



Partecipazione e CONflitto
* *The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*
<http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco>
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version)
PACO, Issue 10(2) 2017: 544-568
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v10i2pXX

Published in July 15, 2017

Work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 Italian License

RESEARCH ARTICLE

BEYOND THE PERIMETER OF DEPOLITICIZATION

The evolution of the global governance of refugees and its territorialisation in Calabria

Mariafrancesca D'Agostino

University of Calabria

ABSTRACT: This study explores the evolution of the global governance of refugees in light of studies on depoliticisation. Following theories on governmentality, it emphasizes the centrality of the concept of depoliticisation when examining the narratives and practices implemented to establish an extraterritorial asylum system of humanitarian containment, detached from any ideals of inclusion and rehabilitation. At the same time, we recall diverse empirical evidence in order to stress the importance of considering the divergent effects of depoliticisation in geographically and culturally distant contexts. The survey in Calabria, Italy, presents in fact the political attempt by its inner areas to foster autonomous practices of inclusion that contrast the securitarian shift of the global asylum system, as well as its national implications, recognising refugees as a strategic factor of economic growth and social innovation. In particular, we reveal the mechanisms through which new forms of local citizenship have emerged here, along with institutional solutions specifically connoted by a *bilateral* and *place-based* approach to forced migration. These efforts persist despite the breakup of the current European refugee crisis which, however, now opens new dilemmas by diminishing the viability of refugee relocation within the internal areas as a truly sustainable process.

KEYWORDS: Calabria, Depoliticisation, Inner areas, Local inclusion, Refugee global governance.

CORRESPONDING AUTHORS: Mariafrancesca D'Agostino, email: dagostino@unical.it

1. Introduction

Beginning in the 1990s, the measures and definitions that underpinned the international asylum regime established by the UN following the end of the Second World War, have undergone substantial changes, designed to pave the way for new governance models, which today represent a field of privileged analyses in relation to the concept of depoliticisation. This is what emerges from the important works we will confront here, in order to examine the diverse forms of depoliticisation operating within the current international asylum regime, and also to underline the divergent territorial impacts they produce in geographically and culturally distant contexts. An emblematic example of these changes is found in the case of Calabria, Italy, where the empirical part of this work is concerned, illustrating policies and logics that deviate from the strategic guidelines of depoliticisation, thereby highlighting its limits and contradictions.

Indeed, as we shall see in the following paragraphs, by emphasizing the concept of depoliticisation, it is possible to grasp the origins of the current regulation of forced migration and its connection to the present European refugee crisis. To explain this evolution, many research studies have approached the theme of depoliticisation by first emphasizing the emergence of a new *order of discourse*, defining today's forced migration as a social menace and as a factor of international instability (Hayter 2000; Guild 2009). In other studies, the problem of depoliticisation is instead approached as a way to illustrate a *new art* of governing refugees, where politics abdicate responsibilities and decision-making roles, enforcing bureaucratic discretion in the interpretation and implementation of laws (Flinders and Buller 2006). In these studies, emphasis is placed primarily on the shift towards new forms of extraterritorial governance, operating directly in the context of crisis, where refugees are systematically put at high risk and made dependant on international aid.

It is interesting to note that the reappearance of the camp in the current international geopolitical scenario, aroused growing interest in depoliticisation studies, and often shared various theoretical perspectives. Many commentators, in fact, identify in this extraterritorial confinement system, the symptoms of a political and cultural operation that, while criminalising refugees, proceeds to their *social elimination* by means of technocratic intervention which have the undoubted advantage of subverting states to internal democratic control. Indeed, the bulk of current forced migrations are undeniably contained in developing countries, inside reception camps that should be temporary solutions but, over years, tend to assume the form of a permanent "state of exception" (Agamben 1995, 195-198; Agier 2002). At the same time, it is also evident that

the reality of forced migration does not adhere without tensions and brutal breaks to the humanitarian and decentralized approaches imposed by new global mobility regimes (Faist 2013). Sociological analysis specifically emphasizes the growing ability that the refugees have to create for themselves, more autonomous, aware and organized movements in order to leave their countries (Mezzadra 2001; Castles 2003). Moreover, the intersection between stricter restrictions on the free movement of refugees and the inability of many states to escape the international human rights regime (Sassen 2008), is at every turn creating a situation of structural disorder that illustrates the limits of current political regulation at the refusal of its domain (Ambrosini 2016).

Especially in Europe, where for many years emphasis was placed on border closure policies, the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring and further conflicts in nearby Mediterranean areas foreshadowed a completely new horizon and a real phase shift, where the dysfunctions created by the incoherence of asylum procedures in relation to the real dynamics of flows are stimulating critiques and responses that radically question the functioning of the European Union and its mobility policies (Zetter 2015). From this perspective, heterogeneous and ambivalent repolarisation phenomena are clearly visible, and this requires consideration of the structural features of contexts in which migrations are territorialized, as well as the concrete local interactions of various social actors. We may in fact observe the uprising of nationalistic forces addressing radical closure objectives which are not always easy to root in the neoliberal context from which they initially emerge (Bazzicalupo 2014). But, at the same time, original solidarity experiences are emerging alongside new forms of local citizenship that prioritize the social innovation and the economic opportunities arising from migration (Campomori 2008). As we will see later, it is just this kind of *win-win* logic which takes place in Calabria with the regional spread of local prospects and practices of inclusion that, for both economic and ideological reasons, dispute the current international framework on asylum and its securitarian approach.

We will recall diverse empirical evidence in order to retrace the evolution of the asylum system in Calabria, and stress the importance of no longer considering depoliticisation as simply a fundamental strategy of transnational flow management, but also as a *bad policy*, structurally insufficient and failing with respect to the complex reality of today's forced migration and the multiplicity of actors dealing with this phenomenon. We will thus methodically restate the importance of linking the following levels of analysis: 1) the *macro level*, which contemplates the influence of macroeconomic and geopolitical factors on the governance of forced migration promoted by the major supranational institutions triggering the present neoliberal order; 2) the *meso level*, which questions the role of nation states and their mobility control strategies in relation to the ac-

tual characteristics and dimensions of incoming flows; 3) the *micro level*, which finally compares with the local dimension. Starting from this analytical scheme, we will consider the results of field research¹, presented here in three sequential sections.

In the first, we will focus on hypotheses that explain the transition of migratory policies from Fordism to post-Fordism, providing an appropriate interpretation scheme and restoring the complexity of the new global governance of refugees in relation to the concept of depoliticisation. In the second part, we will discuss the implications of this transnational system on the Italian reception system, including the evolution that occurred during the last period marked by the European refugee crisis. Finally, we will analyze the declination of regulations in the Calabrian context, and the motivations of the actors who contest it, articulating different levels of response that give weight to the territories and their specific features, re-politicizing them as a fundamental elements of legitimacy and belonging.

2. Asylum, sovereignty and governance

Studies which explore the operation of the International Asylum System in the period following the introduction of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, generally tend to highlight how this regime served the strategic objectives of the Cold War, and also sustained Fordist development processes in a time characterized by a shortage of workers (Zolberg and Suhrke 1999). In light of these political and economic considerations many observers explain why, throughout the period of bipolarity, refugees managed to impose themselves on the West as a moral category, always worthy of asylum and assistance. Only in the 1980s did we experience a transition to a new restrictive phase, and it became more visible and acute with the collapse of the Soviet Union (July 1999), when new conflicts emerged on the geopolitical scene, resulting in a net increase in asylum applications (Unhcr 2016). However, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, refugees seeking protection were no longer seen as strategic weapon to discredit the socialist governments of Eastern Europe. And in addition, the reor-

¹ The research started in 2013 and aimed to outline the evolution of local practices and policies on asylum in Calabria. Data collection was based on a multi-methodological approach: participatory observation and the implementation of 35 unstructured interviews with representatives from local and regional government, and with the main exponents of the third sector involved in the definition of programs aimed at the reception of applicants for international protection. These tools have been designed to verify: the actors' orientations, interventions made, central aspects of governance and difficulties encountered in implementing the various programs launched.

ganization processes of production triggered by workers' struggles and the oil shock of the early seventies (Fiocco 1998), began to cause ever more rigid and restrictive mobility control measures even against asylum seekers. Given the wide range of the phenomenon, a comprehensive list cannot be reported on here. It is important to remember however, that in general these measures have: 1) Institutionalized specific forms of *reception without freedom*, engaging camps as the main dispositif to contain and control forced migrations; 2) Formalized new concepts and intervention practices that jeopardize the existing equivalence between asylum and exile, as the new concepts of *safe areas* and *internally displaced persons* explicitly do; 3) Fragmented the Geneva status of refugees in a variety of legal positions, far more precarious than in the past, which are now reversible and explicitly oriented towards repatriation (Zetter 1991).

These measures have clearly revolutionized the functioning of the international asylum system and the way it was connoted in the Fordist period, when refugees followed a steady path within their host society, intended to result in the acquisition of a new citizenship (Ong 2005). Since the late nineties, various research studies were designed to grapple with the facets and characteristics of this transition. These interpretations are based on different perspectives, but often converge to underline three fundamental depoliticisation mechanisms at the core of these new forms of regulation. Three mechanisms primarily based on the *securitization*, *administration* and *humanitarianisation* of the dispositifs of forced migration management.

Specifically, some analyses focus on the spread of representations in which refugees are portrayed as impostors who unjustly abuse domestic asylum systems to regularize their presence, or to frame this phenomenon in the humanitarian and interventionist logic promoted by the West since the nineties. Many studies on the media's treatment of refugees justly note that, when viewed from afar, refugees continue to be portrayed as blameless victims of bloody conflict while this perspective radically changes as they approach more developed countries to claim status recognition. In this case, Mares highlights, asylum seekers lose their initial veil of innocence, being transformed from passive objects of compassion to unreliable actors (Mares 2003, pp. 330-349). At the same time, new discursive practices emerge at the international level, emphasizing the effects of current global wars on the consistency of flows, as well as violations of fundamental human rights of the populations involved² (Salvatici 2015). In both cases, social representations thus recur that hyper-politicize the issue of escape, presenting it as a threat to public order and international security. But, following Salter's parable

² A wide-ranging review of military resolutions and military interventions justified by the UN Security Council, in the interest of refugees, is found in Loescher 2001, pp. 175-178.

(2008), a social depoliticisation process is being activated parallelly, which many describe by pointing out the *“loss of a collective consciousness of the deepest political, social and cultural reasons for the problems in question”* (Salvatici, 2004, p. 7). A process that essentially implies that refugees are dangerous, weak or unreliable subjects without acknowledging the root causes of present forced migrations, but rather homogenizing diverse contexts of crisis into the same emergency discourse (Pandolfi 2005). And it is within this new cultural framework that another process of depoliticisation has emerged. One that visibly marginalizes the old relationship between politics and territory, to counter the governance monopoly and the benefits it offers in terms of flexibility, participation and efficiency (Gjergji 2016).

The securitization of the discourse on refugees is in fact strictly connected with the promotion of new cooperative forms of migration management directed to include different national contexts, and to operationally interfere with traditional sovereignty. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) highlighted, above all, increased opportunities for cooperation that the end of the Cold War made possible, and the need to use these appropriately in order to establish a more efficient and globally interconnected asylum system (Chimni 1998; Loescher 2002); in the words of the UNHCR, to transit from a reactive-based asylum system, exile oriented, to a proactive, return-oriented system (UNHCR 1995). Several UNHCR studies and recommendations continue to support this vision (Scheel and Ratfisch 2014; Unhcr 2017), which states have actively transposed into their legislation by building multi-level governance systems where new and autonomous international agencies, task forces and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate today, in areas close to those of refugees' origin. It is a proper global government of refugees, characterized by technocratic logics and preventive addresses that clearly overcome the Geneva Convention and the solutions that this treaty traditionally proposed. In particular, priority is given to humanitarian aid programs that merely respond to the essential needs of refugees, promoting the right of return as the ideal solution to their flight (Harrel-Bond 2005). Faced with years of poor results however, there is widespread conviction that these interventions only marginally respond to truly humanitarian considerations, and on the contrary, they expose refugees to high risk situations and long periods of forced territorialisation in overcrowded camps, with few of the services necessary to ensure human dignity (Terry 2002, pp. 216-245; Jones 2016). To many observers, priority is given in fact, to strategic practices of border externalization, ensuring new geopolitical areas of influence to the most advanced Western countries while the poorest countries have to endure the social burden of reception (Pandolfi and Fassin 2010). Furthermore, as Fassin cleverly notes, we can view the spread of administrative patterns that submit refugees

to the evaluation of their physical and psychic traumas, activating a process that at once objectifies their bodies as the place that displays the evidence of truth, and depoliticizes asylum by replacing old ideological imperatives with compassionate forms of aid (Fassin and D'Halluin 2005).

Important contributions have been made toward deciphering the characteristics and determinants of these developments by scholars who approach actual migration management through the lens of governmentality, focusing on the biopolitical dispositifs which allow the construction of new *migrant populations*, making them functional under the conditions required by the current capitalist regime for the purpose of its global expansion (Sivini 2005). Following this precise analytical track, scrupulous works have highlighted the high cost refugees incurred when, at the close of the Fordist paradigm, they were transformed - in the eyes of their country of arrival - as a population *useless and damaging* to development. In Rahola's considerations, as a "*population structurally exceeding the inclusive capabilities of global capital*" (Rahola 2003, p. 15). It is a shift also noted by Düvell who underlines how the new productive and organizational dynamics of neoliberal capitalism require the prediction of *just-in-time* migration patterns, aimed at repatriation as soon as the temporary demand for work has been satisfied. But as Düvell further states, these patterns are unfit for refugees since the rights accorded them in the past become incompatible with the current disruption of the welfare state, and their migration patterns come into sharp contradiction with the circular dynamics that are now encouraged (Düvell 2004, p. 45). This is also what Annamaria Vitale recounts in her work (2005), adding that the new vision of refugees as *surplus*, is bringing large supranational organizations such as the IOM, the WTO, the World Bank, the ILO, asking states to include their asylum prerogatives within a new humanitarian regime, and operating in a decentralized manner, precisely in order to distinguish (in a definitive manner) economic migrants from refugees, thus recognizing the right to mobility only for those human resources considered useful for global growth (Vitale 2005, pp. 27-28). For Vitale, humanitarian language masks this agenda, but ensures its implementation through depoliticisation: namely by excluding refugees from the sphere of citizenship and development, constraining them in a paternalistic perspective focused exclusively on charity and assistance.

However, unlike those who find in the current international asylum system a complete non-access system (Bauman 2005), Vitale states that the new imperial mobility regimes move within a structurally unstable economic and social context, resulting in a considerable gap between the declared aims and the effects that they actually achieve. The Calabrian scholar follows this different analytical track by stating that, what is really at stake, is the biopolitical reproduction of the proletariat on a global scale through

the segmentation of citizenship in a variety of increasingly precarious and reversible legal positions; submitting all foreigners to a similar process of depreciation, irrespective of their actual qualifications and skills, or of the reasons behind their migration. An analysis which we find directly reflected in the context of Italy. Here, for years, the increase of forced migration flows has been, in fact, accompanied by the introduction of liberticide measures that have severely affected the applicants and beneficiaries of international protection. As we will see in the next paragraph, these policies have not however stopped or reduced flows, rather they expose migrants and refugees to similar processes of clandestinization and exploitation in their places of arrival.

3. The Italian asylum system: institutionalizing an emergency approach

Italy has become a landmark for a growing number of asylum seekers and refugees only since the 1990s, when several Western European governments began to rethink, more restrictively, their migratory policies (Melotti, 1992). In particular, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, thousands of refugees arrived in Italy from the Albanian crisis of '91 and the Balkan wars that raged following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. And since 2000, a growing number of refugees have arrived from the Middle East and several African countries devastated by armed conflicts and violence, who over the years are still active.

Compared to the numbers received in smaller and more fragile developing states, Italy however, tallies a reduced presence of refugees, with about 150,000 new arrivals registered in 2015 (Anci 2016). Nonetheless, many statistical surveys show an increasingly hostile and alarming public opinion in relation to refugees, so much as to overlap the issue of forced migration with that of insecurity and international terrorism in 60% of cases (Wike, Stoke and Simmons 2016). At the same time, political talk about migration tends to privilege representations that paint Italy as a country *under siege* (Dal Lago 2010), left alone by the EU to cope with the *overwhelming* number of asylum requests that have come from the many conflicts erupting in neighbouring areas of the Mediterranean.

Actually, in the presence of growing crises and geopolitical instability, the *Dublin System*, which substantially obliges refugees who reach Europe to remain in the place they first land, should be mitigated by a provision of appropriate cooperation mechanisms (Article 78 of the TSUE). The same *European Agenda*³ which the Commission launched

³ COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13.05.2015.

in May 2015 in order to cope with the extraordinary influx of refugees registered in the two-year period between 2014 and 2015, proposed to implement a method of fair migrant distribution among member states, called the *hot spot approach*. (Vitiello 2016, p. 147)⁴. The response to these inflows, and to the decision to relocate migrants from Italy and Greece⁵, was however a clear closing response. The decisions taken in this direction remained in fact unimplemented, and new walls were erected in Hungary, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, France, until even the European Commission's aspirations collapsed under the weight of this increasingly uncomfortable and embarrassing impasse. As we know, only in March of 2016, did the Commission succeed to normalize this affair by *economizing* it: in particular by signing an agreement of about three billion Euros, which assigned Turkey the task of containing refugees fleeing from Syria in its territory⁶. However, after only one year of implementation this agreement provoked strong international criticism for placing thousands of refugees in limbo and exposing them to tragic living conditions in Turkey as well as in the hot spots installed on the Greek islands and in Italy (Amnesty International 2016). At the same time, the central Mediterranean route reopened - far more risky than the Balkan route - and with it, inevitable desperation and deaths.

Since the outbreak of the European refugee crisis, the Italian Government itself has consistently highlighted these contradictions by strongly criticizing the Union's inability to respond with coordination and solidarity to the challenges posed by current forced migration⁷. But in Italy, we can grasp a process of substantial mimetic isomorphism which places this country in the wake of the depoliticisation dynamics first analysed with reference to the evolution of the international asylum regime in the global scenario. It is an articulated project that, in the first place, demonstrates the consonance that now exists between right and left parties, where they both view the administrative detention of asylum seekers as a primary instrument of migration control. At the same

⁴ As stated by Vitiello, this mechanism provides for the establishment of specific teams of specialists, provided by EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Frontex (European Border Management Agency), Europol (Agency for EU police) and Eurojust (EU judicial cooperation agency). These teams are required to work in border areas to quickly conduct fingerprint identification, recording and fingerprinting of incoming migrants, and the identification of those deserving international protection and promotion by relocation to other member states, or to facilitate their repatriation in the case of irregular migrants.

⁵ See Council Decisions (Ue) 2015/1523 from September 14, 2015 and 2015/1601 from September 22, 2015.

⁶ [Http://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/)

⁷ Lastly, the declarations issued in Brussels on June 8, 2017 by the Under Secretary of the Interior, Domenico Manzione: <http://www.eunews.it/2017/06/08/italia-detta-regole-revisione-dublino-asilo-politico/87454>

time, the questionable results this project produces cast doubt on its practicability, showing a movement of repeated adjustments, precisely called to neutralize the social fractures and conflicts that the same depoliticisation scheme enriches and perpetuates in its process of national territorialisation.

On the external front in particular, the Italian government attempts to respond to the challenges related to the growing number of refugees, by externalizing their management by building *ad hoc* committees and negotiating the stipulations of specific economic agreements with the countries of origin and transit. Italy in particular followed this address back in 2009, when the current centre-right government, subcontracted with Libya and its military forces, the task of suppressing and remotely controlling direct arrivals in Italy up to the period of wars that ended with Colonel Gaddafi's overthrow (Rastello 2010). In February 2017, as the European relocation programs failed, the new centre-left Italian government continued to revitalize this approach and actively promote it in Europe by signing a special memorandum (MoU) National Reconciliation Government with the Libyan State⁸. The landings however were not interrupted. Indeed, from January to March 30, 2017, 27,000 foreigners arrived in Italy, totalling 35% more than the same period in 2016, which was also record year, with 181,436 immigrants arriving⁹. In order to deal with such flows, Italy continues to act by using its cooperative development policies as a key instrument to control mobility, but paying insufficient attention to the conditions of crisis and the lack of democracy that often affect the partner countries of these programs. At the same time, on the internal front, forms of explicit emergency governance have been structured over the years, gradually finding full institutional recognition.

The first phase of this development began with the end of the Cold War, when Italy set up an increasing number of rescue camps in order to secure the first refugee reception. It was the so called Puglia law¹⁰ that predicted these structures, justifying them as necessary to confront the most basic needs of refugees in a new phase characterized by increasingly tragic and desperate sea voyages (Delle Donne 2004). Also at this time, these new forms of containment were however tied to exceptional measures such as those which had, already in 1991, decreed the deportation of Albanians, first to a stadium in Bari, and then later to their own country (Dal Lago 1999, p. 186). It was the beginning of a new era of social repression, which began to strengthen borders and measures of detention that found full legal coverage in 2002 with the introduction of

⁸ Available *on line*: <http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Libia.pdf>

⁹ Source UNHCR (<http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205>).

¹⁰ D.L. 451/1995, converted into law L. 563/1995.

the Bossi-Fini law¹¹. A law that initiated a second and even more restrictive phase, sanctioning the mandatory detention of applicants for international protection in special government centres of first reception, called CARA. CARA were formally created to enable the identification of refugees and the processing of their application, but these reception centres suddenly took the form of huge militarized camps, where the average period of stay lasts for many months. As several investigations reveal, applicants here remain suspended in state of protracted limbo, marked by continuous abuses and poor living conditions, that portray a tragic regime of ethnic segregation and exclusion. Moreover, in very few cases the applicants in CARA, once considered worthy of protection, manage to pass to the *regular* structures of secondary reception that the same Bossi-Fini ruled by establishing the Protection System for Asylum and Refugees (SPRAR).

The SPRAR was born under strong pressure from local authorities and civil society, at the beginning of the nineties, to promote an integrated asylum system, capable of supporting the territorial impact of immigration, and therefore, the development of more appropriate local policies and practices of inclusion (Marchetti 2006, pp. 129-130). In fact, a primary feature of SPRAR is the protagonism of local municipalities which voluntarily, and through collaboration with the third sector, take on the task of ushering refugees towards independence by developing an integrated reception model which entails taking charge of a small number of individuals and sustainable housing practices. These modes of intervention, according to several scholars, have allowed SPRAR to more effectively address the needs of refugees and positively impact the territories in recent years, especially in terms of public services and employment opportunities (Marchetti 2016). The SPRAR remains however a weak system, for reasons mainly related to the small amount of ministerial allocations, delays with which they are provided and due to the limited duration of projects in which the beneficiaries enter - allowing just one year of residence - that for this reason, often leaves refugees with no possibility of self-insertion in host societies at the end of the projects. Moreover, SPRAR has always provided an insufficient number of places, and in fact it represents only a residual hosting system with respect to the emergency refugee management model that Italy has strengthen following the outbreak of the *Arab Spring*.

The main guidelines for this approach began to emerge in 2011, during the development of an extraordinary program called Emergency North Africa (ENA)¹², when the

¹¹ Law n. 189 from July 30, 2002.

¹² This intervention started with the DPCM February 12th 2011, which declared until December 31st, 2011 a state of humanitarian emergency in the national territory, in relation to the exceptional influx of citizens from North African countries (OJ No 42, February 21st, 2011). Subsequently, the DPCM of April 7th 2011

Berlusconi government assigned Civil Protection units the task of opening new structures to settle refugees in flight from Tunisia and Libya, that were at that time often housed in former restaurants, hotels or in isolated buildings. Following the closure of ENA, the widening of the flows recorded over the two-year period from 2014-2015 spurred the creation of other extraordinary reception centres (CAS) in all Italian regions. CAS are now under the control of prefectures and it is actually through the consolidation of the prefectural management of refugees, that a third stage in the granting of asylum has opened in Italy, whose general principles are now contained in Legislative Decree 142/2015.

In reality, the most important innovation that this decree intended, was the scanning of reception in two distinct phases, which would support the extension of secondary reception centres within the SPRAR network, and thus shorten the long periods of stay in CARA. In parallel, Legislative Decree 142/2015 assigns CAS a temporary containment function in the event of large numbers and close arrivals of applicants, when there is not sufficient space within the centres dedicated to the ordinary reception of asylum seekers. But, as the Italian Government has decided not to make the SPRAR a compulsory service on a territorial basis, granting local authorities the opportunity to voluntarily adhere, they have deprived their political agenda of the challenge of reception, so much so that calls for access to the SPRAR continue to be almost deserted (Camili 2016). Paradoxically, as a result of the enforcement of Decree no. 142 of 2015, the function of CAS has thus assumed a *prevalent* and *permanent* character. In fact, as of December 31, 2015, there were a total of 135,045 migrants hosted in various facilities in the country (CDA / CARA / CPSA / SPRAR) 96,701 of those individuals in CAS, 14,848 were housed in first reception centres and only 23,496 went to SPRAR.

As CAS numbers grow however, there are also a growing number of allegations about violations occurring inside them, as well as poor transparency by those who manage them. According to numerous observers¹³, here there are often overcrowded and degrading living conditions, lack of hygienic standards and adequate security, poorly skilled staff and limited involvement by local authorities and the surrounding social environment. And, as some international organizations point out (Msf 2016), all these factors have a very negative impact on the living conditions of refugees and the acceptance of their asylum application, aggravating their original vulnerabilities and

extended the duration of the program in response to the massive migratory movements generated by the outbreak of war in Libya (OJ No 83, April 11th, 2011).

¹³ Finally, see the *InCastrati* report, civic initiatives on the management of extraordinary reception centers for asylum seekers, published in 2016 by *Cittadinanzattiva*, *LetciateCIEntrare, Libera*. On-line access: http://www.cittadinanzattiva.it/files/primo_piano/giustizia/inCAstrati-report.pdf

leading them fall into situations of panic, apathy and suffering. At the same time, these lawless and un-welcoming situations easily become instruments of political propaganda delivering the message NO, also to the reception of small groups of migrants. Increasingly, the theme of the asylum business is agitated by mayors and communities to deny territorial access to everyone, even recognized holders of some form of international protection (Lunaria 2017). This is so prevalent in fact, that the current centre-left government has taken note, and placed focus on the many pressures and complaints brought about by the mismanagement that has marked the emergency Italian approach to the European refugee crisis. Beginning with the idea that the values of the left cannot be dissociated from those of security, the Gentiloni cabinet has in particular outlined a new institutional set-up in international protection, which is now contained in Law no. 46 from the 13th of April 2017.

This law again tightens the standards for international protection along guidelines which, according to the Interior Minister who conceived it, are intended to deflate the risks associated with the advance of new extremist and neo-populist forces on the right¹⁴. In particular, this new law aims to speed up international protection proceedings limiting the applicants' right to defence. The decree pursues this objective in particular by cancelling the refugee's right to appeal against orders denying the application for asylum issued by the Territorial Commission for recognition of international protection. Thus, through this decree, the civil servants and Territorial Commissions in which they operate, assume the role of real first-degree courts on the basis of the premise, though not explicit, that refugees should be judged *as such* rather than based on their whole migratory history. At the same time, the decree reconfigures the role of reception centre operators, recognizing them as public officials from every legal viewpoint. In short, these provisions have however triggered strong reactions and protests, even in the judiciary, by those who loudly denounce its unconstitutionality¹⁵. In this way, the ambiguity of the situation grows, and the convergence of policies in the sense of depoliticisation continues to sink into a space of constant tension with the expansion of international migratory flows, making visible a variety of subjects and claims that, as we shall see, seek to fill the gap opened by inadequate regulations.

¹⁴ See here the interview issued by Minister of the Interior Marco Minniti on the weekly "L'Espresso" of January 8, 2017.

¹⁵ Among the many appeals that contest this law, particular attention is drawn to a note from the judges of the Democratic Judiciary. Available online at: <https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/md-asgi-documento-completo-press-release.pdf>

4. Where refugees are welcome: the case study of Calabria

As many researchers have pointed out, migrations are a phenomenon that varies considerably at the local level, where public and third sector actors can interact with each other, outlining divergent governance scenarios different from those handed down in Europe today and those to which Italy conforms (Stuppini 2013; Ambrosini 2013). These considerations are especially valid in Calabria where, especially in the most internal areas, it's possible to observe cultural orientations and reception programs of a radically different nature compared to those previously examined, those amenable to the phenomenon of securitization of flows and to the depoliticization of their management.

In Calabria, the emergence of these aporias dates back to December 1997 when a boat carrying some 800 Kurdish refugees ran aground on the Ionian coast of Badolato. The refugees on that occasion, were immediately welcomed by the local population and settled in the oldest part of the city which had been decimated by emigration and therefore had endless available housing facilities. In that depopulated territory, it soon became clear that refugees could become an important resource, one that could revitalize a territory full of potentiality, yet on the brink of extinction. As Tonino Perna remembers, one of the protagonists of that unusual experience, for the people of Badolato, it was *natural* to welcome the migrants. But that response soon became an *exceptional* event for so many other areas of the world where locals were accustomed to viewing immigrants as a public threat. In fact, the news of Badolato, a town saved from abandonment by the arrival of "sea wagons", brought television crews from all over Europe together with many curious individuals and associations, who in that historical period were experimenting with new practices based on below participation, and characterized by increasing attention to the local dimension. It was through this process that a new discourse began to appear and gain awareness in Calabria, highlighting the positive aspects of refugees' active involvement in community development, where the potential for growth is stunted by depopulation and the subsequent aging of the population (D'Agostino 2009; 2013). This vision has been strengthened further over the years, a few kilometres away from Badolato, in upper Riace, a semi-abandoned village, where today there are about 600 residents, half of whom are refugees.

Even on the Ionian coast of Riace, about 300 Kurdish exiles landed and were readily welcomed in 1998, in particular by the members of the *Future City* association, which was born near that landing. For three years, using only its own resources, the association committed to tracking the available housing left empty by local emigrants, and this

careful accounting has become a vast network of widespread hospitality, called the *Riace Village*, available for the reception of refugees and also for responsible tourism. In the years that followed, the *Riace Village* was in fact able to grow further through resources from the National Asylum Program (PNA) and SPRAR. Furthermore, in 2004 the President of the *Future City* Association, Domenico Lucano, was elected the Mayor of Riace and since then, he continues to guide this small village, fighting for the specificity of the territory and the human rights of refugees, which has earned him prestigious awards and worldwide renown¹⁶.

As Lucano points out, from the outset, the fundamental idea behind Riace's approach to refugees was to match the aspirations of newcomers with those of the local community under a single, ideal vision that expresses the fundamental values of human dignity, solidarity and social justice. Far from considering reception only as a humanitarian work, Lucano, in his statements refers to forms of local citizenship and cooperation aimed at producing trust, healthier social relationships and development opportunities that improve everyone's living conditions. To give substance to this *utopia of normality*, as Lucano himself defines it, refugees are relocated within the old historical centre of Riace. Here they are encouraged to work within the cooperatives and handcraft shops that, over the years, have been reopened in order to facilitate the survival of local knowledge and the durable insertion of refugees in the territory. What Riace is pursuing, as Lucano explains, is indeed "*A global reception that refuses bureaucratic and identity limits*", and this requires a continuous review of national policies, opening them up for discussion and making them more attentive to the local dimension. Lucano carries out this policy stretching operation daily, by for example, extending the period of stay of refugees welcomed in SPRAR. Furthermore, in order to compensate for delays in the reimbursement of expenses incurred by the municipality from the Ministry of the Interior (which often takes months), a special local currency was allocated to asylum seekers to use in Riace and neighbouring territories that adhere to the initiative. At the same time, Lucano managed to create an important coalition with neighbouring municipalities that share similar economic and demographic problems, and as in Riace, have expressed strong ambitions for recognition in the vocation of reception. Over time, these communities together formed what has become known as the *backbone of hospitality*.

In these places, refugee reception has become a political theme of paramount importance. A theme which, in the words of Ilario Ammendolia, mayor of Caulonia, leads us to see refugees as "*active participants in the revitalization of the area, and therefore*

¹⁶ The latest illustration of his influence dates back to March 2016, when Domenico Lucano was ranked fortieth of the fifty most influential world leaders.

not only as victims in need of care or undergoing inspection, violations and degeneration by the right". In parallel, the rights of territories are stressed, in order to make autonomous and strategic choices that meet their specificities, rather than accepting outside regulations and models, so much so that, in 2009, Caulonia symbolically began to recognize foreigners' right to vote, and they have also established intercultural cooperatives that respond to the shared labour needs of refugees and their host communities. Peace, disarmament and self-governance are the guiding principles behind these political initiatives which have, from Badolato, progressively spread to all other Calabrian provinces, emphasizing the need to build reception projects that can give adequate attention to individuals while countering problems like decline in production, demographic depopulation and youth emigration. This clearly emerges from field research on the most peripheral and marginal communities where, apart from the political colour of government coalitions, there is a clear effort to save essential services and repopulate villages through integrated programs of urban regeneration and reception. The difficulties of this current phase however are not difficult to perceive.

As many operators point out in their interviews, even in Calabria, through the growing bureaucratization of SPRAR, a strong alliance has been cemented over the years, between participating municipalities and the Ministry of the Interior funding these projects. At the same time, all the responsibilities and critics of the system are placed on the backs the third sector. Meanwhile, non-government organizations have stopped demanding and stimulating local governs, for fear of compromising the economic relationship that binds them, and in this way they have become mere service providers. But the situation, as a whole, is far from being normalized. Yet different experiences are strongly characterized from a political point of view and identity, because of the attitude of the associations that manage reception projects, or rather the municipalities that are in charge. This is the case in Villa San Giovanni, Decollatura, Acquaformosa, Carlopoli, Lamezia Terme and Cinquefrondi, and we feel this most strongly in Cinquefrondi, a small town in the province of Reggio Calabria, where the administration headed by Michele Conia has recently launched a public appeal to the government to promote the legal protection of environmental refugees, since considering the current regulation inadequate to recognize the complexity of current forced migration. Stronger yet was the all consuming clash between Lucano and the Interior Ministry when he was asked to revoke the use of the local currency he invented, a request that Lucano also denounced in the national media by highlighting the great divide between the technical operation of the state and the legitimacy of its approaches (Messinetti 2016). In this battle Lucano is also joined by strong support from the municipality of Gioiosa Ionica, Cinquefrondi, and the entire Solidarity Network of Municipalities (Recosol). Gio-

vanni Maiolo, Recosol's Calabrian spokesman, does not miss as opportunity to denounce the evolution of SPRAR in the time of the European refugee crisis, based in logic aimed at ensuring savings on public spending. Maiolo as well underlines how SPRAR centres "*are shaping their own premises, favouring access to large associations that care only for selected categories of persecuted people, often without guaranteeing the real will to build reception programs that meet the actual needs of refugees and the area.*"¹⁷

Even political leaders in the Region of Calabria, have recognized the value of the Riace model and the importance of supporting it with more conviction. It is no coincidence that the various regional presidents who have succeeded since 2005, have stated that they want to provide a more organic perspective on this experience. This continued until a special regional law on the reception of refugees was launched in December 2008 (L. 18/2009). Its main feature, was to take full advantage of the ethical governance system developed in Riace, and to support it through additional resources, not only those from SPRAR, in order to provide for the integration of policies aimed at welcoming international protection applicants and beneficiaries of other programs aimed at experimenting with new forms of *social housing* and *solidarity economy*, to be achieved especially in communities affected by *increasing depopulation or those with especially problematic socio-economic situations*. (art. 1). The main regional measures activated to implement Law no. 18/2009 and stabilize the refugees within small Calabrian municipalities, have so far consisted of trained apprenticeships and work grants which, as authorities intended, should have extended the short reception period provided by SPRAR, and blocked the continuous *turn-over* of refugees that we find inside. However, the lack of continuous national guidance and participation in the promotion of internal areas through the reception of refugees, coupled with the fragility of the contexts in which these experiences have been promoted, have not provided long-lasting employment opportunities for asylum applicants who remain the primarily spectators of other social protagonists (Corrado and D'Agostino 2016). Moreover, even in Calabria, new subjective expressions are clearly emerging that aim to physically divert refugees into another places and occupations, exacerbating the current situations of extreme housing disadvantage and exploitation that mark the vocational field of agriculture in this region (Corrado 2011).

The new POR Calabria 2014-2020 explicitly references these most extreme situations, and in fact provides various measures for foreign nationals which are required in order to ensure global involvement through: the strengthening of basic territorial ser-

¹⁷ From a declaration issued during the Conference held at the University of La Sapienza on 6/24/2016: "Let's help: New methods for refugee reception".

vices, the improvement of skills especially in specific sectors of the solidarity economy, and the promotion of desegregation through the development of innovative and sustainable ways of living (OT9). In October 2016, a specific plan was also presented to the European Commission - "Reception system for the *relocation* and *resettlement* of refugees, asylum seekers and holders of humanitarian and subsidiary protection and accompanying minors and victims of trafficking" - which proposes the emptying of existing CAS and the reintegration of about 3000-4000 refugees to build "Civic Labs" based on the enhancement of individual skills, the expansion of housing and support for the creation of innovative social enterprises¹⁸. To be implemented however, this program requires strong support from Europe and the central government. For officials working in the National and Community Planning Departments of Calabria, that is all that is missing. As an official at the top of the Department says, Calabria is a system that boasts many good practices *"but in the current phase there is a clear will to convey all European resources, destined for the regions, into the hands of the Interior Ministry, which employs them by pursuing exclusive security objectives."* The fears that thwart the efforts made so far are clear to see, because there is always someone *"who arrogates the right to decide what must be done, transforming the good practices that Calabria should boast into an assistential and short-lived system."*

The region does not give up however, and indeed entrusts the delegation of immigration to Giovanni Manoccio, former mayor of Acquaformosa, another small town that has distinguished itself in the political landscape nationally and internationally by launching various anti-racist battles¹⁹. The delegation that Giovanni Manoccio brings forward openly overturns the securitarian logic that for many years has defined the national approach to the issue of refugees. According to Manoccio *"these same national policies in fact, produce a serious domino effect, seeking to solve the same problems that they create, certifying fears, uncertainties and summary administrative procedures that create further pockets of irregularities."* From this firm belief, Manoccio strongly denounced the current wording of Law 46/2017 in an open letter to the government, even though the law was conceived by a minister who militates in his own party²⁰. Today, Calabria contends a widespread awareness of the potential associated with the reception of forced migration as well as its inevitability. A recent note from the regional press office highlights that. Following the publication of SPRAR applications received

¹⁸ Presented in Brussels the 7th and 8th of July 2016.

¹⁹ A recent article that gives attention to this important reality is available at:

<http://www.unita.tv/opinioni/migranti-il-modello-acquaformosa-oggetto-di-studio-nel-cuore-delleuropa/>

²⁰ Available at: <http://www.corrieredellacalabria.it/politics/item/53382-migranti,-riaprire-i-cie-%C3%A8-un-errore>

by March 31, 2017, it in particular reports that Calabria carries out the largest number of projects in Italy with respect to the resident population. And in sharp contrast to the rest of the country, the over 3,000 refugees already present here exceed the numbers registered in the CAS circuit, testifying Calabria as the "*Guide Region in the field of reception.*"²¹

5. Conclusions

As this work has shown, depoliticisation is an indispensable concept through which we can understand the mechanisms linking new ways of managing refugees to experimentation with new social and productive relationships. The subsumption of refugees' conditions in the narrative and practice of humanitarian emergency, constitutes a clear prerequisite for an increasing de-evolution of functions and areas of competence within a transnational control apparatus that, without reducing the size of the flows and meeting the real needs of refugees, reveals itself as a fundamental dispositif for racialisation, undermining and defrauding social relations.

Today's *asylum industry* maximizes the weight of bureaucratic and private actors, and minimizes the role of politics, which is well inclined to delegate the task of reducing the right of asylum by promoting extraterritorial containment in order to not compromise its equally democratic and liberal facade. Yet, as we have seen, depoliticisation requires the decisive and continuous help of the state and its articulations. To prevail, it needs not only to dismantle the old legal spaces in favour of new technocratic forms of control, but also to continually, convincingly and territorially penetratingly, reproduce stereotypes and hierarchical relationships of assistance that objectify refugees as mere victims or impostors. What lies ahead however, is not a normalised picture. The stability that the permanent *state of exception* should have secured in Italy remains unpersuasive as opposed to the growth of flows, and to the critical mass of human rights violations which are now chronically unstable and marked by a complex galaxy of subjectivities and actors who emerge to compensate for the failures highlighted by the global governance of refugees and its national prosthesis. Here the situation can evolve in diverse and conflicting ways. We can well observe the rise of political cultures that clearly break the catholic matrix approach that in the past connoted Italian migration policies (Melotti 2006), opening it up to security measures helping to prevent and

²¹ Available at: <http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2017/05/31/calabria-pubblicata-la-graduatoria-bandi-sprar-la-calabria-regione-con-maggior-numero-di-progetti-approvati-516435/>

streamline asylum applications, but this trend struggles to take root in a homogeneous way in many areas of the country. The research carried out in Calabria reveals, in fact, how here economic and demographic suffering have led to feelings of abandonment and a strong sensitivity to inequality which, in its most internal areas, becomes the platform from which to launch new alliances that unify the needs of old and new residents, bringing widespread awareness to their shared condition of subalternity. The historical development of these experiences continues to illuminate the inadequacy of current emergency models with respect to the real dynamics of migration, and especially shows how Calabria remains a patchy region, where innovative experiences of local citizenship which focus attention on opportunities for rebirth and development that the presence of refugees presents, can counteract and coexist with acute profit situations based on poor acceptance, social exclusion and exploitation in the workplace (Medu 2015).

We cannot deny, in fact, that even these most virtuous and inclusive practices do not manage to arrest the territorial spread of fears and social dynamics that compromise the initial promises of reciprocity and inclusion for both native citizens and refugees, thus diminishing the viability of refugee relocation within the internal areas as a truly sustainable process. But it is really the tragic ambivalence of the whole regional context, the polarization that it highlights between desegregated reception models which try to guarantee refugees decent living conditions and their long term stabilization, and situations of racialisation which tend instead to resist and become more acute over time; it's this clear ambivalence which reveals depoliticisation to be a contested field, open to multiple and indefinable territorial declinations (Fantozzi 2004).

From here, it is important to properly address the processes of depoliticisation which undoubtedly characterizes the evolution of the global asylum system in consideration of existing connections between macro, intermediate and micro levels; following an interactive approach, methodologically capable of recognizing the *productive* not only *repressive* nature of power (Foucault 1994). In conclusion, an approach capable of distinguishing the *utopia of power* from the domain system that it actually realizes when instances and tensions coming from worlds that should have remained distant, mingle with other cultures and territories, forging subjective expressions and compositions that may exceed the perimeter of the macro scheme and its depoliticisation goals, obliging it to continually move and transform.

References

- Agamben G. (1995), *Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.
- Agier M. (2002), *Aux bords du monde, les réfugiés*, Paris: Flammarion.
- Ambrosini M. (2016), "Chiusure gridate, aperture implicite, diritti in bilico", in D'Agostino M., Corrado A., Caruso F.S. (eds.), *Migrazioni e Confini. Politiche, Diritti e Nuove Forme di Partecipazione*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, pp. 11-23.
- Amnesty International (2016), A blueprint for despair. Human rights impact of the EU-Turkey deal. Retrieved April 10, 2017, from http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/EU-Turkey_Deal_Briefing_Formatted_Final_P4840-3.pdf.
- Anci, Caritas Italiana, Cittalia, Fondazione Migrantes, Servizio Centrale dello SPRAR (2016), *Terzo rapporto sulla protezione internazionale – 2016*. Retrieved March 20, 2017. (<http://www.anci.it/Contenuti/Allegati/Rapporto%20protezione%20internazionale%202016.pdf>)
- Bauman Z. (2005) [2004], *Vite di scarto*, Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Bazzicalupo L. (2014), "Come in uno specchio. Populismo e governamentalità neoliberale", *Cambio*, 8: 25-34.
- Camili E. (2016), "Accoglienza migranti, flop del bando Sprar: i comuni non rispondono", *Redattore sociale*. Retrieved December 10, 2016. (<http://www.redattoresociale.it/Notiziario/Articolo/502980/Accoglienza-migranti-flop-del-bando-Sprar-I-comuni-non-rispondono>).
- Campomori F. (2008), *Immigrazione e cittadinanza locale. La governance dell'integrazione in Italia*, Roma: Carocci.
- Castles, S. (2003), "Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation", *Sociology*, 37 (1): 13-34.
- Chimni, B.S. (1998), "The Geopolitics of refugee studies: A view from the South", *Journal of Refugees Studies*, 2(4): 350-375.
- Corrado (2011), "Clandestini in the orange towns: Migrations and racisms in Calabria's agriculture", *Race/Ethnicity*, 4(2): 191-201.
- Corrado A., M. D'Agostino (2016), "I migranti nelle aree interne. Il caso della Calabria", *Agriregionieuropa*, 45, Giugno 2016. Retrieved June 10, 2016. (<http://agrireregionieuropa.univpm.it/it/content/article/31/45/i-migranti-nelle-aree-interne-il-caso-della-calabria>).
- D'Agostino M. (2009), "Aporie Mediterranee. La governance dei rifugiati e i suoi oppositori", *Daedalus*, 2: 195-209.
- D'Agostino M. (2013), "Governance dei rifugiati e sviluppo locale in Calabria", in C. Col-

- loca and A. Corrado (eds.), *La globalizzazione delle campagne. Migranti e società rurali nel Sud Italia*, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 170-192.
- Dal Lago A. (1999), *Non-persone. L'esclusione dei migranti in una società globale*, Milano: Feltrinelli.
- Dal Lago A. (2010), "Note sul razzismo culturale in Italia", in S. Palidda (ed.), *Il "discorso" ambiguo sulle migrazioni*, Messina: Mesogea.
- Delle Donne M. (2004), *Un cimitero chiamato Mediterraneo. Per una storia del diritto d'asilo nell'Unione Europea*, Roma: DeriveApprodi.
- Düvell F. (2004), "La globalizzazione del controllo delle migrazioni", in S. Mezzadra (ed.), *I confini della libertà. Per un'analisi politica delle migrazioni contemporanee*, Roma: DeriveApprodi, pp. 23-50.
- Faist T. (2013), "The mobility turn: a new paradigm for the social sciences?", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36, 11: 1637-1646.
- Fantozzi P. (ed. 2004), *Potere politico e globalizzazione*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.
- Fassin D. D'Halluin E. (2005), "The Truth from the Body: Medical Certificates as Ultimate Evidence for Asylum Seekers", *American Anthropologist*, n. 107(4):597-608.
- Fassin D., Pandolfi M. (2010), *Contemporary States of Emergency. The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, New York: Zone Books.
- Fiocco L. (1998), *Innovazione Tecnologica e Innovazione Sociale. Le dinamiche del mutamento della società capitalistica*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.
- Flinders M., Buller J. (2006), "Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools", *British Politics*, 1(3): 293-318.
- Foucault M. (1994), "Precisioni sul potere. Risposta ad alcuni critici", in P. Dalla Vigna (ed.), *Potere e Strategie. L'assoggettamento dei corpi e l'elemento sfuggente*, Milano: Mimesis, pp. 30-42.
- Gjergji I. (2016), *Sulla governance delle migrazioni. Sociologia dell'underworld del comando globale*, Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Guild E. (2009), *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Harrel-Bond B. (2005), "L'esperienza dei rifugiati in quanto beneficiari di aiuto", *Antropologia - annuario diretto da Ugo Fabietti, Rifugiati*, 5: 15-48.
- Hayter T. (2000), *Open Borders. The Case Against Immigration Controls*, London: Pluto Press.
- Joly D. (1999), "A New Asylum Regime in Europe", in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds.), *Refugee rights and realities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jones R. (2016), *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move*, London: Verso.
- Loescher G. (2001) "Protection and Humanitarian Action in the Post-Cold War Era", in A. Zolberg and P.M. Benda (eds.), *Global Migrants Global Refugee. Problems and so-*

- lutions*, New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 171-205.
- Loescher G. (2002), *The UNHCR and World Politics. A Perilous Path*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lunaria (2017), *Accoglienza. La propaganda e le proteste del rifiuto*, le scelte istituzionali sbagliate. Retrieved March 18, 2017. (https://www.lunaria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/OFOCUS1_DEFINITIVO_13marzo.pdf).
- Marchetti C. (2016), "Le sfide dell'accoglienza. Passato e presente dei sistemi istituzionali di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati in Italia", *Meridiana*, 86:121-143.
- Mares P. (2003), "Distance makes the heart grow fonder: Media images of refugees and asylum seekers", in E. Newman and J. van Selm (eds.), *Refugee and forced displacement: international security, human vulnerability, and the state*, Japan: United Nations University Press, pp. 330-349.
- Medu (2015), *Terra ingiusta. Rapporto sulle condizioni di vita e di lavoro dei braccianti stranieri in agricoltura*. Retrieved September 10, 2017. (<http://Alas/www.mediciperidirittiumani.org/pdf/Terraingiusta.pdf>).
- Melotti U. (1992), *L'immigrazione, una sfida per l'Europa*, Roma: Edizioni Associate.
- Messinetti S. (2016), "Bergoglio invita il sindaco di Riace mentre il governo boicotta il suo modello", *il Manifesto*, 10 ottobre 2016.
- Mezzadra S. (2001), *Diritto di fuga. Migrazioni, cittadinanza, globalizzazione*, Verona: Ombre Corte.
- MSF (2016), *Fuori campo. Richiedenti asilo e rifugiati in Italia: insediamenti informali e marginalità sociale*, Medici Senza Frontiere, Roma. Retrieved September 10, 2016. (<http://fuoricampo.medicisenzafrontiere.it/Fuoricampo.pdf>).
- Ong A. (2005) [2003], *Da rifugiati a cittadini*, Milano: Raffaello Cortina.
- Pandolfi M. (2005), "Sovranità mobile e derive umanitarie: emergenza, urgenza, ingerenza", in R. Malighetti (ed.), *Oltre lo Sviluppo*, Roma: Meltemi, pp. 151-185.
- Rahola F. (2003), *Zone definitivamente temporanee. I luoghi dell'umanità in eccesso*, Verona: Ombre Corte.
- Rastello A. (2010), *La frontiera addosso. Così si deportano i diritti umani*, Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Robinson, V. (1998), "Security, Migration, and refugees", in N. Poku and D.T. Graham (eds.), *Redefining security: population movements and national security*, Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 67-90.
- Salter M. (2008), "Securitisation and desecuritisation", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11(4): 321-349.
- Salvatici S. (2004), "Introduzione", *Genesis*, 3: 5-20.
- Salvatici S. (2015), *Nel nome degli altri. Storia dell'umanitarismo internazionale*, Bolo-

- gna: il Mulino.
- Sassen S. (2008), "Nuove politiche di appartenenza", *Mondi Migranti*, 3: 7-29.
- Scheel S., Ratfisch P. (2014), "Refugee Protections Meets Migration Management: UNHCR as a Global Police of Populations", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40(6): 924-941.
- Sivini G. (2005), "Le migrazioni dal fordismo alla globalizzazione", in G. Sivini (ed.), *Le migrazioni tra ordine imperiale e soggettività*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, pp. 39-64.
- Stuppini A. (2013), "Tra centro e periferia. Le politiche locali per l'integrazione", in C. saraceno, N. Sartor, G. Sciortino (eds.), *Stranieri e disuguali. Le disuguaglianze nei diritti e nelle condizioni di vita degli immigrati*, Bologna: il Mulino.
- Terry F. (2002), *Condemned to Repeat?*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- UNHCR (1995), *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty years of Humanitarian Action*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- UNHCR (2016), *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries – 2016*. (<http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html>)
- UNHCR (2017), *UNHCR's strategic directions – 2017-2021*. Retrieved April 08, 2017. (<http://www.unhcr.org/5894558d4.pdf>)
- Vitale A. (2005), "Verso un ordine imperiale delle migrazioni", in Sivini G. (ed.), *Le migrazioni tra ordine imperiale e soggettività*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, pp. 11-38.
- Vitiello M. (2016), "La crisi dei rifugiati e il sistema europeo comune d'asilo. Che cosa non ha funzionato", *Meridiana*, 86: 145-165.
- Wood M., Flinders M. (2014), "Rethinking depoliticisation: beyond the governmental", *Policy & Politics*, 42(2): 151-170.
- Zetter R. (1991), "Labeling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4(1): 39-62.
- Zetter (2015), *Protection in Crisis. Forced Migration and Protection In a Global Era*, Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved October 15, 2016. (<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/protection-crisis-forced-migration-and-protection-global-era>).
- Zolberg A., Suhrke A., Aguayo S. (eds. 1989), *Escape from violence*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wike R., Stoke B., Simmons K. (2016), *Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean more Terrorism, Fewer Jobs*, Pew Research Center. Retrieved May 10, 2017. (<http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/>)

AUTHOR'S INFORMATION:

Mariafrancesca D'Agostino is Assistant Professor of Political Sociology in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Calabria, where she teaches "Co-development and Migration". She has authored various essays on transnational migration governance and local host policies. Among her most recent publications: with Alessandra Corrado and Francesco Caruso, *Migrazioni e confini. Politiche, diritti e nuove forme di partecipazione* (Rubbettino, 2016).