational perspective, as it follows the standard and widely performed practices of IPD that characterise mainstream party families across Europe and beyond. Out of the five IPD dimensions, only descriptive representation seems to exhibit low levels of IPD, suggesting that the European radical left, old and new, has not internalised (or rejects), in large part, the notion of descriptive representation, at least beyond women and (in some cases) the young and ethnic minorities. Still, this is by all means a very strong test to pass for most parties of any family, most of which do not use quotas for anything more than gender.

In retrospect, we have shown that what is often treated as illiberalism and anti-establishment politics in its various forms within the left cannot suggest illiberal party organisations. While at the same time, as we know well by now, illiberalism on the radical right reflects preferences for vertical bureaucratic models, inscribed by respect for authority and nationalist or racist positions, which inhibit inclusiveness (Gauja, 2016: Chapter 6). This combined knowledge significantly nuances the 'illiberalism thesis' as it highlights yet another major difference between the radical left and the radical right; in terms of IPD.

Concerning the centrist parties of the left and right, comparison through the index is in lieu at this point but based on previous broad comparisons (Poguntke et al. 2016), many mainstream actors (social democrats, conservatives, Christian democrats or liberals) are at best only slightly higher or equal with RLPs in terms of these principles. Indeed, given the index used so far for such comparisons is the one of the PPDB project – which measures inclusiveness –, it can be assumed that differences could be lower or in some cases reverse using the Rahat and Shapira index. As per populism's application to RLP organisation, if there is validity in distinguishing between populist RLPs and non-populist RLPs in terms of ideology and discourse then this is not relevant for IPD. This can be a warning opposite the easy utilisation of the phenomenon as explanatory variable for party structure and competition on the left.

IPD within the radical left is relatively high, but it is also differentiated between the older, traditional, communist parties and the reformed or 'new left' parties, in what concerns representation and (to a lesser extent) competition. Historical, path-dependent behavior seems to be an important feature of the trajectory of organisational practice among RLPs; the fault lines of the 1960s and 1970s events, apparently a critical juncture for the socialist movement, are today still somewhat relevant. Organisational principles of democracy correspond to the sides of historical fault lines within the party family. Party structural features that are associated with IPD are fed into by ideological division lines. In this sense party ideology is a key determinant of the existing variation among RLPs in terms of democratic practice, although such variation is limited in its scope. The structure of the party body or membership strength does not significantly affect IPD; the former feeds into different patterns of IPD but it is still, by and large, an implication of ideological/historical divisions within the party family.

The variation in IPD and across its dimensions can be subsequently linked by future literature to relations to social movements, and bottom-up linkage. We can assume that parties with high participation opportunities for 'outsiders' or blurry membership boundaries or quotas of descriptive representation can facilitate or are the product of the engagement of certain groups (e.g. feminist or immigrant associations) with the party. Further research can examine patterns of IPD in RLPs in more detail, for example, across the distinction between formal rules and informal practice; using measures of 'radical', rather than 'liberal' democracy; or in relation to the history and politics of decentralization initiatives. Taking this study further in debates about IPD and party organisation and in the context of evidence supporting the 'de-ideologisation' of party politics, it would be worth considering whether in settings where ideology is historically

important in terms of intra-party family cleavages, as in the radical left, it is a stronger predictor of IPD and in pronounced interplay with party structures.

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Appendix A

The modified Rahat and Shapira Index and coding specifications[4]

(1) Participation (30 pts)

1.1 Who selects the party leader? (5 pts)[5]

(5 pts) A group of elected representatives (central committee, council or convention), all party members or all citizens of voting age

(0 pts) A small inner circle of the party elite or a single leader

1.2 Who selects the party leader? (5 pts)[6]

(5 pts) All citizens of voting age

(4 pts) All party members

(3 pts) Selected representatives

(1 pt) A small inner circle

(0 pts) A single leader

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[4] This is the final, revised version of Rahat and Shapira (2017), as used to collect data. Scoring has been updated up to July 2019.

[5] Questions 1.1 – 1.5 reflect who can cast a final vote in the party leader selection process, the candidate selection process and the party platform or manifesto, respectively. At the same time, involvement in the consultation of an issue is taken into consideration for the final score and given 0.5 points. If the selection of the party leader is a two-tier process, whereby a pre-election by all members is organised before the party congress, and then the congress or another representative body cast a vote under moral pressure by the outcome of the first round, then a score of 3.5 was given. If friends of the party are entitled to a final vote, but not all citizens, then a score of 4.5 was given. If all members are allowed to cast a vote but membership obligations are almost inexistent (as in Podemos), then a score of 4.8 was given.

Some parties, such as Die Linke, have dual leaderships and some others collectives with spokespersons. In the latter case, the date of the election of the leadership body is taken into consideration rather than of the appointment of the spokesperson, which may not be the same. Only if there is no statutory commitment to representative selection, are 1 or 0 coded, except in the PG, where the national secretariat which is elected by Congress leads the party but the two spokespeople of that body are only decided from within it. Meanwhile political power is contested via France Insoumise, led by Jean Luke Melenchon, who used to be the leader of the PG. A score of 5 was given to question 1, and a score of 1 in question 2, because the party leadership selection process resembles features of both representative selection and inner circle and single leader workings. The Left Bloc was scored with 2.5 in question 2, since in the selection of its collective leadership prevail the four founding tendencies and their leaders enjoy autonomy.

Note on sources: Scoring was based on party statutes, cross-checked with Political Party Database (PPDB) data (for the cases this was available).

[6] Selected representatives may include 'council, central committee or congress. A small inner circle refers to the executive (such as general secretariats, executive councils, chairman and vice-chairmen or other small coordinating groups running the party's daily affairs).

1.3 Who selects the party's candidates to the national parliament? (5 pts)[7]

(5 pts) A group of selected representatives, all party members or all citizens of voting age

(0 pts) A small inner circle of the party elite or a single leader

1.4 Who selects the party's candidates to the parliament? (5 pts)

(5 pts) All citizens of voting age

(4 pts) All party members

(3 pts) Selected representatives

(1 pts) A small inner circle

(0 pts) A single leader

1.5 Who of the following can participate in writing or approving the party electoral platform? (5 pts) [8]

(5 pts) All citizens of voting age

(4 pts) All party members

(3 pts) Selected representatives

(2 pts) A small inner circle

(1 pts) A single leader

(0 pts) The party doesn't have a platform

1.6 Who of the following could take part in ideological, identity or policy debates conducted by the party in the last four years? (5 pts)[9]

(5 pts) All citizens of voting age

(4 pts) All party members

(3 pts) Selected representatives

(0 pts) The party didn't conduct such debates

(2) Representation (20 pts)

2.1 What is the proportion of women elected by the party in the last, national parliamentary elections? (5 pts)[10]

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[7] If members or party friends participate in discussing and nominating the candidate list but do not have a final vote directly at a mass level, then a score of 3.5 is assigned. If they do have a vote at the mass level then a score of 4 is assigned. If in the candidate selection process the leader has a significant say on the final list, shouldn't make a a difference as to selected representatives' right to vote on the list and members's right of participating in nominating and approving. Centralisation is thus not strictly measured. As long as only a minority of candidates, are selected by the leader, it does not have an effect on the score.

Note on sources: Scoring was based on party statutes, cross-checked with PPDB data (for the cases this was available).

[8] If a party has a platform or a document presenting basic principles, but it is not known who wrote it or ratified it, then the document is considered to have been written by a 'small group'. If members or party friends participate in discussing and modifying the platform but do not have a final vote directly at a mass level, then a score of 3.5 is assigned. A platform is not necessarily in view of an election. If the manifesto drafting process starts from above (for example, the central committee or party council approve an initial draft but then members debate it before it is amended and approved by the party council or the party congress), shouldn't make a difference as to the right of consultation or decision, and thus whether the manifesto is centrally drafted is not taken into consideration.

Note on sources: Scoring was based on party statutes, cross-checked with PPDB data (for the cases this was available).

[9] Such debates usually take place before the party's regular congress. If the dialogue is explicitly open to anyone that wants to voice or submit a view but in practice, contributors to this public debate are party members and intellectuals or critical citizens close to the party, the score here is still 5, because of the intention rather than the outcome which is the result of informal partisan life. If formally organised debates and dialogue are open to 'friends' or 'sympathisers', then a score of 4.5 is given.

Note on sources: Party statutes, expert information.

(5 pts) 45% –
(4 pts) 35 –44%
(3 pts) 25 –34%
(2 pts) 15 –24%
(1 pts) 5 –14%
(0 pts) 0 –4%

2.2 What is the proportion of women elected by the party in the national parliamentary elections before that? (5 pts)
(5 pts) 45% –
(4 pts) 35 –44%
(3 pts) 25 –34%
(2 pts) 15 –24%
(1 pts) 5 –14%
(0 pts) 0 –4%

2.3 Does the party employ special mechanisms to guarantee representation for the following social groups or sectors on its parliament list? (10 pts)[11]
(2 pts) Women
(2 pts) Immigrants/Ethnic minorities
(2 pts) Senior citizens
(2 pts) Young adults
(2 pts) Residents of the geographical periphery

(3) Competition (20 pts)
3.1 Have there been competitive elections (with two or more candidates) for the position of party leader since the penultimate general elections? (10 pts)[12]
(10 pts) Yes
(0 pts) No

3.2 Have there been competitive elections (with two or more candidates) for the party institutions (convention, council or central committee) during the last four years? (10 pts)
(10 pts) Yes
(0 pts) No

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[10] If the party ran as part of a coalition, then the percentage is calculated on the basis of the coalition's electoral list, not the party's own candidates.
  Note on sources: Ministries of Interior official election results or Parliaments' websites.

[11] Voluntary party measures may range from recommendations and general goals (or 'soft' quotas) to mandatory rules and requirements such as alternating male and female names on the party list (also known as the zipper system) or having a minimum percentage for the representation of a group. In the case of 'strong' quotas for electoral districts a positive score is assigned independent of whether these special mechanisms exist at the party level or because of the national electoral system. A score of 1 is given to 'soft quotas', or 'an assumed logic of selection' as reflected in the presence of women leaders, and a score of 2 is given to 'strong quotas', such as reserved positions. Informal, election to election considerations of how to fit in this or that group are not scored in the absence of the above indicators.
  Note on source: Keith and Verge (2017); Party statutes cross tabulated with PPDP (Political Party Database Project) data and national electoral systems.
[12] Election of party leadership at the congress or Central Committee/Council.
  Note on sources: Expert information, party websites and online media.

(4) Responsiveness (15 pts)

4.1 Does the party have an elected representative institution and has it met at least once in the last two years? (5 pts)[13]
(5 pts) Yes
(0 pts) No

4.2 Do the party's elected institutions or members do the following? (10 pts)[14]
(4 pts) Take part in selecting the party's representatives in the national cabinet
(3 pts) Approve whether the party joins, supports or leaves a government coalition at the national level
(3 pts) Conduct debates about policy-relevant matters

(5) Transparency (15 pts)
5.1 Are the following available on the party's website and/or Facebook page? (15 pts) [15]
(3 pts) Information about the party's finances[16]
(3 pts) The party's constitution or regulations
(3 pts) The party's platform or document of principles
(1 pts) Information about the party's history
(1 pts) Biographies of the party's parliamentary members and or candidates
(1 pts) A list of party officials and their contact details
(1 pts) Documentation of party events
(1 pts) Articles or transcripts of speeches by party representatives and officials
(1 pts) News and update

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[13] Elected representative institutions refer to the Council or Central Committee of parties.
Note on sources: Experts cross-checked with internet/media sources.
[14] Deciding on joining or leaving a coalition concerns the national level. Some parties, for example, VAS and PCF have held primaries for supporting a candidacy/entering a coalition.
Note on sources: Party statutes cross tabulated with PPDB data.
[15] If an item is made up of two parts, then each is scored by 0.5 point.
Note on sources: Search of party websites/Facebook pages
[16] Different national practices take one point in so far some information is given about income, income sources and expenses.