DO LULU MOVEMENTS IN ITALY FIGHT MAFIA AND CORRUPTION?
Framing processes and ‘anti-system’ struggles in the No Tav, No Bridge and No Muos case studies.

Gianni Piazza
University of Catania

Giuliana Sorci
University of Catania

ABSTRACT: In this article, we focus on the way in which the LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) movements against great infrastructures have framed the issues of corruption and organized crime in Italy, with particular reference to the mafia system, and the struggle against them. Even though they may seem minor issues, they are present in many territorial struggles, from North to South: indeed, we have chosen to analyse – using documents and semi-structured interviews with key informants – as empirical cases the No Tav, No Bridge and No Muos movements. Considering the frame analysis of the activists we have found the same mechanisms of frame bridging, which connect corruption and mafia with other issues in the movements, and frame extension from the particular cases to the general issues. Moreover, the corrupt and mafia systems outlined by the Lulu activists merge into a unique “corrupt-mafia system” that produces unwanted public works. Indeed, we have defined the Lulu movements as territorial movements carrying on ‘anti-system’ struggles, because, while contrasting specific large-scale infrastructures and military bases, they struggle against the system that have created them and to which they belong.

KEYWORDS: corruption, mafia, lulu movements, great infrastructures, Italy

CORRESPONDING AUTHORS: giannipiazza@tiscali.it, giuliana.sorci81@gmail.com
1. Introduction: Lulu movements and frame analysis

A large white sign dominated the side of the Musiné mountain, in Val di Susa, for years: ‘No Tav - No Mafia’, which was then changed into ‘Tav=Mafia’. What does the mafia have to do with the controversial realization of a large-scale infrastructure - the high-speed railway line - in the far northwest of Italy, more than a thousand kilometres away from the southern regions, which are usually considered ‘Mafia lands’? As we will see in the following pages, mafia – and corruption – are certainly concerned with this and other great public infrastructures, though in a more articulated and complex way than we might expect.

In this article, we focus on the way in which the Lulu (Locally Unwanted Land Use) movements against large-scale infrastructures and military bases have framed issues of corruption and organized crime in Italy, with particular reference to mafia systems, and the struggle against them. If it is true that there has been significant research carried out into corruption and mafia within the social sciences (e.g. della Porta and Vannucci 1999; 2007; Schneider and Schneider 2003), not many of these studies adopt a bottom-up perspective on anti-corruption and anti-mafia ‘from below’. That is, the way in which social actors - like civil society and social movements - have worked out, and pursued, practices of daily resistance to the phenomena of corruption and mafia. In fact, although for these actors there has been significant demand for anti-corruption policies and practices, studies on mobilization have focused only on specific cases, addressing specialized audiences of civil society practitioners (Beyerle 2014). As far as the specifically Italian case is concerned, despite the fact that corruption and mafia are extremely widespread, the anti-mafia and anti-corruption frames have remained marginal in the mobilization that has taken place in recent decades. This may seem paradoxical, and against the current trend of anti-austerity social movements at the transnational level that, following the financial crisis, put the fight against corruption at the heart of ‘public discourse’ (e.g. the Indignados movement in Spain). However, according to della Porta and Vannucci (2007), this is because anti-corruption was rarely included on the public agenda in Italy, despite numerous episodes of micro-corruption and related political and financial scandals that revealed continuity with the era of Tangentopoli. Generally, social movements and grassroots actors have identified the fight against corruption and mafia as secondary claims, when weighed with issues that

---

1 Although both authors share the contents of this article, Gianni Piazza wrote the sections 1, 2, 5 and Giuliana Sorci the sections 3, 4, 6.
2 “Tangentopoli”, literally “the city of bribes” was, in the early ‘90s, the great scandal of political corruption in Italy.
were considered more important. Specifically, only a few movements, such as those against large infrastructures (Lulu) and those against water privatization in Italy, have identified specific episodes of corruption and the environment in which they occurred (della Porta and Piazza 2008a; della Porta, Mosca and Parks 2014).

**Lulu movements.** Since the very beginning of the 1990s, some Lulu territorial mobilizations have taken place in Italy. These were usually promoted, initially, by local communities and citizens’ committees (della Porta 2004), giving voice to their claims through protest, opposing unwanted urban and territorial interventions and transformations. What is at stake is the use of the land, the territory as the expression of social conflict over the relative ‘use value’ versus ‘exchange value’. On the one hand, the local political and economic elites conceive the city and the territory as a means to make profit or obtain consensus (exchange value); on the other, informal groups of citizens and associations consider the territory as use value for social and environmental purposes (della Porta and Piazza 2008b, 6). Many of these conflicts are not Nimby (Not In My Back Yard) but Nope (Not On the Planet Earth) (Trom 1999). Indeed, they are only seemingly parochial/localistic and/or environmentalist: large infrastructures, polluting waste disposal plants, bases and military installations, etc. are considered harmful, by the protesting local population, not only to the environment and public health, but also from political, social and economic points of view. Protesters tend to advance the claims of alternative solutions and models of development (della Porta and Piazza 2007; 2008a; della Porta et al. 2013).

**Frame analysis.** Previous above-mentioned research (della Porta and Piazza 2007; 2008a; 2008b, 70) already discussed the frames of the Mafia’s involvement in plans for construction of the Bridge across the Messina Straits, and of corruption in the Tav in Val di Susa, but not in an in-depth or detailed way. Therefore, in order to analyse the way corruption and mafia – and the struggle against them – have been addressed, and practiced, by activists involved in Lulu movements, we have used frame analysis, which allows us “to capture the process of attribution of meaning which lies behind the explosion of any conflict” (della Porta and Diani 2006, 74). From a strategic perspective, protest entrepreneurs elaborate a discourse oriented towards convincing citizens of the legitimate reasons for protest. According to Snow and his collaborators, a precondition for success is a process of “frame alignment” between movement activists and the people they intend to mobilize, that is a “linkage of individual and SMO interpretative orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO

---

3 Though we are aware of the theoretical difference between movements and mobilizations, in this article we have used the two terms as synonyms, because in the three cases analysed they correspond empirically.
activities, goals and ideology are congruent and complementary” (1986: 464). We have considered, for this research, two of the major forms of frame alignment: ‘frame bridging’ and ‘frame extension’. The former highlights common elements among cognitive frames which are otherwise isolated, occurring when “representations by movement organizers incorporate interpretations of reality produced by sectors of public opinion which might otherwise remain separated from each other” (della Porta and Diani 2006, 82). The latter “extends” the frames from the particular to the general, allowing “the specific concerns of a movement or organization to relate to more general goals, in contexts where the connection might not be at all evident” (ibidem). In fact, we have found the same mechanisms of frame bridging and frame extension, in all the Lulu movements analysed.

From a methodological point of view, this article is based on the findings of empirical research that is part of a larger European project on ‘Anticorruption policies’4. We have chosen to analyse, as case studies in Italy, the following three. The No Tav, against the construction of the high-speed railway in Val di Susa in Piedmont close to the border with France; the No Ponte, against the building of a bridge on the Messina Straits; the No Muos, which opposes the construction and operation of a US Navy ground station of satellite communications in Niscemi, Sicily. These cases have been selected because they can be considered among the most relevant and well-known in Italy, in terms of disputes for national and regional governments, for the importance they have achieved in terms of public opinion and media attention, for the level of conflict they have reached, and the amount of academic publications about them (e.g. Caruso 2010; della Porta and Piazza 2008b; 2016; Fedi and Mannarini 2008). Moreover, the types of collective actors who form the protest networks are very similar: citizens’ committees, environmental associations, grassroots unions, squatting social centres, and other groups. Two of these mobilizations are against large-scale public infrastructures, and one regards military bases. Two are located in southern Italy (one in Sicily and the other between Calabria and Sicily) and one in the far north of the country, in Piedmont. However, in terms of duration, composition of actors and socio-geographical area, the three campaigns can be considered as if they were two. In fact, both the No Tav and the No Bridge movements started almost simultaneously during the 1990s, but while the No Tav continues today, the No Bridge finished its mobilizations between 2008 and 2009; the same years as the No Muos movement began, which has lasted until today (there are also some actors from No Bridge among the initiators of No Muos). Moreo-

4 The European FP7 project ANTICORRP on “Anticorruption Policies Revisited. Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption” is directed by Donatella della Porta, from the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa-Florence, which we thank for having funded our research.
ver, while all three are located in extra-urban areas (a mountain valley, an agricultural area and the coasts of a sea strait), the No Tav movement is located in a region of the industrialized North with high social capital, while the movements No Bridge and No Muos are in the underdeveloped South, with low social capital density (della Porta and Piazza 2008a). Therefore, in a comparative perspective, we can analyse how the issues of the fight against mafia and corruption of these movements have been dealt with, in different areas such as the North and South of Italy.

Apart from previous publications on these movements (della Porta and Piazza 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2016; Piazza 2011), the main sources were a set of semi-structured interviews carried out with some activists from the three Lulu mobilizations: 11 interviews, 5 with activists of the No Tav Movement, 4 with No Muos, and 2 with No Bridge. Respondents were chosen among those activists identified as key informants, and selected for their expertise on the subject and internal representativeness. Lawyers from the No Muos movement, members of anti-mafia associations, experts on the topic among the movement’s spokesperson, journalists and bloggers, were all included. Through these interviews, we wanted to represent the plurality of different positions and interpretations among those who had skills within the various collective actors of the movement, rather than have indistinct representativeness of all components and groups.

In the following pages, we first briefly summarize the histories of the three mobilizations from their origins to the present day, then analyse the framing processes of the Lulu activists regarding mafia and corruption, the importance of these issues within the territorial movements, and the role played in them by individuals and/or specific groups. Finally, we outline our brief conclusions, synthesizing the emerging findings and the framing processes identified.

2. Brief summaries of three long Lulu movement histories

No TAV. The protest campaign against the construction of a 57 km tunnel, as part of the TAV (Treno Alta Velocità — High Speed Rail Line) in Val di Susa, Piedmont, close to the border with France, originated in the 1990s (della Porta and Piazza 2008b, 13-15).

\[5\] We gave each respondent a questionnaire divided into four parts. Each part was formed in turn by a set of specific questions. The first two parts were about how these LULU movements had dealt with the issues of the fight against organized crime and the Mafia, both in the specific mobilizations against the great infrastructures and in general in politics in Italy. The other two parts concerned the internal organization of groups and movements, the decision-making process, and finally the political opportunities structure.
However, it became more visible in the early 2000s, when the second Berlusconi government accelerated the policy-making process. The No Tav campaign, which started as a reaction to the risk of damage to the environment and health of citizens (due to soil erosion and asbestos within the mountain to be excavated), became increasingly proactive and constructive. The protest networks – environmentalists, local governments, citizens’ committees, social centres and grass-roots unions – developed both specific alternative proposals and, through a scale shift, ‘another model of possible development’, based on ‘de-growth’ (Latouche 2007). Moreover, they claimed the right of the local population to decide the future of its own territory, demanding a different form of democracy, more participative and deliberative (della Porta and Piazza 2008a, 107).

Following the decision by authorities to undertake the first site tests on the ground, the mobilization reached its first peak at the end of 2005, when the violent eviction of protestors occupying the site by police gave the case national visibility. During marches and demonstrations, the protesters displayed posters and banners against the supporters of the Tav, who were defined as “money makers” speculators, corrupt and ‘Mafia’, while in that period there appeared, in large white writing, the sign “No Tav – No Mafia”, on the side of the Musiné mountain.

On 22 January 2006, two large demonstrations in Val di Susa and Messina, against the TAV and the Bridge on the Straits, sealed the ‘twinning’ between the two movements. The first acute phase of the conflict concluded with a partial victory by Tav opponents: the temporary suspension of works and the start of negotiation between national experts and government representatives, counter-experts and local politicians, the ‘Technical Observatory’ (della Porta and Piazza 2008b, 20-21).

In 2006, the new centre-left Prodi government initially adopted an ambiguous position, but the implementation of the high-speed rail line in Val di Susa remained on the agenda, although concrete action was limited to continuing negotiation. In the summer of 2006, No Tav and committees elsewhere in Italy set up the Patto Nazionale di Solidarietà e Mutuo Soccorso (Mutual Aid and National Solidarity Pact), aimed at supporting and giving visibility to LULU movements. The pact was based on the conception of territory as a ‘common good’ not to be commodified, on demand for more participative democracy, and on the assertion of autonomy for governments and parties of ‘every colour’, including those of the left.

After the electoral triumph of the centre-right coalition in April 2008, the fourth Berlusconi Government restarted the TAV programme. In June, negotiations within the Technical Observatory concluded with an agreement between the government and some of the Val di Susa mayors, allowing the building of the high-speed line. No Tav
committees and the radical and antagonist left rejected the agreement, creating a split between local administrations and other protesting actors. In January 2010, the site tests restarted, in spite of the opposition from members of the No Tav committees, who were charged by police during demonstrations. The national governments following the fall of Berlusconi in 2011, those led by Monti and, after the 2013 general elections, Letta, Renzi in 2014 and Gentiloni in 2016, all strongly confirmed the decision to implement the TAV in Val di Susa, notwithstanding widespread protests and opposition all over the country. The working site and the surrounding area was militarized, and the most recent peaks of conflict and clashes with the police were seen between 2011 and 2013, when protests were followed by arrests and convictions for the No Tav activists, above all the social centre militants and anarchists.

The No Tav is the longest-lasting and best-known territorial movement in Italy, with the highest level of mass participation ever achieved in the country. It is considered, by most Italian movement activists, an inspiring symbol of resistance and a model of struggle to be imitated. Currently, the mobilization and protests go on, notwithstanding state repression and the will of the Italian and French governments to continue and complete the building work, which is far behind schedule, with only the secondary tunnel under construction.

**No Bridge.** The opposition to the project of a bridge on the Messina Straits (No Ponte), between Sicily and Calabria, is also a long-lasting mobilization, even if it has been less contentious, intense and continuous than the No TAV movement. The campaign against the construction of the bridge also began during the 1990s with some counter-informative actions. When, in 1997, the first Prodi Government approved the project by the ‘Stretto di Messina Ltd’ company, an opposing committee ‘Tra Scilla e Cariddi’ was formed by intellectuals, environmental associations and green-radical left parties, who appealed to UNESCO for protection of the area around the Strait (della Porta and Piazza 2008a, 33).

Protests arose during spring 2002, with the mobilisation of citizens’ committees, social forums, social centres, environmental groups, grass-roots unions (Cub, Cobas) and radical left-wing political parties against the bridge. These took place a few months after the approval of the ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (Target Law) by the second Berlusconi Government, which deregulated procedures for public works, and included the bridge as a strategic infrastructural project (della Porta and Piazza 2008b, 22). The No Bridge (Ponte) movement attracted involvement from further protest elements and cross-issues actors whose concerns went beyond the environment, demanding the modernization of existing infrastructures according to principles of eco-compatibility. In November 2002, the No Bridge activists and organizations participated in the European Social Fo-
rum in Florence. The discourse of protesters extended to a transnational dimension, the battle against the bridge became linked to mobilizations against other major public infrastructures in Italy, and became inserted in the framework of a more general struggle against neo-liberal globalization (della Porta and Piazza 2008a, 35-37). During the summers of 2002, 2003 and 2004, the No Bridge activists organized national and international ‘camps of struggle’ on the two coasts of the Straits, with the participation of hundreds of activists from Italy and abroad. The documents setting up the campsites denounced how “there is convergence in the interests of powerful financiers, businessmen, politicians and the Mafia, whose intertwining is now no longer considered a crime or even a scandal” by institutions and public opinion, according to the activists (della Porta and Piazza 2008b, 62). Between 2004 and 2005, both the decision-making process – through the approval, by the European Parliament, of the bridge plan and the call for tenders from contractors – and the protest campaign, gathered pace. The various marches and sit-ins attracted thousands of participants; an enormous papier-mâché hen was carried, to symbolize the construction of the bridge as a chicken that produced “golden eggs”, and used as a symbol of corruption in the large infrastructures (ibidem, 26). Demonstrations culminated in the twinned No Tav–No Bridge demonstration, of 22 January 2006 in Messina, when 20,000 people participated in the National Procession against the Bridge in Messina, an event which included a sizeable delegation of protesters from Val di Susa. In the following months, this twinning was consolidated and extended to other mobilisations, beyond the local dimension (della Porta and Piazza 2008b, 27), and peaked with the formation of the National Pact of Mutual Aid.

After the general election in April 2006, the new Prodi centre-left government declared the bridge project to be ‘non-priority work’, and held up the procedure. Consequently, the No Bridge campaign also halted, because the activists believed they had achieved their immediate goal (deferral of the decision). During the brief life of this Prodi Government, the attempt to abolish the ‘Stretto di Messina’ company by law failed, because members of the Italia dei Valori party, together with the centre-right opposition, voted to maintain it (19 November 2007). After the fall of the government and the general elections, in 2008, the new Berlusconi centre-right government re-launched the bridge project, aided by the Sicilian government, which was led by the autonomist Lombardo. They resumed the policy process and announced the beginning of work on 23 December 2009. Consequently, the No Bridge campaign also intensified once again, with mass demonstrations on 8 August in Messina, on 19 December on the Calabrian coast, and by placing presidi (pickets) on the building sites during June 2010.

After the EU’s decision to no longer fund the bridge project, in October 2011, and
the resignation of Berlusconi in November, the new Monti administration, and subsequent national governments, blocked the implementation of the project. On April 2013, the ‘Stretto di Messina Ltd’ company was liquidated. Only a few months before his defeat in the referendum and subsequent resignation, on 4 December 2016, Renzi relaunched the idea of building the bridge, but without success. The No Bridge Movement has thus been successful so far, and has demobilized after achieving its main goal. However, its activists are involved in other mobilizations such as those against the Muos and the G7 2017, in Taormina.

**No Muos.** The movement against the MUOS (Mobile User Objective System) started in 2008-2009 in Niscemi (Sicily), with the main goal of stopping the construction of a ground station for satellite communications inside the nearby US Navy base. If, at the beginning, local residents had protested because they were worried about health risks and environmental damage due to radio waves, they were joined very soon, in the course of mobilization, by other protesters. Their frames were extended beyond the concern for electromagnetic pollution: from NIMBY to NOPE activism. The struggle broadened, in fact, into what social movement scholars have called ‘scale-shift’ (Tarrow and McAdam 2005). Activists from all over Sicily and Italy came to Niscemi to participate in national marches, ‘struggle campsites’ and direct actions; for them, the No Muos became a symbol of authentic territorial resistance, not only against unjust and non-democratic decisions, but also against war and the militarization of the land. The protest network was formed by citizens’ committees, social centres and left-wing opposition groups, grassroots unions and environmental associations. They were able to cross and connect the territories from Niscemi to the regional, national and transnational level, targeting different institutions, linking up with other similar LULU movements who aimed to find different uses for the territory (No Radar, No Tav, No dal Molin, No Bridge, No Triv, etc.), as well as anti-austerity movements, those in favour of housing rights and migrants’ rights, etc. (della Porta and Piazza 2016).

During a period of latency in 2010-2011, some activists denounced Mafia infiltration of the construction company in charge of the works. Then, following a change in regional policy, mobilization resumed in 2012, and the first national demonstration was held on 6 October. The peaks of the conflict occurred between 2013 and 2014. On January 2013 and during the following months, hundreds of activists blocked the road to prevent the entry of trucks into the base, and were violently charged by the police. On 30 March there was the largest procession to the US base (15,000 demonstrators), which was followed by a self-organized strike, on 31 May in Niscemi (5,000 participant residents). In July, the Sicilian Democrat Governor, Crocetta, suddenly changed his decision to block the Muos, thus allowing the building work to continue. As a reaction, on
9 August 2013, thousands of demonstrators invaded and temporarily occupied the US base, after cutting the fences and facing-off with police (129 activists were later charged). After the regional demonstration in Palermo on 27 September (5,000 participants), mobilization declined in the autumn-winter, to restart again in the spring of 2014: on 1 March, a new national demonstration saw some thousands of protesters march to the base, despite the police presence, reaching the gates. Then, in the summer, “history” unexpectedly repeated itself. On 9 August, 2,000 demonstrators marched from the picket-campsite to the gates of the base. There, some of them cut the fences and more than 1,000 invaded the base after a brief confrontation with policemen, who had tried to prevent their entrance with truncheons; after that, the ‘base invaders’ gathered in assembly, and decided to leave the military site.

In 2015, the regional civil court (TAR) unexpectedly blocked the MUOS operation, and the local prosecutor of Caltagirone (the judicial office responsible for Niscemi) seized the building site, because construction permission had been granted without taking into account the health risks, nor those to the environment or the air traffic of nearby airports. However, one year later, these judgments and court decisions were overturned. On 6 May 2016, the definitive judgment of the CGA (Council of Administrative Justice, the second and final civil judicial step in Sicily) accepted the appeal of the Italian Defence Ministry, stating that the electromagnetic waves were not harmful for health. On 5 August, the Court of Review of Catania released the site from seizure, despite an ongoing criminal proceeding for environmental offences and illegal building, underway at the local court. From that time forward, the Niscemi satellite plant has been operational, and able to transmit. Despite this, the No Muos still continue to protest and demonstrate in the streets in Niscemi, in the city of Giardini against the G7 Taormina summit, and in the cork forest around the US base. More recently, the former mayor of Niscemi, Francesco La Rosa, was arrested in June 2017 for mafia and ‘exchange of votes’ and released in July, while the No Muos activists won the Aachen International Peace Prize.

3. Frame bridging and extension: anti-mafia and anti-corruption as ‘anti-system’ struggles

After these short summaries of the three territorial movements, it might seem that the issues of corruption, of organized crime, and the struggle against them, are marginal features of the discourses and claims of these Lulu mobilizations. It may seem that the No Tav, No Bridge and No Muos activists, and citizens involved in the strug-
Gianni Piazza and Giuliana Sorci, Do Lulu Movements in Italy Fight Mafia and Corruption?

gles, were not greatly interested in these issues. However, if it is true that the fight against corruption and the Mafia was not always among the main reasons for citizens and activists to mobilize in these Lulu movements, the issues were often present inside them, and used in cognitive frames and discursive strategy, in order to further legitimize claims and forms of action.

The narratives and frames that emerge from the semi-structured interviews carried out during the research leave no doubt on the matter, even if the ways in which fighting against the mafia and corruption are conceived, interpreted and practiced are variegated and nuanced across the different movements and, sometimes, also within them. However, in all three cases, we find the same mechanisms of frame bridging and frame extension and, with slight distinctions, we can define these mobilizations as ‘movements conducting antisystem struggles’. They are not ‘antisystem movements’ because they do not aim to radically change the overall political, social and economic system, though their more radical sectors – social centres, anarchists and other antagonistic groups – would have this long-term goal. This is not the case, however, for the more moderate factions (environmental associations, unions, mayors, etc.). Nevertheless, the Lulu movements, opposed to specific large-scale infrastructures and military bases, do fight, according to their frames, against the ‘corrupting system’, collusive with the Mafia, which generated the contested works, and of which they are a part. If, for the radical sectors of the movement, the ‘mafia and corrupting system’ is inevitably produced by the capitalist system, which they oppose and would like to overthrow, for the more moderate, the overlap between the specific (mafia/corruption) system and the general (capitalist) system is not presupposed. For the more moderate groups, the fight against the ‘corrupt and criminal system’, which generated the disputed infrastructures, does not necessarily coincide with the struggle against the capitalist system, because capitalism does not necessarily entail crime and corruption. Therefore, to avoid terminological confusion or conceptual ambiguity, we prefer to define these mobilizations not as ‘antisystem movements’, but as Lulu movements carrying out ‘anti-system’ struggles. As we will see below, this also depends on the frame extension and frame bridging detected.

Firstly, we observed that mafia and corruption, and the fight against them, are strictly interrelated and intertwined in the activists’ frames; and not only those forms deriving from Sicily, as we expected, but also from the Valley, in a territory apparently far from ‘mafia land’. This is not only because the mafia firms and families are already present and operational even in northern Italy, but also because the overall system of the large-scale infrastructures is considered as an intrinsically corrupt and mafia system. As one No Tav activist argues: “The Mafia is not just a geographic location, so the North is
clean and the Mafia is in the South ... we have the Mafia in the North, but not so much because it emigrated from the South to the North, but because the Mafia is the system that carries out great evil works” (INT1).

However, though the dimensions related to mafia and corruption are sufficiently closely intertwined that they merge into a unique system, we have addressed them separately in the movements’ frames, for analytical purposes alone, in order to better understand the ways in which they are conceived. Starting from the interpretations relating to criminal organizations, therefore, we found only partially different ways of framing the Mafia system and its involvement in the respective contentious public works. Indeed, all the activists interviewed shared the idea that the Mafia is not a phenomenon of folklore, nor simply a set of firms or families trying to infiltrate the public works in order to have subcontracts, an extension of their activities in the illicit trafficking of drugs and weapons, their rackets, etc. The Mafia is considered a complex, overarching system of which the Tav, the Bridge, Muos – and other large infrastructures – are an integral part and, for this reason too, opposing the large public infrastructures and the US military bases is a way of fighting the Mafia.

In the No Muos case, the mafia system is represented by a local mafia firm involved in the building works, but in connection with (and with the complicity of) local/regional institutions and US military administrations. The No Muos activists discovered the importance of the Mafia during monitoring activities around the base, when they found that the building company owned by a local mafia boss had received the contract for the works without anti-mafia certification:

... the No Muos committees found that the trucks coming and going for earth-moving, belonged to the then mafia boss of Niscemi, ... who was then sentenced for mafia. It was a discovery by the movement, that denounced it ... I met him at the No Muos demonstrations, because he came to the marches in the most arrogant possible way, because in a village like Niscemi, he had no problem with checking who was involved in the actions ... with intimidation. Therefore, the Movement realized that the mafia was an important actor, which is creating one of the most devastating projects ... together with the US Navy, the arrogant Italian Army and government, and the collaboration of the Sicilian Region and some other political forces ... The movement realized that it was not an anomaly. There was no military infrastructure in which Cosa Nostra did not have a decisive role. I am referring to US and NATO bases. After the allied landing, in Sicily in '43, a relationship of exchange between local and international criminal organizations and a large polit-

---

6The Calcestruzzi Piazza Srl Company was owned by V. Piazza: there is no degree of kinship or familiarity between the boss and the co-author of this article, they are just homonyms.
ical, economic and military apparatus was created. In all military structures, in Sicily in particular ... there was the possibility that works or sub-contracts were managed, with the utmost transparency, by criminal organizations (INM2).

From this long extract, moreover, it can be seen how the No Muos have elaborated a frame bridging, connecting the struggle against the US military station with the fight against the Mafia, an issue shared by a large sector of public opinion, and which could otherwise have been considered unrelated. There is then a frame extension, in which the specific opposition to Muos is inserted in a more general struggle against war, militarism and the mafia system. Also in the discourse opposing the project of the bridge on the Messina Straits, we can find both frame bridging and frame extension, connecting the project of infrastructure with the Mafia and generalizing the mobilization against the bridge to that against the large-scale infrastructures. Even in this case, local mafia firms are involved in earth-moving, but they are only parts of a larger framework in which the greater, international mafia have tried to fund the project, in order to launder dirty money and for self-legitimization. A well-known No Bridge journalist-activist provides the following analysis:

I wrote a book, “The Godfathers of the Bridge” ... which ... attempts to prove an assumption that the mafia does not intervene immediately only because it concerns the South of Italy (where it controls the territory) ... this large work in itself, as it has been designed, thought out, structured and narrated, is crimigenous in itself, so it immediately lends itself to the control of criminal organizations ... I tried to prove - also based on some international judicial inquiries - that the Mafia, not the local criminal organizations, but the great Mafia, Cosa Nostra, coming from North America controlling the great cocaine and heroin trafficking worldwide, had seen in the bridge a model of self-legitimation ... Whoever builds the bridge will go down in history. When criminal organizations see a large infrastructure that is narrated in this way, and find credible political interlocutors, who have the need to co-finance the work ... they propose themselves as financiers. They are not interested in the subcontracts, but they want to fund the large infrastructure as political self-legitimation after the massacres of '92 - '93, because the mafia needs to self-legitimize. The bridge becomes ... a model of expropriation of subjectivity that controls the territories, as well as a great speculative and criminal operation where mafias become fundamental players (INP1).

As a matter of fact, the No Bridge activists disagree with the slogan of Vendola, ‘the
bridge unites two cosche\textsuperscript{7} and not two coasts’, because “the territories are complex things, within which there are corrupt elements, there are the mafias, yet there are also non-mafias, and those who fight the mafia. And if you say that, ‘the bridge joins two cosche’, this is like saying you are homologizing the territories to the mafia families that govern them” (INP2).

The involvement of the mafia firms or families in the works at the building site of the Tav is a common feature of Val di Susa and Sicily, even though Piedmont is not traditionally considered a mafia region. Indeed, as one activist explains, “there is also the specificity of Valsusa, where since the 70s some families coming from Calabria, and somehow linked to this type of organization (’Ndrangheta\textsuperscript{8}) have been put on confinement in the valley. Therefore, it is no coincidence that some of these firms won the lowest bid to perform a certain kind of work like heart-moving” (INT4). However, the presence of these criminal firms is considered the tip of an iceberg, the part that is visible and somewhat reassuring - a known disease that can be cured - but which actually hides the real nature of the mafia system: “Mafia is always identified with some particular families ... Mafia firms, who worked and who continue to work indirectly at the Tav building site. We know that these issues come out openly and from above, when these things no longer serve, so they are often used and thrown out. We often think that the Mafia is hiding right in the centre of power, in the heart of the state…” (INT1).

Therefore, for the No Tav movement, the Mafia is not conceived of only as a criminal organization linked to its geographical position (southern Italy), but a more overall and general system they call the Business Transversal Party. A system comprising not only mafia families, but also large construction companies, bipartisan politicians, parties, and which is even supported by media mainstreams and some state institutions like the police and judiciary, to control mobilization. As two well-known Valsusini activists affirm:

\[\ldots\text{the Mafia is what we call the Business Transversal Party, that is, for example, that of the big pseudo-cooperatives like the CMC\textsuperscript{9}, who do the work at the building site. \ldots\text{with the big heart-moving machines, that is also part of the Mafia because these big machines are then given to subcontractors \ldots Why do we call it transversal? Because this contract}\]

\textsuperscript{7} Vendola is a left-wing politician, former leader of Sel (then Sinistra Italiana). The Cosche or mafia families are groups of criminals under the command of a boss. In this case, the bridge would unite the Sicilian and Calabria mafias. See the following note.

\textsuperscript{8} The ’Ndrangheta is the crime organization coming from Calabria, similar to Sicilian Mafia.

\textsuperscript{9} The CMC – Coop\textipa{r}ativa Muratori e Cementisti of Ravenna was one of the oldest cooperatives of bricklayers, born at the beginning of the XX century and always linked to the traditional left wing parties. Now it is a great construction company with millionaire contracts for large-scale works all over the world.
had been given to the CMC, and therefore the PD ... by the then minister of the Berlusconi government, Lunardi, who, however, had had a favour in exchange for this. And is this not mafia? Great families, who control and favour each other, I wonder what it is? (INT1).

Despite the fact that there have been judicial investigations, involving the firms ... the implication we have always been aware of is not the Mafia with the ‘coppola’ - to simplify - but it’s just concerned with power; transformed by the mafia, that becomes power. For us the Mafia today is on a large-scale work, so it’s the Mafia of parties, the Mafia of power, the Mafia of big construction companies, and the division of money (INT5).

In this case, the frame bridging and the frame extension are well represented, as we have mentioned beginning this article, by the large symbolic characters on the mountain Musinè in Val di Susa, saying ‘No Tav - No Mafia’. “It’s very clear, for us the enemies are fairly clear” (INT5), underlines an activist from the ‘Popular struggling committee’ of Bussoleno. Another activist specifies that “on the Musinè, where there was the large sign ‘No Tav - No Mafia’, this has now become ‘Tav = Mafias’, because the Mafia is not one, rather it is a system. Therefore, I would say that the movement has understood it well, and it never loses sight of that. It is not a matter of folklore, the Mafia, but it is an economic and social issue” (INT1).

The above-outlined mafia systems have to be analytically integrated with the corruption dimension, which is always present in all three case studies, even if there are different degrees of intensity between the large-scale infrastructures (Tav or Bridge), and the military satellite station (Muos). As an effect of the frame bridging and extension, the two dimensions merge into a single system. In fact, for all the activists interviewed, these disputed public works are not only inevitably characterized by the phenomenon of corruption, but this dimension - together with that of the Mafia - is constitutive and fundamental for the overarching system. Indeed, the large-scale public infrastructures system is considered corrupt and “criminogenous” in itself, because the episodes of corruption that are discovered and brought to light are not casual or accidental, but are the physiological consequence of a system that is inherently pathological. Therefore, this system would inevitably favour – or entail – corruption, bribes for politicians and extra earnings for construction companies, including those affiliated to the mafia. As the No Bridge and No Tav activists argue:

The political areas of the movement have identified the normative and financial elements that were the criminogenic elements at the base of the bridge. That is, the crimi-

\[\text{Coppola}\] is a traditional Sicilian hat usually associated with the old rural Mafia.
nal aspects, which then emerge as epiphenomena in the judicial inquiries, are not an outgrowth in respect to the work, but are part of the work because they are produced by the normative and organizational structure of the large-scale works (INP2).

It is clear that such a mechanism is pathological in itself. It is a system that is corrupt in itself, which favours corruption, and I believe this inquiry confirms it ... (INP1).

Many of us realized that the engine of the implementation of these large infrastructures is based on corruption, and decisively on the ease through which, in these areas, they create bribes for politicians and extra earnings for the financial companies ... (INT2).

The model harshly criticized by the movement activists is that designed by the Objective Law (Legge Obiettivo) of 2001, centred on the role of the general contractor, in which all the phases of the work are put in the hands of a unique subject, without real mechanisms of control, transparency, or checks and balances. The public institutions would be exempted from their functions of control, favouring the transfer of financial resources from the state to private companies, both legal and criminal, above all in times of economic crisis. Once again, the No Bridge and No Tav activists are in agreement in their analysis:

... the way in which the large-scale works were thought out, the model provided by the Objective Law: to give the general contractor the whole management. From the planning to the executive design, to the realization of the work ... It is a system designed to give exemption from controls, reduce the possibility of controls and intervention, to favour the way that huge resources are transferred illegally to business organizations or criminals. (INP1)

... When they decide to carry out the work, there is no more effective control and transparency, and the money increases enormously. There is even a greater commingling between the world of a certain entrepreneurship, the big entrepreneurs, and political power; which means an overlap of interests, over which it is difficult to exercise control (INT4).

... Since you attribute to the general contractor both the design of the financial system’s organization and the control mechanisms, it is clear that you are putting into the hands of a single subject, the elements that instead should be within a system of balances, and therefore inevitably the general contractor has become a criminogenic element. ... It is a system organized so that, in a situation of economic crisis, where large companies cannot stand alone on the market, public resources are attacked by them. Therefore, a system for “milking the cow” (the State) has been organized (INP2).

It is clear how, in all this analysis there is a process of frame extension, in which the activists generalize the criticism on the Tav in Val di Susa and the bridge on the Straits to the overall and broader model of large-scale public infrastructures. Moreover, in the
Gianni Piazza and Giuliana Sorci, Do Lulu Movements in Italy Fight Mafia and Corruption?

case of the bridge on the Messina Straits, the model would be conceived of as operational only in the planning phase, rather than that of the construction work (which almost never started). It would transfer public money to what an activist calls “mafia bourgeoisie”, composed not of gangsters but of “white collars”; that is, businessmen, designers, engineers, lawyers, etc.: “the model of the bridge on the Straits, is not a model of work but of planning ... there are not only criminal organizations which speculate on the work, but there is also a system that we define as ‘the mafia bourgeoisie’. These are not criminal organizations but businessmen, designers, engineers and lawyers who just get together around the table and design works with no reference to the territories...” (INP1)

Even in the case of a non-large-scale infrastructure, such as the construction of the Muos in Niscemi, where corruption episodes have not emerged (yet), though there are several administrative and criminal proceedings for environmental offences and illegal construction, the procurement and constructions system is considered, by the activists, to be very probably corrupt, and certainly illegal. This is because of the lack of political-institutional control, and even real complicity in the violation of norms and rules. As one of the No Muos lawyers affirms:

... For a plant like the Muos ... in its construction and implementation and even before its authorization, a procedure was followed that violated a number of legal rules. We have no exact understanding of corruption episodes, but as we know the case, we are sure there will have been such passages. Also because, at the political level, there was a lack of parliamentary debate, and in the Region, again, it was not a matter of debate, but it was like a passage of cards, involving politicians who violated a series of rules while the permissions were given (INM3).

And, as another activist argues, also involving local and national authorities, like police, Prefecture and Regional officials, in the system that defends US military interests:

The local authorities and police that have the task of protecting the territory, that should enforce ‘so-called’ legality, in the mafia construction company affair, they did not. ... the Caltanissetta Police Department had warned the Prefecture and informed the Italian military air force that the subcontractors were without anti-mafia certification. ... The Prefecture could not fail to know this, because it is the body that provides this certification. This demonstrates the level of complicity. ... if the Muos has been realized so far, it is because there was a system - not only ‘bad Yankee imperialism’ that imposed the work. A number of subjects, including officials from the Sicilian Region, who even pretended not to know the urban and environmental regulations, which were supposed to protect the natural reserve, constitute the system (INM2).
4. Do anti-mafia and anticorruption issues matter in the Lulu movements?

In the three cases analysed, most activists interviewed consider fighting the Mafia and corruption as important issues of the mobilizations, even if they have different positions in the priorities of the movement’s agendas; sometimes they are primary themes, other times secondary, depending on the different movements’ groups and actors. According to No Tav, these issues have been and are central for the whole movement, not only for a few activists, and they are also widespread among the inhabitants of Val Susa. This is also confirmed by the interviewees who have been following these themes as professionals (engineers and transport technicians) as well as No Tav militants: “for me these themes are absolutely central” (INT2); “for us, they are one of the strengths of our battle, because they show that that entire building site is illegal” (INT3). These issues are recognized as crucial themes, shared by the No Tav people, also by the social centre activists. However, the latter group do not consider them a priority, because they are more interested in the process of self-activation, politicization and self-organization of the Valsusa inhabitants:

From the very beginning, for the nature of the movement and its components, the discourse against bribery and mafia infiltration was part of the discourse of the No Tav movement. I would say more at the beginning than later. Then it occupied a pretty central position. At first it was one of the strong discourses, it is also now one of the discourses of building consensus and adhesion ... However, combating corruption and mafia has never been our main goal as social centre comrades and as the antagonistic and most radical sector. ... For most comrades, what was interesting was self-activation, and the first-person participation of the inhabitants of the Valley (INT4).

Also for the No Bridge activists interviewed, struggling against corruption and Mafia are important issues, but they are aware that they were mainly significant for political groups and militants, not for many ‘ordinary’ people within the movement, who were motivated by other environmental, socio-economic and political concerns: “Fighting mafia and corruption were included in the movement’s claims, and they were for me, and at least for the political groups, extremely important ...” (INP2). However, “for most people they have never been major issues. Some parts of the movement have tried, and I have personally tried to systematically say: this is not a secondary issue ... Within the movement, for thousands of people it has certainly not been a major thing, although ... I would say that in the end it was an aspect which did motivate and attract interest” (INP1).

Like the previous interviewees, the No Muos activists also consider these issues im-
portant and easy to include in the movement’s agenda, highlighting in this way *frame bridging* with other issues: “Yes, they are important. No, it has not been so difficult (including them), the No Muos movement has always seen, I believe, all these issues as joined together, they are not separated themes, there is a thread…” (INM1); “then, they certainly have a weight. But the fight against Muos has put together many aspects, in my opinion, all of equal importance, because there can be no priority among health, antimilitarism, security in the territory and the fight against the mafia, for me they are all matters which are equally important” (INM3). However, some respondents also admit that not all the other sectors of the protest campaign believed them really significant: “They were not really relevant” (INM2); “Was it difficult to include them among the movement’s claims? The difficulty is inevitably tied a bit to the historical moment in which we live, where the discussion about corruption has now become a normal thing, a normal attitude, normal behaviour” (INM3).

5. More individuals than specific groups have addressing the struggle against corruption and mafia

As we have seen, corruption and mafia, and the struggle against them, are important issues in the movements analysed, even if they are not always central in the movement’s agenda (this is more a feature of the No Tav than the others), nor are they pushed or supported by all the movements’ actors. Instead, rather than specific groups and organizations focused on fighting mafia and corruption, we have observed the relevant role of some individuals, activists with specific skills (freelance journalists, professionals, academics, etc.). They significantly contributed to the *frame extension* and *bridging*, investigating public contracts and the relations among economic and political-institutional powers, writing documents and publishing books, so disseminating the knowledge acquired. It is not by chance that we have interviewed almost all of them for this research.

First, the figure of Antonio Mazzeo features in the Sicilian movements, a freelance journalist-activist who initiated, and promoted both mobilizations with the help of a few others, writing and publishing continuously - documents, articles and several books, the two most important are: *The Godfathers of the Bridge* (2010), about the Bridge on the Straits, and *The Monster of Niscemi* (2013), on the Muos. In addition, Gino Sturniolo, one of the initial promoters of the No Bridge movement, edited a book entitled *Bridge on the Strait and Milking Cows* (2009). During his interview, he remembers how there were no particular groups or “sectors (of the movement) that dealt
with the issues of corruption and the mafia ... apart from the journalistic enquiries carried out by Antonio Mazzeo, which were the most important” (INP2).

In the No Tav case, no specific sectors of the movement were created to deal with the topics of Mafia and corruption, but some professionals and academics explicitly followed these issues, as one activist remembers: “We do not have specific sectors ... we did not create an association or group that specifically follows this ... if we can say that there are people who specialize in these things ... they do it in order to share what they find out with everyone” (INT1). The activities of enquiring, monitoring and mapping the construction companies working at the Tav building sites were carried out not only as individual activists, but also as members of formal and informal local organizations which preceded the mobilization and initiated it. In fact, Claudio Giorno was a member of the “Pro-Natura environmental association, which has always denounced building speculation and the infiltration of mafia groups in the valley” (INT2). He remembers that “The No Tav movement has an ancestor ... a group of technicians and university professors, people with some professional competence in the field of transport, in the environmental field, established since ‘91–‘92: the Habitat committee for the protection of the residual liveability of Val di Susa” (INT2). Even an Askatasuna social centre activist underlines the role of the intellectuals, “who gave birth to the Habitat group in the early 1990s and ... pointed out all the contradictions in the non-transparent relationships between contracting firms and political power... The most important was Ivan Cicconi, who ... analysed how project financing in Italy, especially for large public works ... created a huge increase in costs ... because there is no effective control and transparency” (INT4).

Therefore, beyond these intellectual-activists, very few groups/organizations played a specific role in fighting mafia and corruption. The most quoted – or maybe the only one – is the “Rita Atria Anti-mafias Association”¹¹, both in the No Bridge and in the No Muos mobilizations, as a lawyer interviewed affirms: “The most active group from this point of view, which played an important role in the action, was the anti-mafia association ‘Rita Atria’, which of course had a specific role and therefore always denounced these issues of legitimacy of the works” (INM4). The former chair of the anti-mafia organization underlines that: “… my association has accepted to take responsibility for this struggle, because we thought it was a battle against the mafias ... We are now addressing the fight more in the courts. We have already denounced several people, from the managers to the police escorting the trucks ... to the subcontractor who had no anti-mafia certification” (INM1).

¹¹ This association takes the name from Rita Atria, a young girl witness of justice who committed suicide shortly after the killing of the judges Falcone and Borsellino by the Mafia in 1992.
By contrast, in the No Tav mobilization the anti-mafia associations did not participate actively, neither did they explicitly support the struggle, because their first principles were respect for legality and the state, and they therefore disagreed with the most radical - even illegal – forms of action of the movement. In the words of a social centre militant, “they (e.g. the Abele group) recognize the centrality of the law, the state ... while instead the strength of the No Tav movement had been to break with these things, and to focus on direct participation and self-organization” (INT4). According to another activist, “the great anti-mafia associations never participated in a decisive way, nor openly supported the No Tav, for two reasons. The first is ... not wanting to get their hands dirty with behaviour (of the No Tav movement) that is very different from theirs... Second, the main ‘Inquisitor’ of the No Tav movement was, and is (though he no longer occupies the role) the judge Giancarlo Caselli. That (his judicial inquiry against activists) was a big watershed, because he was linked to very large associations like ‘Libera’ and to the party that had the dirtiest hands, the Democratic Party” (INT5). In fact, while for anti-mafia associations Caselli represents a very positive model, as a defender of law and state, according to the No Tav activists he is one of their main enemies.

6. Conclusions

As we have seen, fighting corruption and mafia is almost never the main motivation or reason for citizens and activists to mobilize in the Lulu conflicts studied, but they are considered important issues, even if they occupy different position in the movements’ agendas. Sometimes, they are primary themes (No Tav), other times secondary issues (No Muos, No Bridge), depending on the different actors and composition of the movements. In a comparative perspective, we can say that anti-mafia and anti-corruption claims are more widespread among protesters, and have a more popular dimension in the No Tav movement than in No Bridge and No Muos, where they have been dealt with by a narrower circle of specialized activists endowed with expertise in the matter. This may seem paradoxical, because southern Italy and Sicily in particular, are the territories where there is a high concentration of these phenomena, but perhaps that is just why most people are more accustomed to coexisting with them with resignation or indifference. As a No Muos lawyer affirms, “we live as if the corruption at the bottom does not arouse so much scandal. The difficulty is therefore because the level of intolerance has been lowered ... in common perception” (INM3).

In particular, these activists with specific expertise (academics, journalists, profes-
sionals, etc.) have individually pushed these issues within all the movements, rather than through specific groups and organizations focused on mafia and corruption. They have played a fundamental role in elaborating and disseminating knowledge on these themes, so contributing to the framing processes we identified in the introduction, shared by all the three Lulu movements, i.e. frame bridging and frame extension.

Frame bridging occurs, because the activists have been able to connect the issues of anticorruption and anti-mafia with the main, but not exclusive, claims of mobilization, like the defence of citizens’ health, the safeguard of the territory and the environment, the right of the local population to decide their own future, etc. Moreover, they have tried to align, more or less successfully, those issues with the interpretative schemas of sectors of public opinion that could otherwise stay disconnected from each other. Frame extension is relevant because individuals and groups of the movements have been able to generalize their specific concerns, inserting the struggle against the Tav and the Bridge into the context of opposition to the development model based on large-scale public infrastructures, or framing the fight against the Muos in terms of the struggle for peace, against war and the militarization of territory.

These two types of frame alignment have often been used in the discursive strategy of the Lulu activists, not only because they expressed the movements’ identities, but also to further legitimize their claims, to try to gain consensus, and to fight corruption and mafia: “some of us understood ... that a struggle would probably be more effective if it puts at the centre of the matter, or in any case, if it promotes in the hierarchy, a moral question like that of corruption, because it could extirpate or drastically limit this phenomenon” (INT2).

Moreover, from these framing processes, a systemic dimension of the corruption and mafia related to the disputed public works emerges. The Tav, the Bridge, the Muos are indeed considered by the Lulu activists as the outcomes of policies in which mafia and corruption are integral parts of very similar systems, with only diverse nuances according to the different movements and, sometimes, also within them. These systems are framed as “criminogenous” and corrupt in themselves, because all the powers are put in the hands of a unique player – the general contractor in the large-scale infrastructures – without transparency and control mechanisms (Tav, Bridge), providing bribes for politicians and extra earnings for construction companies, legally and illegally, with mafia infiltrations. But, these are also conceived as ‘Mafia systems’, not only because of the presence of local crime firms receiving subcontracts for heart-moving, which are considered to have links with local/regional institutions and US military administrations (Muos). They are overall systems in which the great international Mafia tries to directly fund great works for self-legitimizing purposes (Bridge), or else they are
known as Business Transversal Party, consisting of mafia families, construction companies, bipartisan politicians, supported by media mainstreams, and belong to institutions (Tav). Therefore, as the outcome of the frame bridging and extension processes, the corrupt system and the mafia system outlined by the Lulu activists merge into a unique “corrupt-mafia system” that produces unwanted and disputed public works and infrastructures.

Indeed, we have defined the Lulu movements, fighting against mafia and corruption as territorial movements carrying on ‘anti-system’ struggles, because, while contrasting specific large-scale infrastructures and military bases, they struggle against the system that - in their frames - have created them and to which they belong. Therefore, they are not ‘anti-system movements’ - only the most radical factions can be defined as such - but rather movements that, while mobilizing against mafia and corruption, as well as for the defence of the environment and health, for popular sovereignty and democracy from below, are also fighting ‘anti-system’ battles. Frames bridging and frames extension, indeed, lead Lulu protesters from single-issue mobilizations to more general and ‘anti-system’ struggles.

Acknowledgements

This article has been developed within the framework of the EU FP7 ANTICORRP project – Anticorruption Policies Revisited, Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption (Grant agreement no: 290529).

References

della Porta D. (ed. 2004), Comitati di cittadini e democrazia urbana, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino.
(eds.), *Spaces of Contention: Spatialities and Social Movements*, Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 27-46.


INTERVIEWS (carried out by Giuliana Sorci)

**INM1.** Nadia Furnari (Movimento no Muos - Associazione Antimafia “Rita Atria”). Interview carried out on 05/11/2016 in Palermo.

**INM2.** Antonio Mazzeo, Reporter and Blogger (Movimento No Muos). Interview carried out on 02/11/2016 in Messina.

**INM3.** Avv. Paola Ottaviano (Movimento No Muos - Associazione “Borderline Sicilia” – Legali No Muos). Interview carried out on 01/12/2016 in Catania.

**INM4.** Avv. Antonello Papandrea (Movimento No Muos - Coordinamento Regionale dei Comitati No Muos – Legali No Muos). Interview carried out on 09/11/2016 in Catania.

**INP1.** Antonio Mazzeo, Reporter and Blogger (Movimento No Ponte). Interview carried out on 02/11/2016 in Messina.

**INP2.** Luigi Sturniolo (Movimento no Ponte - Confederazione Cobas). Interview carried out on 02/11/2016 in Messina.

**INT1.** Nicoletta Dosio (Movimento No Tav - Comitato di Lotta popolare Bussoleno). Interview carried out on 13/12/2016 in Bussoleno (TO).

**INT2.** Claudio Giorno (Movimento No Tav - Comitato “Habitat”). Interview carried out on 13/12/2016 in Bussoleno (TO).

**INT3.** Alberto Perino (Movimento No Tav - Comitato “Habitat”). Interview carried out
on 28/12/2016 in Turin.

**INT4.** Gianluca Pittavino (Movimento No Tav - Centro Sociale Askatasuna-Torino). Interview carried out on 14/12/2016 in Turin.

**INT5.** Lele Rizzo (Movimento No Tav - Comitato di Lotta Popolare Bussoleno). Interview carried out on 14/12/2016 in Turin.

**AUTHORS’ INFORMATION:**

**Gianni Piazza** is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Catania (Italy) and the Associate Editor of the scientific journal *Partecipazione e Conflitto*. He has published books and journal articles on local government and politics, public policy analysis, social movements, territorial and environmental conflicts, and squatted social centres. Among his publications: *Voices of the Valley, Voices of the Straits* (with D. della Porta 2008), and the special issue of *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, ‘Il movimento delle occupazioni di squat e centri sociali in Europa’ (2012).

**Giuliana Sorci** is Phd student in Political Sciences at the University of Catania. She graduated in International Relationship and then Contemporary History as Master’s Degree. She has published the book: *I social network. Nuovi sistemi di sorveglianza e controllo sociale* (2015).