

*Interdisciplinary Political Studies*

<http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/idps>

ISSN: 2039-8573 (electronic version)

*IdPS*, Issue 7(2) 2021: 119-166

DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v7n2p119

Published: December 23, 2021

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## RESEARCH ARTICLE

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# Populism Literature on Europe: A Brief Overview and Meta-Analysis

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## ABSTRACT

*Populism is undoubtedly one of the most relevant concepts to the study of contemporary party politics. A massive amount of literature has been produced on this topic, especially with regard to the European continent. However, the literature still lacks a comprehensive meta-analysis of this vast body of research. In this work, we summarize the results of one hundred and ninety-four articles present on the two most authoritative bibliographic databases, Web of Science and Scopus, in the last three decades. The meta-analysis enquires into definitions of populism employed across the decades and the main characteristics of the research design. The main results show that, across time, the definition of the concept has become increasingly clear, with the interpretation holding populism to be a thin-centred ideology clearly prevailing. The focus on the empirically oriented partially confirms our expectations, although relevant differences are identified and further discussed. We conclude that more research is needed on this topic, in particular with regard to the diversity of the geographical contexts.*

**KEYWORDS:** Populism; European Politics; Meta-analysis; Literature Review

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## **1. Introduction**

There is a voluminous and ongoing debate about the nature and defining features of populism. This prolific literature chronicles distinct approaches to the phenomenon, some of which share relevant similarities, while others are mutually exclusive (Gidron & Bronikowski 2013). It is therefore unsurprising that the community of scholars has not been able to converge on an unanimously accepted definition (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017). There is also a relatively broad literature that provides different meta-analyses focusing on both the impact of demand-side and structural factors on the radical right-wing vote share (among others Stockemer et al. 2018; Amengay & Stockemer 2019) while only recently there have been the first attempts to analyse systematically populist literature (Hunger & Paxton 2021). In this study, we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis by looking not only at how the populist phenomenon in Europe has been treated from the perspective of its determinants but also at how the conceptual solidity of the phenomenon has matured over time and which are the main definitions adopted in the available research.

In order to grasp the evolutions in the literature on populism, we examine both theoretically focussed and empirically-driven articles over time as well as the type of research design implemented. To the best of our knowledge, while there is research available dealing with the complexity of the phenomenon from a conceptual, methodological, and interpretative perspective, there is not yet a comprehensive meta-analysis of the study of the phenomenon in Europe. This represents the innovative aspect of this research, which is focussed on the perspectives of the scientific users of the concept. In this way, we provide an up-to-date review of the literature, using it as a fruitful positioning device and identifying how academic scholars relate to the concept of populism and how their analyses deal with the conceptual, methodological, and empirical challenges. In other words, from an empirical perspective, we contribute to the literature by specifying the ways in which the meanings of populism have been constructed and employed by the academic community.

This meta-analysis by no means can cover the richness of meanings attributed to populism in other disciplines or the variety of experiences labelled as populist outside Europe. Differences in the scientific focus or the geographical area would clearly have led to different results from those presented in this article, since comparative politics on Europe has evidently adopted some lines of theoretical and empirical research over others and has mainly associated this phenomenon with the right-wing. However, such a focus appears nevertheless necessary to investigate the state of the art on populism in Europe within the privileged discipline for the study of politics.

To build our corpus of scientific literature, we did an extensive search of scientific articles - research articles, editorial or introduction to special issues - published between 1990 and 2019 in relevant journals present on the two most authoritative bibliographic databases, Web of Science and Scopus (Clarivate Analytics 2021; Elsevier 2021). We will examine in detail the definitions of populism employed across decades, as well as the main characteristics of the research design of the empirically-driven articles, including whether focus is on the supply- or the demand-side, the ideological positioning of the actors, the geographical areas covered, and the number of cases.

This article proceeds as follows. First of all, we will provide an overview of the main conceptualisations of populism and the literature on its determinants, which aims to clarify the complexities faced by the literature in dealing with the populist phenomenon. This is an unavoidable step to understand the main theoretical approaches and lines of research employed by the scholars of this field that will be studied in our meta-analysis. In the second section, we move on to the research strategy, followed by the presentation of the variables of reference and expectations. The third section presents the results. We conclude by discussing the findings of such research.

## 2. The conceptualisation of populism

Classifying populist parties and their variants remains controversial and challenging. Note indeed that populism lacks organic *maîtres à penser* and foundational texts. It has strongly negative connotations (Urbinati 1998; Rosanvallon 2008) and, unsurprisingly, the name ‘populism’ is rarely invoked by those actors who are labelled as populists. There is also a widespread semantic confusion with other terms like demagoguery. In the *mare magnum* of definitions, there are four dominant conceptualisations: populism defined as a (thin-centred) ideology, a discourse, a style, and a strategy (Moffitt 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017). While this plurality of definitions can be partially explained by the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon, it also reflects the specificities linked to the contexts of reference and the potential of collision between the theoretical assumptions on which the different conceptualisations are based.

The most influential - and most frequently invoked - definition in contemporary comparative politics interprets populism as a thin-centred ideology (Rovira-Kaltwasser et al. 2017). Theorised initially by Canovan (2002), it was further refined by Mudde (2004, 2007) and Stanley (2008). Building on the work of Freedman (1996), Mudde’s minimal definition of populism is probably the most popular in contemporary social sciences, since its focus on minimal and essential features enabled it to travel safely across time, space, and political orientations. Mudde (2004) argues that unlike traditional interpretive frameworks - liberalism or socialism - populism is unable to provide by itself an interpretation of contemporary socio-political questions and therefore receives grafts from classic ideologies. Populism is, hence, defined as ‘an ideology that considers society separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004, p. 543; Italics in the text). At least two features of this definition need further specifications. First, by focusing on the realm of ideas, this definition does not postulate specific populist organizational traits or communicative features. Second, because of its ‘thinness’, populism can be combined with other, more

structured host ideologies, and can be located in different positions on the left/right continuum. For instance, the ideational morphology of populist radical right-wing parties relies on nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007).

Within the definition of populism as a discourse, two distinct views cohabit. While sharing the same label, they differ quite significantly with regard to the interpretation of populism they provide.

First, there is the interpretation that can be considered the main contender to the definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology. Populism as a discourse is intimately related to Laclau's (1977, 2005a) conceptualization of populism and the post-structuralist school that assumes that political identities are created through discursive practice. In this vein, Laclau rejects a definition based on fixed characteristics, considers this approach to be 'essentially flawed' and 'overwhelmed by an avalanche of exceptions' (Laclau 2005a, p. 117) and equates populism to a particular type of political logic, in the attempt to generate a new hegemonic order based on the antagonistic articulation of unfulfilled social claims that divide the society into two camps, the underdog and the power (Laclau 2005b, p. 38). In brief, 'the people' is the subject of the political and, hence, populism is the logic of the political. In this sense, at the centre of this interpretation is the claim that all politics is populism (Laclau 2005b, p. 47).

Closely related to that of Mudde (2004), Hawkins's (2009) definition of populism as a discourse has been incorporated by the same author under the umbrella term of 'ideational approach' on the ground that populist parties and movements share a way of seeing the political world (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde 2017). In this vein, populism is defined as 'a Manichaeian discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite' (Hawkins 2009, p. 1042). However, while the core of this definition of populism is located in the domain of political beliefs, it is not the result of the conscious production of a coherent worldview. Rather, it refers to 'a *latent* set of ideas or a worldview that lacks significant exposition and 'contrast' with other discourses and is usually low on policy specifics' (Hawkins 2009, p. 1045).

An alternative conceptual approach relates to populism as a political style. This is one of the oldest interpretative keys to this phenomenon. In the mid-1990s Mudde (1996, p. 231) argued that populism was ‘primarily used to describe a specific political form or style instead of a specific ideology’. Various other authors referred to the rhetorical features of the phenomenon in order to grasp its specificities (Kazin 1995; Taguieff 1995; Knight 1998; Canovan 1999). Recently, the literature has seen increased work towards conceptual refinement in this area. Jagers and Walgrave offer a ‘thin’ conceptualisation of populism as a ‘political communication style of political actors that refers to the people’ (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 322; *Italics in the text*), which can be expanded into a ‘thick’ conceptualisation, based on vertical (anti-elitism) and horizontal (exclusion of minorities) dimensions. It is mainly the work of Moffitt and Tormey (2014) that has succeeded in fleshing out the conceptual elements of populism as a style. They define the political style as ‘the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations’ (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 387; *Italics in the text*). Besides the rhetorical and communicative aspects, they include in the definition a relational dimension according to which populism is ‘performed and enacted’ (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 388; Moffitt 2016, p. 38). In this way, this strand of literature acknowledges the limited interest in the content of the populist platform, its organisational features, or the political logic behind it and focuses instead on performance and the relationship between the populist leaders and their followers (Moffitt & Tormey 2014). This approach shares several commonalities with another interpretation, the so-called socio-cultural approach, which emphasises the socio-cultural relationship between populist leaders and social bases (Ostiguy 2017).

The fourth definition of populism considers populism to be a peculiar form of political mobilization. Most famously, Weyland defines populism as a ‘strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’ (2001, p. 14). This definition does not deal with ideology, nor the type of (economic) policies enacted, but rather centres the way in which populist leaders directly relate to their constituents. While this approach has undoubtedly been

explored in the study of populism in Latin America, its application to the European context has been rather limited (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013).

### **3. The determinants of populism: an overview**

The theoretical arguments made by this extremely diversified scholarship converge, however, into considering the socio-economic context as a fertile breeding ground for the breakthrough of populist parties across the world. Building on grievance theory (Gamson 1968), feelings of diffused economic and cultural insecurity are considered to be (major) drivers of populist voting (Kriesi et al. 2008). In direct consequence, populist parties are expected to be endorsed by the ‘losers’ - those individuals, and groups ‘who lack the professional and/or cultural skills to function successfully in a globalizing world’ (Kriesi 2007, p. 85). Recently, Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) interestingly combined arguments connected to theories of changing socio-political conflicts with those focussed on the crises of political representation to suggest that, while electoral support for radical right and radical left parties are rooted in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, the electoral performance of these parties is in both cases connected to individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Yet, as sharply pinpointed by van Kessel (2015), this interpretative line fails to explain relevant cross-national differences in the electoral support for the different ideational varieties of populist parties or their absence in certain countries.

Both supply- and demand-side analyses present us with contradictory assessments and even conflicting suggestions, noting also that most of this literature focuses on the constellation of parties which were often described as extreme or radical right variants of populism. The literature tends to use a plethora of definitions interchangeably, including (among others) radical right, populist right, and extreme right - echoing Mudde’s comment that ‘we know *who* they are, even though we do not know exactly *what* they are’ (1996, p. 233). More recently, left-wing (March 2011) and valence (Zulianello 2020) forms of populism received increased interest.

### *3.1. Populism and supply-side factors*

One privileged dimension of inquiry concerns those variables directly connected to the functioning of the electoral arena. This direction of study shows moderate to limited success rates. While scholars like Abedi (2004), Carter (2005), Norris (2005), and Bustikova (2014) uncover low or no evidence related to traditional electoral variables (e.g. the disproportionality of the electoral system, requirements regarding ballot access, the turnout, etc.), various others (Jackman & Volpert 1996; Golder 2003; Veugelers & Magnan 2005) find evidence that permissive electoral systems help these parties. Recently, Amengay and Stockemer's meta-analysis (2019) further documents the relevance of permissive electoral systems in bolstering the vote share of the right-wing parties, while fine-tuning the relevance of certain assumptions (including turnout).

Other supply-side explanations focus on the impact of a federal or decentralized state structure. Scholars like Arzheimer and Carter (2006) assumed that (right-wing) populist parties might be advantaged by federal state structures with voters more willing to support them in second order elections. While the literature finds limited evidence in support of the impact of federalism on the electoral viability of (radical-right) populism (Hakhverdian & Koop 2007; Norris & Inglehart 2019), recent work documents sub-national variation in the populist phenomenon (Heinisch et al. 2020). However, rather than being a supply-side issue, this literature links this finding to the fact that populist voters are not distributed in a homogenous manner across the national territory (Vampa 2020). This burgeoning literature further shows that some territories have more populist potential than other national counterparts (Van Hauwaert et al. 2019)

In attempting to measure the supply-side of populism, scholars increasingly focus on the winning ideology of these parties. Scholars investigate party manifestos and platforms, media, or the speeches of politicians in order to assess what the core populist ideas are and how they affect party competition (Mudde 2007; Hawkins 2009; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014; Tarchi 2015). On this ground, a flourishing strand of literature focuses on these parties' impact on the agenda of the mainstream



parties (Meguid 2008). While the literature widely acknowledges the influence of populist parties on the positions assumed by other (mainstream) competitors, the direction of this influence remains a contentious topic, with cross-country and diachronic variations, as well as different effects on left and right mainstream parties, governmental and/or oppositional parties (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2020; De Vries & Hobolt 2020). A similar inconclusiveness is identified with regard to other aspects connected to the dynamics of party competition: the degree of polarization (Spies & Franzmann 2011; Mudde 2014; Enyedi 2016), issue salience and issue ownership (Meguid 2008; Bornschier 2010), or the nature of the government and its ideological position (Coffé et al. 2007). Recently, a group of scholars has inquired into the populist rhetoric among the mainstream parties, but once again with mixed results. While Rooduijn et al. (2014) have not found evidence of a linear growth of populist rhetoric, others have identified a concentration within the 2010s (Mannucci & Weber 2017).

Several studies have focussed on media as a relevant supply-side explanation (Koopmans & Statham 1999; Koopmans & Muis 2009; Vliegenthart et al. 2012). Part of this literature links the electoral performance of populist parties to the growth of polarization, the spread of misinformation and the diffusion of conspiratorial thinking (Block & Negrine 2017; Hameleers et al. 2017). Others have focussed on how the so-called discursive opportunity structure impacts the electoral viability of these parties (Koopmans & Olzak 2004). In parallel, various scholars have focussed on the agency of populist radical right parties with regard to the politicization of topics such as immigration (Van Spanje 2010; Yılmaz 2012; Helbling 2014) or EU-related issues (Hooghe & Marks 2009; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Hoeglinger 2016).

The focus on the supply-side also includes analysis of the characteristics of the leadership and internal organization of populist parties. At the beginning of the 1990s, Betz (1998) argued that strong party organization helps in achieving both party cohesion and leadership stability and, hence, provides an element of reliability to the party. Similarly, in her seminal research, Carter (2005) beautifully illustrates the key importance of party organization and leadership in explaining the varying levels of

support for extreme right parties in Europe. The most recent literature acknowledges that the organizational patterns of contemporary populist parties are a fundamental element in terms of party development and adaptation, although additional comparative studies are required (De Lange & Art 2011; De Lange 2015). Many observers also suggest the need to expand the narratives beyond high-profile cases and leaders.

All in all, despite clear individual accomplishments in advancing our understanding of populism, it is hard to draw any consistent conclusions about the effect of supply-side explanations on the parties of reference. Some of the explanations provided by the literature target the lack of consensus on which variables ought to be tested in order to explain the geographical variation of the phenomenon (Arzheimer 2009; van Kessel 2015). Various other scholars suggest the need to fine-tune the aggregate studies with a subset of geographical units and to include smallest units of subnational analysis (e.g. municipalities, communes or electoral districts) (Amengay & Stockemer 2019). Moreover, considering the variety of the phenomenon and its historical manifestations, it is reasonable to assume that changes have occurred across time, and the results we rely on have potentially altered since the research was undertaken.

### *3.2. Populism and demand-side analyses*

The second main line of investigation aims to identify who supports populism and why (Arzheimer 2009; Akkerman et al. 2014; Spruyt 2014; Elchardus & Spruyt 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert 2020). The underlying assumption is that the social basis for (radical-right) populist mobilization is shaped by economic transformation and cultural diversity (Kriesi et al. 2008, p. 19) and that successful populist actors resonate with attitudes, sentiments and (political, cultural, economic) views already present among voters (Spruyt et al. 2016) as well as individuals' personalities (Bakker et al. 2016).

Until recently, the literature assumed that populist parties mobilized people who have been placed in a vulnerable cultural and economic position because of the

societal changes that have occurred since the 1960s (Betz 1990); the literature further considered that it is reasonable to expect that these parties' voters are characterized by lower educational, and cognitive resources, weaker positions in the knowledge society, more vulnerable economic positions, and Eurosceptic attitudes (Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Hooghe et al. 2002; Lubbers et al. 2002; Ivarsflaten 2005; Norris 2005; Oesch 2008; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Werts et al. 2013; Visser et al. 2014; Ramiro 2016). Various studies have suggested that this is indeed the case, namely that those people who vote for populist radical right and left parties tend to come from lower social classes, to be unemployed and have lower incomes (Lubbers et al. 2002; Van der Brug et al. 2003; Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007; Arzheimer 2009; Visser et al. 2014; Ramiro 2016). Interestingly, studies have increasingly acknowledged that education and occupational status are not perfectly correlated and operate independently of each other. Moreover, various studies show that education has a positive impact on radical left voting (Visser et al. 2014; Ramiro 2016). In parallel, education has increasingly been connected with the degree of tolerance toward out-groups (Meeusen et al. 2013). In general, more recent research has fine-tuned the initial expectations, indicating that the link between personal situation (i.e. vulnerability) and political choice is not straightforward: political choices appear to be less influenced by personal life situations and more by a societal diagnosis and an evaluation of the societal consequences of the (voting) position (Elchardus & Spruyt 2016). Several scholars illustrate also that it is not (only) the economic position that explains the rise of populism, but also increased perceptions of deprivation and discrimination against 'people like us' who feel their voice no longer matters (anymore) in politics (Elchardus & Spruyt 2016; van Kessel et al. 2021) and, consequently, see the populist platform as a (desperate) politics of hope (Elchardus & Spruyt 2016, p. 126).

Several analyses inquire into gender effects and identify that men have a higher propensity to vote for (radical right) populist parties, although with relevant differences across countries (Norris 2005; Harteveld et al. 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015). However, more recent studies indicate an overestimated difference between

male and female voters and context-dependent electoral behaviour (Spierings & Zaslove 2015; Hartevelde et al. 2015; Geurkink et al. 2020). Some analyses chronicle women's increased agency in right-wing movements and parties (Erzeel & Rashkova 2017). New empirical data also show that, while both men and women tend to vote for radical right parties in line with their opposition to immigration (Immerzeel et al. 2015; Spierings & Zaslove 2015), mixed and even contradictory results are registered in terms of law-and-order attitudes, political interest, and discontent with democracy (Immerzeel et al. 2013; Hartevelde et al. 2015; Spierings & Zaslove 2015).

Shifting our attention from socio-economic features, several scholars argue that people with lower levels of education, lower incomes and who are unemployed become populist voters because of their higher levels of political distrust and discontent (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Akkerman et al. 2017; Castanho Silva et al. 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018; Geurkink et al. 2020). Populist platforms provide distrustful and discontent voters with an opportunity for reconnecting with a positive social identity. On this point, Spruyt et al. (2016, p. 336) convincingly argue that 'populism remains a politics of hope, that is, the hope that where established parties and elites have failed, ordinary folks, common sense, and the politicians who give them a voice can find solutions'.

Over recent years, the literature has increasingly analysed the role of strong and moralized attitudes about political and societal issues (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser 2019; van Prooijen 2021). Successful populist entrepreneurship draws on shared sentiments and views within a significant part of the population (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Hawkins et al 2020). With varying operationalizations (Hawkins et al. 2012; Akkerman et al. 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016), scholars have investigated populist attitudes, connected them with party preferences and demonstrated that these attitudes are shared by both left-and right-wing populist voters (Akkerman et al. 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018; Hawkins et al. 2020).

In their search for explanations for populist voting, scholars implicitly and explicitly refer to the literature on political psychology (Meléndez & Rovira

Kaltwasser 2021; Rovira Kaltwasser 2021). This burgeoning strand of literature assumes that populist voters tend to simplify the dynamics of the political arena and are more susceptible to forms of conspiratorial thinking (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008; Hawkins 2009). Despite these expectations, the empirical research available shows that holding a populist view is correlated only with some sub-facets of belief in conspiracy theories. In their pioneering study, Castanho Silva et al. (2017) argue that, although conspiracy theories and populism share a simple Manichean narrative, individual support for conspiracy thinking is much higher than populist voting. They also suggest the need to inquire into which types of conspiracy beliefs attract specific (populist) constituencies, as well as the extent to which left-wing and right-wing populist citizens endorse different conspiracy-based narratives. In this vein, Vasilopoulos and Jost (2020) identify both psychological similarities and dissimilarities in left-wing and right-wing citizens who endorse populist attitudes. In parallel, Rovira Kaltwasser (2021) calls for increased attention to the link between misinformation, conspiracy thinking and populist voting. The available analysis produces mixed results. While Miller et al (2016) shown that populist voting is not necessarily driven by misinformation, van Kessel et al (2021) find evidence that misinformation relates to support for parties on the right side of populism, but not for those on the left side.

The analyses summarized above are only a tiny part of the extremely vast literature on the populist phenomenon. This literature converges in identifying that populism is more than an expression of protest with complex triggers of mobilization and a heterogeneous support base. Additional explanations concern the way different scholars operationalize the dimensions of interest, while, more recently, scholars like Stockemer et al. (2018) suggest that increased in-depth qualitative research might be needed in order to document the complexities behind the processes through which individuals becomes voters, supporters or activists for a populist party.

#### **4. The construction of the database and the criteria of selection**

If we put together the complexities behind the definitional attempts and the fertile literature on the determinants of populisms, the meeting point is the intricacy of the phenomenon. This justifies the need to further inquire into the meanings, uses and operationalization of populism in the literature. A meta-analysis dealing with a concept with such a wide range of uses, determinants and research outcomes unavoidably requires specific methodological choices. We have decided to limit the analysis to scientific articles published in English in academic journals. We are aware that the focus on scientific journals can be seen as a limitation, considering that seminal works on this topic have been published in books and/or in other languages – particularly German and French. However, we believe that this choice is in synch with the evolutions in the academic career path, since the ability to publish (peer-reviewed) articles has become a key metric of a competitive publication record. It is far beyond the aim of this article to inquire into the desirability of this evolution and we treat it exclusively as a documented fact (Kusmanoff 2019). However, almost every article included in our analysis made use of a wide variety of scientific publications, not exclusively in English. Indirectly, this bibliographical element broadens the debate on populism beyond the strict criteria described above.

Once the territory of inquiry was delineated, another crucial selection element concerned the identification of the most relevant (social sciences) disciplines for our topic. We deliberately favoured comparative politics as a privileged environment. We also included articles dealing with the European Union (EU) treated through the lens of comparative politics. In line with the literature on the influence of the context on the electoral performance of populism, there is extensive evidence that party competition over European integration (see also EU issue position, issue salience, or issue framing) interacts with the electoral performance of populism. We applied the same type of reasoning to journals of three other disciplines with porous boundaries with comparative politics: political theory, sociology, and communication. We included articles from these disciplines in our analysis insofar as they maintained strong links with comparative politics – in other words, if comparative politics

research is explicitly cited and debated in these articles or they have later been influential in the comparative politics literature.

Bearing in mind these criteria, we relied on two of the most authoritative bibliographic databases, Web of Science and Scopus (Clarivate Analytics 2021; Elsevier 2021). Given the vast number of bibliographic sources indexed in both databases, we adopted additional operational criteria in order to better grasp the relevance of the articles in the debate on European populism.

The first step involved a preliminary evaluation of the relevance of populism by running a simple search string in both databases looking for the word populism and its derivations in the title, abstract and authors' keywords (See Appendix). However, up until the 2000s or even the 2010s, it was not uncommon to find journals without abstracts, not to mention keywords. Note also that journals differ quite significantly in terms of the length of their abstracts or the number of keywords. Relying only on the words associated with populism would have created several unbalances among sources and/or different periods of time. Hence, we launched an additional search string, composed of one hundred and fifty-nine terms, such as the names of the most relevant populist parties or some concepts usually associated with them – such as 'radicalism', 'extremism', 'Euroscepticism' – and which did not have at the same time any reference to populism in their title, abstract or keywords. From these, we considered all articles which included at least ten references to populism in the body of the article or at least one reference to populism in their introductory paragraph or the conclusions<sup>1</sup> and additional four references anywhere in the text, excluding bibliography and footnotes from both criteria. A caveat is needed: we made an exception only for those articles which explicitly defined populism or a concept with a fundamental feature labelled as populist as their key concept.

The second step allowed us to further reduce the database and select only those articles using populism in a substantial way. For theoretically oriented articles, we included only those articles which explicitly used this concept in their analyses and

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<sup>1</sup> For articles without division into paragraphs, we took into account the first and the last two pages.

considered the European context<sup>2</sup>. With regard to empirically oriented articles, we included all articles which explicitly defined political actors, parties or movements as populist or labelled one of their specific features as such and used at least one European country as a focus. We selected empirical articles relying on descriptive analyses when they specifically employed a populist phenomenon as their main focus<sup>3</sup>. For articles dealing with causal relationships, we included all pieces of research which had at least one phenomenon as populist among their main *explananda*. When used among the main *explanantia*, we include only those analyses specifying or testing the causal pathways between them and the phenomena to be investigated. We also included the negative pole – those articles that used populism to openly reject its applicability to a given phenomenon, insofar as they explicitly explained the reasons for this choice and the preference for other conceptualizations.

Last but not least, we set a threshold of relevance in an attempt to obtain a list of the fifty most cited articles for every decade in each database and kept in the analysis all the articles present in at least one of the two. Since the number of citations can vary rather significantly with any update of the databases, we relaxed this criterion by using also the articles with less than two citations compared to the fiftieth most cited article per decade. In order to consolidate this list, we included two additional criteria, regardless of the threshold of fifty articles per decade. First, we eliminated all articles that received less than ten citations on Web of Science or less than twelve citations on Scopus. Second, we incorporated all articles that received at least sixty citations on Web of Science or seventy citations on Scopus. Finally, since the bibliographic search was made according to their citations on 7 May 2021, we also wanted to ensure that the articles published in the last years of the 2010s were not excessively penalized by the timing of our search. For this reason, we fine-tuned the

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<sup>2</sup> There are, however, theoretical articles that made only brief remarks on the European context and the specific characteristics of contemporary European populism (e.g. Canovan 1999; Aslanidis 2016). We decided to keep them in our analysis given their small number and the vast influence they have had in the theoretical debate on European populism.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, an article dealing with the general description of the electoral geography of the main parties in a given election, including a populist party, would not be included as there was not a specific selection of the populist party, while a similar study that focussed on how a populist party and a Green party were electorally distributed would be.



criterion for inclusion related to that decade, namely that every year must be represented in the dataset with at least three articles. This threshold was met by all years but 2019. For this reason, we ran a separate search limited to articles published during that year, selecting the three most cited articles published in 2019 in both databases. Finally, both Scopus and WoS made it possible to look for citations of articles published in journals not indexed within the database, a feature that we explicitly used in our selection<sup>4</sup>.

Considering the above-mentioned criteria, we were able to select one hundred and ninety-four articles (Piccolino & Soare 2021). More specifically, in the 1990s we were only able to identify forty articles; in the following decade, a total number of seventy articles were gathered. In the 2010s, we were able to obtain eighty-four articles. Table 1 shows a summary of the articles in our dataset.

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<sup>4</sup> In the 1990s, we did not obtain fifty indexed articles corresponding to our selection criteria. We therefore included all non-indexed articles with citations equal to or higher than our minimum threshold of citations. In the 2000s and 2010s our goal was fully meet. We decided to keep non-indexed articles insofar as they matched the number of citations of the least cited article in both databases.

**Table 1. Articles according to journals (per decade)**

<b>1990s</b>	
	<b>Number of articles</b>
Comparative Politics	4
Parliamentary Affairs	4
Party Politics	4
West European Politics	4
European Journal of Political Research	3
Telos	3
South European Society and Politics	2
Journals with only one article in the decade	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>2000s</b>	
	<b>Number of articles</b>
European Journal of Political Research	8
West European Politics	8
Journal of Political Ideologies	7
Party Politics	5
Comparative Political Studies	4
Comparative European Politics	3
Journal of European Public Policy	3
Parliamentary Affairs	3
Patterns of Prejudice	3
Acta Politica	2
East European Politics and Societies	2
Government and Opposition	2
International Political Science Review	2
Political Studies	2
Problems of Post-Communism	2
SAIS Review of International Affairs	2
Journals with only one article in the decade	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>2010s</b>	
	<b>Number of articles</b>
European Journal of Political Research	7
Government and Opposition	7
Party Politics	6
Political Studies	6
West European Politics	6
Information Communication and Society	4
Journal of European Public Policy	4
Journal of Political Ideologies	3
British Journal of Sociology	2
Comparative Political Studies	2

Electoral Studies	2
Ethnic and Racial Studies	2
German Politics	2
Journal of Common Market Studies	2
Journals with only one article in the decade	29
Total	84

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Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

### 3.1. Coding, variables and expectations

The coding was carried out through human coding of articles by looking at the full text of them. An inter-coder reliability test was carried out on a sub-sample of articles<sup>5</sup>. The first distinction in our dataset was made according to the level of inquiry of the populist actors or phenomena discussed. We differentiated between articles that had populist actors or phenomena among their main *explananda*, on the one hand, and articles that used populism to label an *explanans* or an *explanandum* that was relatively secondary in the framework of the article, on the other.

A second variable involved the essential focus of the article. Even though all selected articles included some sort of theoretical elaboration and at least an elementary empirical inquiry, we made a distinction between theoretically focussed and empirically focussed articles. In the first category, we included all articles centred on the discussion, definition or improvement of concepts, while the second category includes all articles with empirical analysis as their main focus. In our definition of theoretically oriented articles, we included not only all articles of *strictu sensu* political theory, i.e. written by scholars of this discipline according to its classical approaches, but also some articles written by scholars of comparative politics. Even though this discipline may be defined in essentially empirical terms (Schedler & Mudde 2010), some of its articles are clearly focussed on debating and refining concepts rather than exploring new empirical findings. Conversely, we considered as empirically oriented articles all those pieces of research that, regardless of the originality of their theoretical framework, had a structured empirical analysis. Obviously, the empirical examination

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<sup>5</sup> The value of the Krippendorff's alpha on the eleven variables under coding ranged from 0.678 to 1, for an average figure of 0.844 considered reliable by the literature.

in these articles is never independent from theory, but it is nevertheless possible to identify a distinct research design.

For empirically focussed articles, we employed additional variables concerning their research design<sup>6</sup>: number of cases, quantitative or qualitative design<sup>7</sup>, focus on demand- or supply-side of politics<sup>8</sup>, geographical focus between Western and Central and Eastern Europe and between Europe and other continents, and the position of the populist actors discussed in the political spectrum.

Finally, we included two variables related to the definition of populism. The first assessed whether or not populism was explicitly defined within the article, using an admittedly large criterion. Indeed, we considered populism to be defined if an article made at least some elementary references to the main characteristics of populism. We thus considered all those articles that did not have such an (even elementary) analysis, regardless of references to a given populist ‘ideology’, ‘ideal type’, ‘style’, etc. as lacking an explicit definition. The mere use of populism as an adjective cannot tell us much about the interpretation of it given by an author.

In the second variable, we reported *verbatim* the label adopted by the authors to classify populism. In a rather limited number of articles, the authors employed more than one label in their definition without a clear preference for one over the others. In these cases, we counted all the labels employed within an article in our classification. In some articles, the authors did not take an explicit stand on which category should be used to classify populism, and we thus grouped all of them into a specific category. As we saw in the first paragraph, however, the same label may have different interpretations. In the case of discourse, following Poblete (2015) we will

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<sup>6</sup> Most of these variables would have created a high arbitrariness in the coding. We therefore decided to focus on empirically oriented articles since their research design makes the application of these variables almost free from subjectivity. Moreover, as they are articles focussed more on the operationalization of concepts rather than on their definitions, the analysis of these variables seems much more relevant.

<sup>7</sup> To distinguish between the two, we adopted the criterion most used in the literature, related to the use of some kind of statistical inference rather than the mere use of statistical data (Schedler & Mudde 2010, p. 419).

<sup>8</sup> For articles using aggregate-level data as explanandum (i.e. the vote share for populist parties), we considered them focussed on the demand-side when they employed at least one dependent variable related to the characteristics of the population (such as the unemployment rate) and focussed on the supply-side when they did not make use of such variables.

differentiate between the post-structuralist and the post-modern approaches, with the former referring to Laclau's and the latter to Hawkins' conceptualization of populism, plus another category for the generic use of this label. In the case of ideology, we differentiated between articles explicitly interpreting populism as a thin-centred ideology from those that used a different definition of ideology.


The definition of populism within articles is unavoidably the focus of our first expectations. We expect that the number of articles with a definition of populism will increase over time and the approach that interprets populism as a thin-centred ideology will gradually prevail over the others. In other words, we expect that the concept of populism will be more central and debated within the literature and that a certain consensus about its definition will be observable.

The first expectations concern both theoretically and empirically oriented articles. Our second group of expectations focuses on the empirically oriented articles only (see footnote 5). We expect that the articles with a focus on the supply-side of politics will prevail over those dealing with the demand-side in every decade, following the consideration of the literature which considers the former to have been explored less than the latter (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2018). Then, we want to verify to what extent the expansion of the 'populist *Zeitgeist*' across countries and ideological positions has been studied by the literature. For example, we expect an increase in the cross-country studies over the case studies. In recent years, populist actors or phenomena have been observed in many countries where in the past they were thought to be absent, and therefore the literature on the subject should have taken a broader perspective on the phenomenon. For the same reason, we expect an increase in the number of studies which take into account both Western and Central and Eastern European cases, as well as an increase of articles that study left-wing populism and compare populist parties with differing ideological positioning.

## 5. Discussing the data

In order to verify our expectations, we focus first on the evolution over time of the definitions of populism. We considered the percentage of all articles containing an explicit definition of populism, and focussed specifically on those that had populist actors/phenomena among their main *explananda*. Intuitively, it is more likely that a definition of populism will be put forward in these articles rather than in those that use it as an *explanans* or as a subsidiary *explanandum*. Figure 1 presents us with a simple diachronic overview. The data confirm our initial expectation: in the 1990s, 37.5% of all articles used some kind of definition of populism, whereas in the 2010s the explicit definitions were present in almost two-thirds of the articles. This trend is also present among the articles that have a central focus on explaining populist phenomena, characterized by a percentage higher than the rest of the articles.

**Figure 1: Articles with explicit definitions of populism per decade (in %)<sup>a</sup>.**




<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=40 and 38; N 2000s=70 and 66; N 2010s=84 and 73

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

In looking at the difference between theoretically oriented and empirically oriented articles, we assume that since the former are, by definition, more interested in conceptualization, a much higher share of articles with explicit definitions is to be identified. This is, indeed, confirmed by Figure 2. Again, in both categories, we can

see a confirmation of our expectations of an increase in the use of definitions of populism across decades.

**Figure 2: Articles with explicit definitions of populism per decade according to theoretical/empirical focus (in %)<sup>a</sup>.**



<sup>a</sup>Note N 1990=8 and 32; N 2000s=13 and 57; N 2010s=17 and 67

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

It seems reasonable to suggest that populism is defined more often in the literature today than it was in the 1990s. However, the presence of an explicit definition does not specify what happens in terms of conceptualization. Is this the result of an enduring “war of words” or is this connected to conceptual convergence towards the definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology? The data present in Table 2 seem to privilege the second line of argumentation, albeit with caveats. The picture varies across decades. During the 1990s, we can observe a certain fragmentation, with no category clearly prevailing over the others, a form of equilibrium between the labels that connected populism to the realm of political ideas, discursive rhetorical strategies and strategic-organizational features. The strategic-organizational interpretation is particularly popular in the Latin American context, and it is thus not surprising that this decade saw the publication of two relevant analyses that explicitly connected Central and Eastern Europe with the Latin American context: Di Tella (1997) and Weyland (1999). The most employed definitions of the 1990s associate populism with a style (20%), followed by those that

place emphasis on strategy (13.3%). Significantly, there is an important number of articles that did not include a specific preference for a categorization of the phenomenon (46.7%), which decline rather sharply in the following two decades.

In the second decade, the picture remains fragmented, with at least two differences to the 1990s. First, the most frequent definitions are those of style and thin-centred ideology, although they account for slightly less than a fifth of the categories employed. Second, during this period, the definitions that link populism to the realm of ideas become much more relevant. In the last decade, it is possible to identify a clear affirmation of the interpretation of populism as a thin-centred ideology. The frequency of the definitions associated with this strand of literature is only slightly less than an absolute majority (46.9%). Moreover, it would surpass this threshold if we took into account only the definitions with a clear categorization or added a strongly connected category, i.e. the interpretation of populism as a set of ideas (7.8%). Despite this increasingly accepted reference to a definitional framework, the overall definitional landscape remains fragmented. Apart from categories that connect the use of populism and apply it to macro-phenomena (e.g. a form of representation - Caramani 2017; democratic illiberalism - Pappas 2014), the other available definitions maintain their appeal. It is the case of the style-focussed or discourse-focussed definitions. This is relevant finding, considering that some classifications – such as those inspired to Laclau’s work – are clearly more difficult to operationalise compared to the thin-centred approach.



**Table 2. Categories employed in the definition of populism (per decade)<sup>a</sup>.**

<b>1990s</b>		
	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Style	3	20
Strategy	2	13.3
Political Belief	1	6.7
Political Movement	1	6.7
Political Philosophy	1	6.7
Main characteristics defined without explicit categorization	5	46.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>2000s</b>		
	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Ideology (thin-centred approach)	7	18.9
Style	7	18.9
Discourse (generic/other approaches)	4	10.8
Discourse (post-modern approach)	1	2.7
Field of the Political Spectrum	1	2.7
Form of Organisation	1	2.7
Ideology (generic/ other approaches)	1	2.7
Mass Movement	1	2.7
Mode of Representation/Participation	1	2.7
Set of Ideas	1	2.7
Strategy	1	2.7
Main characteristics defined without explicit categorization	11	29.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>2010s</b>		
	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Ideology (thin-centred approach)	30	46.9
Set of ideas	5	7.8
Style	5	7.8
Discourse (post-structuralist approach)	4	6.3
Discourse (post-modern approach)	3	4.7
Strategy	3	4.7
Rhetoric	2	3.1
Democratic Illiberalism	1	1.6
Discourse (generic/other approaches)	1	1.6
Discursive frame	1	1.6
Form of Representation	1	1.6
Ideology (generic/other approaches)	1	1.6
Repertoire	1	1.6
Main characteristics defined without explicit categorization	6	9.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>a</sup>Note: Number of labels may be higher than the number of articles with an explicit definition of populism since some articles used more than one label to describe populism


Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

We can now move to the characteristics of the empirically oriented articles. In line with our expectations, we observe a clear prevalence of articles whose *explananda* are focussed on the supply-side compared to those focussed on the demand-side (figure 3). The percentage of the analyses focussed only on the supply-side remains high. Our analysis identifies a steady growth in the research dealing with the demand-side of the phenomenon. Interestingly, despite relevant analyses illustrating the need to recognize the interaction between demand-side and supply-side factors in the analysis of the electoral performances of (radical right-wing) populist parties (Golder 2016), our data show a decrease in the research that did not clearly privilege one of the two sides. Most probably, the explanation is connected with an increased specialization of the discipline in this time frame<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> In each decade, qualitative articles are a clear majority of those articles. These are often general reviews of the populist phenomenon in Europe. The growth of quantitative articles over time probably plays a role in the decrease of such pieces of research.

**Figure 3. Research Design focus on Demand/Supply-side per decade (only empirical-oriented articles, %)<sup>a</sup>.**




<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=32; N 2000s=57; N 2010s=67

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

Finally, with regard to cross-country studies (figure 4), our expectation regarding growth in this category is not confirmed, since in the last decade the number of cross-country studies – i.e. multiple European countries or at least one European country and one from another continent – is the lowest recorded in the series. Nevertheless, this finding is in line with the general trend of the discipline (Pepinsky, 2019).

**Figure 4. Cross-country studies per decade (only empirical-oriented articles, %)<sup>a</sup>.**



<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=32; N 2000s=57; N 2010s=67

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

To explore this surprising finding in more detail, Table 3 shows the data of the countries investigated in case study articles. In the last two decades, we can observe a strong presence of the Netherlands, which accounts for more than a quarter of the case studies in our dataset. Quite striking is the absence in the last decade of articles on a country like Poland, which is undoubtedly fundamental in the study of contemporary populisms. The same applies to the scarcity of case studies dealing with France (only one article in the 1990s and one in the 2010s). Most probably, part of the explanations is connected to the increased diffusion of populism in countries where they were previously absent and, hence, an increased attraction for new cases. To this, we can add the influence of different national traditions, for instance, the continuing relevance of publications in the national languages in certain countries.

**Table 3. Specific country in case-study articles<sup>a</sup>.**


1990s		2000s		2010s	
Country	%	Country	%	Country	%
Germany	28.6	The Netherlands	25	The Netherlands	28.1
Italy	28.6	Italy	15	Belgium	12.5
Greece	14.3	United Kingdom	15	United Kingdom	12.5
Czech Republic	7.1	Austria	5	Germany	9.4
France	7.1	Belgium	5	Spain	9.4
Hungary	7.1	Bulgaria	5	Greece	6.3
Slovakia	7.1	Denmark	5	Czech Republic	3.1
		Hungary	5	Finland	3.1
		Ireland	5	France	3.1
		Poland	5	Hungary	3.1
		Slovakia	5	Italy	3.1
		Sweden	5	Sweden	3.1
				Switzerland	3.1
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100

<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=14; N 2000s=20; N 2010s=32

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

Looking at the geographical area of reference, the available data do not fully confirm our expectations (Figure 5). The data show that there is only a very small trend towards an increase of the analyses taking into account both Western and post-communist contexts. If no article of this kind was present in our dataset during the 1990s, the literature taking into consideration at least one country of both areas amounts to 8.8% of the reviewed empirical articles in the 2000s (13.5% without taking into account case study articles) and increases to 11.9% in the following decade (22.9% without taking into account case study articles). The most cited literature on populism in Europe is still dominated by research production dealing with Western Europe, which accounts for more than three-quarters of the articles reviewed in each decade. Finally, the studies with took into account Europe and other continents are still in their infancy. The highest value of such articles was reported during the 2010s, with 11.9% of articles with at least one case outside Europe (22.9% without taking into account case study articles).

**Figure 5. Geographical focus per decade (only empirically oriented articles, in %)<sup>a</sup>.**




<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=32; N 2000s=57; N 2010s=67

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

Moving to the ideological focus, our expectations find mixed results (Figure 6). As in the previous case, we took into consideration exclusively empirically focussed articles. The articles dealing only with left-wing parties do not grow consistently over time. Rather, our data show a relevant increase in the number of articles dealing simultaneously with actors belonging to different ideological positioning. From 6.3% of articles in the 1990s, the frequency of these analyses rises to one-third of the reviewed articles in the 2010s. While, in the first two decades, radical-right populism dominates the research agenda (over 80% in both decades), in the last decade this percentage decreases, although it remains by far the most researched topic in the constellation of publications of populism we mapped.

**Figure 6. Ideological positioning of observations per decade (only empirically oriented articles, in %)<sup>a</sup>.**




NC= *Non-classifiable*

<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=32; N 2000s=56; N 2010s=64

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

Finally, even though we did not formulate specific expectations about this variable, we present the data about the qualitative/quantitative research design of empirical-oriented articles. A particularly steep trend is observed: while quantitative articles amounted to just 12.5% during the 1990s, in the last decade they have (just) become the majority. This growth in quantitative articles is in line with the general trend of the literature (Schedler & Mudde 2010). However, in this particular case, this strong growth may also signal an increased interest in the study of populist phenomena within the mainstream of the discipline.

**Figure 7. Quantitative research articles (only empirical-oriented articles, in %)<sup>a</sup>.**



<sup>a</sup>Note: N 1990=32; N 2000s=57; N 2010s=67

Source: Piccolino and Soare (2021), based on Clarivate Analytics and Elsevier (2021)

## 7. Conclusions

The analysis of populism is a particularly fertile field of study in the social sciences. The literature agrees that the analysis of European populism has reached a high level of complexity and sophistication over the last three decades. However, a systematic meta-analysis, unwrapping the main analytical and conceptual trends in this prolific literature, was lacking. This article aims to fill this gap; though the results largely confirm our expectations, several counterintuitive findings have been noted.

Our results show that populism is much more defined than in the past. This undoubtedly signals increased attention for the phenomenon as a classifier. However, it also shows that its essential features and categorization remain debated. Among the definitions referred to, the interpretation of populism as a thin-centred ideology is clearly the prevailing one, even though it still faces lively competition from other approaches, once again illustrating the complexity behind the phenomenon.

The study of the more empirically oriented articles yielded several interesting results. It shows that the supply-side of politics is still more explored, even though an



increase in studies on the demand-side can be observed. The meta-analysis also shows a clear interest in the varieties of populism. In more detail, our analysis shows that a higher proportion of studies takes into account parties from different ideological positions. There is, however, no increase in respect of those analyses dealing with left-wing parties only. With regard to the geographical context, we did not observe a strong increase in the number of studies taking into account both Western and Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the frequency of cross-country studies has, surprisingly, not increased over time, a finding which may be in part explained by the consolidation of populist parties in some areas, such as the Benelux countries – one of the most studied contexts of the rise and growth of populisms. Finally, yet importantly, a very strong increase in quantitative articles across decades was recorded.

Given these findings, we believe that future studies should use increasingly work on the interaction between the supply- and demand-side, as well as on cross-country studies that combine Western and Central and Eastern European contexts. Although not directly mapped by our meta-analysis, this recommendation is in line with various studies that argue in favour of increased inquiry into the sub-dimensions of populism in both new and old democracies. Even more promising, in our view, is the potential of analysis of all the variants of populisms identified by the literature: we see potential here for analyses that combine qualitative and quantitative data. All in all, more research is needed on this topic – a topic that will undoubtedly continue to capture the attention of voters and scientific research in the years to come.

## **Acknowledgements**

The authors would like to thank Leonardo Puleo and Federica Martiny for the friendly discussions about the article; Maria Giovanna Brancati for the great support; Mirco Ramacciotti for advice on the bibliometric sources; and Uwe Backes, Meindert Fennema, Frits Meijerink and Christopher Pollmann for their kind help with some articles available only in hard copy.

## **Appendix**

Primary search string (Title-Abstract-Author Keywords)

\*populis\*

Secondary search string (Title-Abstract-Author Keywords)

\*antielit\* OR \*anti-elit\* OR anti-establis\* OR \*antiestablish\* OR \*anti-immi\* OR \*antimmi\* OR anti-party OR antiparty OR anti-parties OR antiparties OR anti-partitism OR antipartitism OR anti-partyism OR anti-partytism OR antipolit\* OR anti-polit\* OR "anti-system party" OR "anti-system parties" OR "authoritarian parties" OR "challenger party" OR "challenger parties" OR euroscept\* OR euroskept\* OR "extreme left\*" OR "extreme right\*" OR extremism\* OR "extrem\* party" OR "extrem\* parties" OR "left extrem\*" OR "left-wing extrem\*" OR "right extrem\*" OR "right-wing extrem\*" OR "Far Left" OR "Far Right" OR \*nativis\* OR "nationalist part\*" OR "New Right\* parties" OR "New Left\* parties" OR "post-communist part\*" OR "post-fascist part\*" OR "radical left\*" OR "radical right\*" OR radicalism OR "radical\* party" OR "radical\* parties" OR \*xenophob\* OR "Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs" OR "Freedom Party of Austria" OR "Bündnis Zukunft Österreich" OR "Alliance for the Future of Austria" OR "Team Stronach" OR "Vlaams Block" OR "Vlaams Belang" OR "Flemish Block" OR "Flemish Interest" OR gerb OR ataka OR "Most nezavisnih lista" OR "Bridge of Independent Lists" OR "ANO" OR "Akce nespokojených občanů" OR "Action of Dissatisfied Citizens" OR "Tokio Okamura" OR "Svoboda a přímá demokracie" OR "Freedom and Direct Democracy" OR "Dawn of Direct Democracy" OR "Úsvit přímé demokracie" OR fremskridtspartiet OR fremskrittspartiet OR "Dansk Folkeparti" OR "Progress Party" OR "Progress Parties" OR "Danish people's party" OR "Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond" OR "Conservative People's Party of Estonia" OR perussuomalaiset OR "Finns Party" OR "Front National" OR "National Front" OR "France Insoumise" OR "Unbowed France" OR "Die Republikaner" OR "The Republicans" OR "Die Linke" OR "Left Party" OR "Alternative für Deutschland" OR "Alternative for Germany" OR syriza OR "Coalition of the Radical Left" OR "Popular Orthodox Rally" OR "Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós" OR "Independent Greeks" OR "Anexartitoi Ellines" OR fidesz OR "Hungarian Civic Alliance" OR jobbik OR "Movement for a Better Hungary" OR "Flokkur fólksins" OR miðflokkurinn OR "Centre Party" OR

"Sinn Féin" OR "Forza Italia" OR "Go Italy" OR "Five Star Movement" OR "Movimento 5 Stelle" OR "Northern League" OR "Lega Nord" OR "Who owns the state" OR "For a Humane Latvia" OR "Kam pieder valsts?" OR "Par cilvēcīgu Latviju" OR "Reform Party" OR "Reformu partija" OR "Order and Justice" OR "Tvarka ir teisingumas" OR "Darbo partija" OR "Lithuanian Labour Party" OR "Forum for Democracy" OR "Party for Freedom" OR "Forum voor Democratie" OR "Partij voor de Vrijheid" OR "Pim Fortuyn" OR "Centre Democrats" OR "Centrum Democraten" OR "Socialist Party" OR "Socialistische Partij" OR "League of Polish Families" OR "Liga Polskich Rodzin" OR "Law and Justice" OR "Prawo i Sprawiedliwość" OR korwin OR kukiz OR chega OR "Greater Romania Party" OR "România Mare" OR "Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti" OR "Ordinary People and Independent Personalities" OR "Slovak National Party" OR "Slovenská národná strana" OR "Sme rodina" OR "We Are Family" OR "Smer" OR "Direction -- Social Democracy" OR "Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko" OR "Slovenian National Party" OR "Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka" OR "Slovenian Democratic Party" OR "Slovenska demokratska stranka" OR levica OR podemos OR "Schweizerische Volkspartei" OR "People's Party" OR "Lega dei Ticinesi" OR "Ticino League" OR "Auto-Partei" OR "Automobile Party" OR "Swedish Democrats" OR sverigedemokraterna OR ukip OR "United Kingdom Independence Party" AND NOT \*populis\*

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