

# WHO BELONGS TO EUROPE? NOTES ON THE (LACK OF) INCLU-SIVENESS OF RESEARCH ON SOCIAL TRANSNATIONALISM

**Christine Barwick** 

Centre Marc Bloch

A Turkish-German man in his late 30s, asked about his cross-border trips in the past two years, recounts that he has been on holidays with his wife and son to Spain, Italy and Greece. Asked why he chose these countries as destinations, he hesitates briefly and then says that he goes there because nobody asks him where he is from. People in Spain, Italy, Greece would think that he is one of them (as long as they do not talk as he does not speak the languages). In Germany, he is always perceived as 'the Turk'. In Turkey, on the other hand, they call him 'almanci', the German. These experiences of not belonging or of always being seen as 'the other' have a clear effect on his cross-border mobility as they affect which countries he chooses to visit and which ones he tries to avoid.

This account does not stem from the book, but from my own ongoing research on social transnationalism of Muslims and People of Color in Europe. It forms the background from which I read the book, namely under the header of 'who belongs to Europe?'. As such, I will describe what I find to be the major contributions of the book, a few small criticisms that apply mostly to the presentation of cases and results, as well as a suggestion on how to further advance research on social transnationalism and European identification of people who are often not part of the European narrative.

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In the discourse about who belongs to Europe, as well as research on social transnationalism, including long- and short-term mobility, feeling European and attitudes towards the EU, there are two major problems I want to draw out before coming to the book. First, even within Europe, the discourse about mobility and migration suggests a differentiation according to who is mobile. To illustrate, Europeans moving from Eastern to Western countries are often viewed as migrants, while Western Europeans who move within Europe, are rather called 'mobile Europeans' or expats.

The second problem I want to address is that the research on transnationalism primarily focuses on what I call the 'native, white' population. However, a large part of the European population has a migrant background, meaning that they themselves or their parents migrated from a non-European country. Instead of including immigrants and their descendants in the narrative of Europe and taking seriously their contributions to Europeanization from below (by analyzing their cross-border mobility and feelings as European), they are continuously treated as 'the other', particularly if they are ethnic, racial or religious minorities.

In his pioneering study on the Eurostars in Eurocities, Adrian Favell (2008) – one of the editors and authors of the debated book – describes how Western Europeans can move freely within Europe, how they enjoy invisibility and spatial flexibility. He voices the hope that "Poles, Romanians, even Turks may one day feel and be treated as simply mobile European citizens, not immigrants" (Favell 2008, p. 103). While this may not be true yet in reality (neither in in political, public nor much of the academic discourse), the authors of the study make a big step in the right direction by including Romanians and Turks in the study of social transnationalism. First, while there are various qualitative studies dealing with the experiences of mobility and settlement of intra-European migrants (including Romanians), quantitative studies are usually confined to the analysis of social transnationalism of the society 'in situ', not those who are living in another country. Second, as Turks are non-EU migrants and still not part of the European narrative, the study of their transnational practices is usually confined to links between the country of residence and the country of origin. In these two ways, studying transnational practices and feelings as European or cosmopolitan of Romanian and Turkish migrants, alongside the Italian, Spanish, Danish, German, Romanian and British sample is for me the major contribution of the book.

## Social transnationalism: focus on Romanians and Turks

How transnational are Europeans? What forms of transnationalism do members of different European societies engage in? Are there differences between groups within one society as well as between European societies? Which differences are relevant for transnationalism and developing a European or cosmopolitan identity? These are just

some of the questions that the authors of this great collection of chapters, deriving from the EUCROSS survey, engage with. They thus continue a research tradition in the political sociology of Europe that focuses on the motives and patterns of social transnationalism of Europeans, and the question of whether and how these practices relate to the emergence of a European identity. The authors therefore analyze practical as well as virtualsymbolic transnationalism, European and cosmopolitan identifications, consumption patterns, or narratives about Europe.

The background to this study is Europe's multiple crises (which have only become worse since the survey – just think of Brexit or the aftermath of the immigration of refugees to European countries). The authors aim to show that despite Europe's difficult situation, processes and changes in people's minds have already occurred throughout many years, which are quite stable, despite Europe's crisis. Thus, a state of crisis does not automatically imply that European citizens would engage to a lesser extent in cross-border mobility or feel less European.

To answer the above-mentioned question, the authors conducted a cross-national telephone survey with 1,000 resident nationals in Denmark, Germany, Spain, Italy, Romania and the UK. In addition, they did a survey with 250 Romanian and Turkish migrants residing in these countries. Lastly, they included a qualitative part, comprising 160 indepth interviews with both resident nationals and migrants.

The six countries included in the study can be grouped according to different characteristics such as North/South, or core/peripheral/new member states. In the analysis of the data, differences between the countries are just as relevant as in-country differences. A major addition compared to other studies on social transnationalism is the inclusions in the sample of two migrant groups: Romanians and Turks.

## So what do we learn about these two groups regarding social transnationalism?

For the Romanian sample (residing in Romania), prior results on their extent of transnationalism are confirmed: en gros, they are less transnational than the other groups. They have less familiarity with other countries and most other countries they know are within Europe. Nevertheless, "the extent and breadth of European connections are striking". In contrast to the other national groups who have the strongest links to neighboring countries, Romanians have strong connections with Italy, Spain and Germany. This difference can be explained with the importance of labor migration for Romanians. Given their lower familiarity with other countries, I find it quite striking that half of the Romanian respondents feel European and citizen of the world (p. 56). They thus have a European and cosmopolitan identity that is only higher in Spain. For half of the Romanian

respondents, it seems that feeling European is associated with feeling citizen of the world. Only nine percent feel European but not citizen of the world. In contrast, almost a fifth feels citizen of the world, but not European. Concurrently, the share of people who identify neither as European nor as citizen of the world is among the lowest in Romania.

The chapter about the social structure of transnationalism which analyzes practical and virtual-symbolic transnationalism also includes the migrants' samples and gives some interesting insights. Romanian nationals, both in Romanian and outside, have the highest share of respondents who have lived in another EU country for at least three months. In contrast Romanians in Romania engage much less in short-term cross-border mobility (only one fourth). Among their migrant counterparts, this share is about double. The large share of people with own migration experience among Romanian respondents (in Romania) and hence the high likelihood of knowing someone who lives or has lived in another country might explain why communication by phone, computer, e-mail as well as communication via web-based social networks is highest among all groups (only higher for the migrant samples).

Interesting for the Turkish migrants is that they do not engage very much in shortterm cross-border mobility. Only about 39% of Turkish respondents have visited another EU country in the past two years – this number is on a similar level with Italians and Spaniards. It might reflect that Turkish migrants do not have the European citizenship and that their cross-border mobility is governed differently and therefore limited. Not surprisingly, the analysis of determinants of transnationalism confirms previous findings, namely that transnationalism is unequally distributed, with men, the better educated and better earners engaging in more transnational practices. For migrants, the socioeconomic effect is even stronger, whereas the effect of gender disappears. Interestingly "the least educated are more likely to have lived in a different European society in the past" (p. 75). A further analysis also demonstrates that for migrants, socioeconomic incorporation in the country of residence correlates strongly with cross-border mobility. To illustrate, migrants schooled in the Country of residence, the younger and more educated are more likely to engage in cross-border mobility.

In a separate chapter on Romanian migrants, the authors analyze their 'space sets', thus the "size, range, intensity and salience of Romanians' transnational mobility" (p. 199). The authors claim that so far, everyday transnationalism, in contrast to seasonal or circular migration of this group, has not received much attention in the scholarship. This confirms that in much of the political, public and even academic discourse, Romanians, just as other people from Eastern Europe, are primarily viewed as migrants, not as mobile Europeans. In essence, the chapter shows that "long-term mobility, motivated especially by work-related reasons, is matched by an increasing short-term mobility" (p.

197). Thereby, the authors compare stayers, returnees and movers. All groups primarily engage in short-border trips for vacation, for professional reasons and to visit family or friends. Regarding size and range of the migrants' space sets, the authors demonstrate that the share of the 'immobile' (i.e. no short-border trips within the past two years) is highest among the stayers (two thirds), followed by the returnees (half) and the movers (one third). Movers and returnees also visited a higher number of countries than stayers. Among the movers, however, there are also clear differences, with those residing in Germany or Denmark being more mobile or having visited more countries than those in Spain or Italy. A regression analysis confirms the effects of gender, education and professional status on cross-border mobility. The chapter then analyses the qualitative interviews, inquiring about the salience of space-sets. It shows that the salience does not depend so much on socioeconomic resources but is rather based on an astonishment of being in another country. This astonishment can be both positive and negative, depending on one's experiences in that country.

The last chapter of the book looks in more detail at social transnationalism of Turkish migrants in Europe. Usually, transnationalism of Turks - just as other non-European immigrants – is primarily thought of as links between the country of residence and the country of origin (Barwick 2018). That there are links to other countries as well is usually not addressed in the migrant transnationalism literature. Thus, analyzing Turkish migrants' overall mobility patterns gives a much more extensive pattern of their actual transnationalism. We thus learn that a quite important share of Turkish migrants engaged in cross-border trips to another European country, particularly those residing in Denmark, Germany and the UK. The differences between cross-border trips between the countries partly reflect the reasons for moving there and the socioeconomic profile of the migrants. Very insightful were also the personal accounts about the car trips many Turkish families engaged in to go 'home', lacking the financial means to buy flights for the whole family. These car trips brought them to other European countries where they also got out of their role as 'German Turk' or 'Danish Turk' and where they had the opportunity to compare their situation to that of Turks in other European countries. The Turkish migrants' social transnationalism thus shows "the extent to which Turkey is de facto integrated into Europe" (p. 250).

As the time of the survey with Turkish migrants coincided with the onset of the Gezi Park Protests, the authors also analyze political transnationalism. Particularly among the higher educated respondents, the Gezi park protests led to an increased political activism. Not only did their use of social media such as Facebook increase to keep up with and comment on news, but many also went to demonstrations in their country of residence.

While I think that the inclusion of migrant samples is a great and important step forward, I was sometimes missing more detailed explanations of the reasons behind certain patterns of transnationalism. Sometimes, the interpretation of results ended where it actually became most interesting, and where some links between the chapters would have been insightful. Take the Gezi park protests, for example, and the transnational political involvement of Turkish migrants. While we learn about the extent and kind of involvement, the following interesting question would be whether these protests and particularly the authoritarian turn of the government had an effect on their national, European or cosmopolitan identifications.

The same is true for Romanian migrants. While we know from another chapter that among mobile Romanians we find a higher share that identifies with Europe or as cosmopolitan than among the stayers, there is no information on the influence of the space sets, i.e. the number of countries they have visited or the number of cross-border trips on European and cosmopolitan identifications. Moreover, what is the explanation that half of the Romanian respondents (stayers) feel European and citizen of the world? For Spain, which has a similar pattern, the connections to South America quickly come to mind as an explanation of them feeling citizen of the world. But what is the explanation for Romanians? As their current transnational practices are lower and cover fewer countries compared to residents of other European states, it cannot be explained with personal experience. Might it be that for Romanians, the regime and system change which happened in 1990 not only opened Romania to Europe but to the world? And that this memory is still relatively fresh? Or are there other historical reasons that would explain this finding?

It was striking to me as well that discrimination and its effects on transnationalism and identifications did not play a role in the chapters on Romanian and Turkish migrants. A multivariate analysis (p. 120ff.) showed that for Romanians, discrimination has a negative impact on European identification. This is not the case for Turkish migrants. A possible explanation might be that for Turks, identification as cosmopolitan is much higher than as European, so that experiences with discrimination do not have a negative effect anymore. Or they do not feel part of Europe from the outset as Europe continues to be constructed as a 'white, Christian' entity. This might also explain why for Turkish migrants, cosmopolitan identification is much higher than European identification. Moreover, the level of identification with the country of residence among Turkish immigrants is quite diverse. It is very low in Romania and Germany and highest in the UK. European identification, in contrast, is highest in Romania, and on the same level in Germany and the UK. What do patterns like these tell us? Is it possible that discrimination plays a role? In contrast to the UK, the discourse around multiculturalism in Germany has been quite negative, which might be an explanation for the lower levels of identification with the country of residence. It would have been very insightful to know more about experiences with discrimination on Turkish and Romanian migrants' patterns of social transnationalism and particularly their European and cosmopolitan identification.

As pointed out already, I think including the migrant samples in the study is a major advantage compared to other studies. At the same time, however, it made me think on how to advance our research on social transnationalism and European/cosmopolitan identifications in an even more encompassing way.

To illustrate, I wondered about the reasons for only including Romanian migrants. Why not also Danish, German, Spanish, Italian and British migrants? Obviously, there are always time and budget constraints, but the inclusion of Romanian migrants as the only European migrant group suggests that there might be something particular about them. Is it due to the history of the country, is it because it is the youngest EU member, because a high share of the population are mobile and migrate for a longer time (from East to West), or due to the rather disadvantaged economic position of Romania? The results from the Romanian migrants sample essentially confirm what we know so far for other mobile European groups: mobility is a source of inequality, the better educated and higher earners are mobile, men are more mobile than women. Moreover, the Romanian migrant sample also confirms that mobility correlates with a higher European identification. Also, the questions about the most memorable trip reveal the prevalence of astonishment over socioeconomic position. Would we not expect that for most mobile persons? In a way, the choice of only including Romanian migrants reinforces what it wishes to overcome, namely the 'de-migratisation' of migration research. To truly do so, would Romanian migrants not have to be presented alongside other European migrants, not as a group that suggests being particular. In that sense, it would have at least been helpful to have a short reflection about differences and similarities to what we know for other groups of European migrants.

The data about Turkish migrants showed that they also engage in social transnationalism and that some of them develop a European identity. What was missing to me was the Turkish migrants' narrative of Europe. This leads me back to the question of 'who belongs to Europe?', that I want to focus in the remainder of this contribution. How can we advance what the authors have started and expand our research on social transnationalism in Europe, in an even more inclusive way.

## Towards a postcolonial research agenda

My claim that the inclusion of the Romanian and Turkish migrants sample in the study of social transnationalism in Europe stems from the observation that (1) people moving

from East to Western Europe are mostly viewed as migrants instead of mobile Europeans, and (2) that so far, transnationalism of migrants, particularly from non-EU migrants, is usually only studied between the Country of Residence and the Country of Origin. There is thus a need in the political sociology of Europe to not only limit the analysis of social transnationalism or Europeanization from below to 'native, White' Europeans, but to take into account the diversity of Europeans, regarding their ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds, and their different contributions to Europe. This can be done by demigratising migration research (Dahinden 2016; Römhild 2017) and by adopting a postcolonial perspective on the study of social transnationalism and European identification.

It is certainly true that there is now an increasing number of studies that deal with onward or secondary mobility of migrants. These studies reflect what is now a consensus in migration studies, namely that migration is not a process with a clear starting and end point. Migrants might move to one country, even with the intention to settle their, but personal and economic situations might change, which lead to a move to another country. To illustrate, Helen McCarthy (2019) showed how Latin American migrants who came to Spain were among the first who felt the impact of the financial crisis. As they had preferential access to Spanish (and hence European) citizenship, they used their freedom of movement to move to the UK (where they are now facing another 'crisis' with Brexit). Such 'onward mobility' has also been demonstrated for other groups such as Dutch-Somalis, Swedish-Iranians and German-Nigerians moving to the UK (Ahrens, Kelly, & Van Liempt 2016) or Senegalese migrants moving between France, Spain and Italy (Toma & Castagnone 2015), just to mention a few. Since the immigration of large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe since about 2015, an increasing number of studies has also shown that even those who are not supposed to be mobile but whose status confines them to one nation state, find ways to cross borders and move to another country (e.g. Fontanari & Ambrosini 2018). While this is a very precarious mobility, it nevertheless shows that migrants of all kinds of statuses are mobile within Europe.

While this kind of research is insightful as it demonstrates the mobility of immigrants in Europe, it has also been criticized. For example, Schapendonk (2017) criticizes that the movement across borders of Europeans is always framed as mobility, while the same movement for immigrants (even those who are naturalized, I would add!) is described differently, such as onward migration or secondary movement, "as if mobility is something that citizens do and migration is something that the 'the other' does" (p. 408). He himself conducted a study on West African immigrants' (both documented and undocumented) cross-border mobility in Europe, to show their "movement, mobility, dynamism and multi-locality" (p. 408). His African respondents, even though often in rather precar-

ious situations, are just as open to the possibilities of mobility as the 'Eurostars' described by Favell. Schapendonk shows that the 'Afrostars' are mobile and use the postnational European space, have transnational networks, try to learn different languages.

However, neither Schapendonk nor any of the authors analyzing onward mobility / migration actually inquire about migrants' identification with Europe, or their attitudes towards the EU. To my knowledge, it is only the study of Celine Teney et al. (2016) that has analyzed immigrants' identification with their home country, country of residence, and Europe. The authors demonstrate a "clearcut and systematic boundary between EU and non-EU immigrants in their level of European identity; the development of a sense of European belonging is closely linked to the EU citizenship". Nevertheless, non-EU migrants do identify with Europe and the transnational practice of crossing-borders is positively associated with a European identification. That echoes the finding of Recchi et al. who found that for Turkish migrants, cross-border trips strengthen European identity (p. 133). The above-mentioned studies about migrants' mobility in Europe clearly show that migrants (naturalized or not, documented or not) use the European space to move around. How do these practices of mobility and the different experiences of mobility (an undocumented migrant moves differently than someone with a resident permit) influence a feeling as European, as well as the migrant's narrative about and attitudes towards? This is the step that is still missing from the research.

A reason for this lack is the still predominating 'parochial cosmopolitanism' (Bhambra 2016) in the research on Europe, which is based on a clear notion of us and them. Current academic research on these issues largely reproduces the image of "an often unspoken, but nonetheless seemingly very precise, racialized understanding of proper Europeanness that continues to exclude certain migrants and their descendants", such as Muslims and People of Color (El-Tayeb 2011, xii). Immigrants from non-European countries as well as their descendants are thus not part of the cosmopolitan Europe narrative. As also criticized by Schapendonk, these 'others' are supposed to 'integrate' into the nation-state and remain immobile, while the mobility of the 'native' society is viewed as a sign of economic success and of an integrating Europe.

While more research meanwhile addresses migrants' cross-border mobility, it is striking to me that there is no research (to my knowledge) that looks at social transnationalism of the second generation, thus the children of immigrants who have been born in a European country. Just as for people who migrated themselves, the study of second generation transnationalism only looks at links between the country of residence and the parents' home country. There is a lack of studies inquiring about cross-border mobility and other transnational practices as well as European and cosmopolitan identifications of 'second generation Europeans'. As racial, ethnic or religious minorities, they continue

to be viewed as the 'other' and hence their mobility patterns and contributions to horizontal Europeanization remain hidden.

My own ongoing research on social transnationalism of Muslims and People of Color has already shown that experiences with ethnic or religious discrimination and the ensuing feeling of not-belonging have an impact on cross-border mobility. To illustrate, one Turkish-German respondent in his mid-forties was a strong European who dreamed of 'The United States of Europe'. While his identification with Turkey was also very important to him, he felt that it did decrease in the past years, since all the political happenings were against European values. Another example is the Turkish-German quoted at the beginning, who goes to holidays in Southern European because there he passes as one of them and is not asked where he comes from. This person is also quite mobile for business reasons, as he works in the export sector. As he has been to many countries, he feels that the European countries, he is convinced that differences between societies are too large to speak of any kind of 'community'. At the same time, he affirmatively states the EU has huge advantages for him, particularly due to his job. Without the freedom of movement, being in an export business would be much harder.

In the future, a study like the one by Recchi, Favell and the various co-authors should thus be further developed to include a variety of migrant groups and particularly also the descendants of non-European immigrants. Explicitly including the latter in the study of social transnationalism and European and cosmopolitan identifications seems crucial to me as they are undeniably part of Europe (most having the European citizenship) and contributing to Europeanization form below, while still being largely excluded from the European narrative.

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# **AUTHOR'S INFORMATION:**

**Christine Barwick** is a post-doctoral researcher at the Centre Marc Bloch, where she is the co-director of the research group 'Place, mobility, migration'. She also serves in the board of the Section Migration and Ethnic Minorities (German Sociological Association), of which she is the vice-spokesperson, and the editorial board of the Journal of Undergraduate Ethnography. Her research interests focus on migration and mobilities. Her dissertation at the Humbolt University dealt with social mobility and neighborhood choice of second generation Turkish-Germans in Berlin and was awarded multiple prizes, such as the dissertation prize of the Section Urban and Regional Sociology (part of the German Sociological Association) and the Hartmut-Häußermann-Prize 'Social City'. She is part of the project group ,What is governed in the large metropolis? Comparing Paris and London', directed by Prof. Patrick Le Galès.

Email: <u>barwick@cmb.hu-berlin.de</u>