Kissinger e il dilemma dell'alleato. Gli Stati Uniti e la crisi cipriota dell'estate 1974


In summer 1974 the Cypriot question reached the peak of tension. Greece and Turkey were very close to an inter-allied conflict and the crisis seemed on the verge of escaping the control of Western powers because of the autonomistic claims of President Makarios and of Soviet interference. While Watergate was culminating in Nixon's resignation, Henry Kissinger, undisputed leader of American foreign policy, carried out his flexible and well known realistic approach: he performed as “honest broker” between the two contenders trying to prevent a dramatic war not only for NATO but also for American influence in Eastern Mediterranean. Main tool of Kissinger's approach to Greece and Turkey were military aids and supplies, strongly opposed by Congress. This diplomatic low profile apparently failed in facing the Greek-Turkish escalation and caused strong criticism. According a plot theory, Kissinger hoped to get Makarios removed and encouraged Turkey, main US strategic partner in the area, to occupy part of Cyprus. By the way, the consequences of Cypriot crisis, Greek withdrawal from NATO and the cooling of relations with Ankara, were strongly negative for US foreign policy. Then Carter tried to recover the strategic cooperation with Athens and Ankara by the same military means.

DOI Code: 10.1285/i22808949a2n2p109

Keywords: Cypriot Crisis; Kissinger; US Foreign Policy; Greece; Turkey

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