

cal help, because some of residents left their homes before fire. It may be said that the state bodies have no models and the least idea on the forthcoming disaster, its scope, timing, pace, probable character of damages as well as on how to cope with it.

Furthermore, the authorities has no idea what must be done (secured) first of all and what can wait till Spring (Summer, etc). Then it is a problem of neglecting long-term effect of disaster. Rescues returned to their barracks and who will plan and implement of people, settlement and nature rehabilitation?

I share the view of Keen that not consulting of end-user is a serious problem. The voice of victims only rare comes through the evaluations made by officials. Calling victims or end-users 'beneficiaries' tends to pre-empt the crucial question or whether they have indeed benefited.

The next common failing in evaluations of a disaster consequences is that the sociologists and rescuers, being outsiders, not asking relevant questions to victims of disaster. For example, they were usually never asked about plans on their immediate and more distant future. As our investigation showed the situation is 50: 50. One half has no plan to resettle, the other dreams to leave their settlement for ever.

I agree with Keen that problems of timing is very acute. Insofar as evaluations are carried out at the end of the project (whether this is development or relief), there will be few opportunities for putting right problems as they arise. The temptation is for donors to take minimal responsibility for implementation a complicated set of rehabilitation measures. Donors prefer simply to decide at the end of a rescue operation 'whether the implementing partners performed well or badly. And the final related problem centers on *who is evaluating whom*. Some aid workers have stressed that a proper evaluation should be a "two-way street": there should be opportunities for recipients to evaluate donors as well as the other way round.' (Keen, 2008: 158-9). Donors and rescue organization welcomed to use resources of local people, but never involved them in planning of rescue operations and their evaluations.

9. Conclusions

Biophysical 'events undermine assumptions of safety and mastery of nature' (Murphy, 2010: 15). Nature defined the rescue structure of civil rescuers activities and stimulates the emergence of multiple 'spots' of activity far

beyond the SM's networks. At the same time, the catastrophe have made selection within the environmental and other SMs (active participants, wishful participants and by-standers).

The catastrophe stimulated the dialogue between scientists and local people as well as inside the scientific community. There is no doubt that after the above events they are both became more politically oriented. It appears that discourse and rhetoric are critically important because they result in particular practices that are either pro-ecological or harmful in human interaction with biophysical dynamics. In particular, how the local population and leaders of rescue teams define particular situation as safe or as risky determines the actions that will be taken by civil society activists. Discourse is another key component in shaping practices, because winning wrong rhetoric leads to disastrous consequences. Discourse analysis focuses on 'claims-making' by complaining groups.

The overall cumulative social effect of this Summer catastrophe ha been the recognition that the social order in the country, and of the New Forestry code (2005) in particular are harmful both for Russian society and its nature. Besides, the actual behavior of the state organizations responsible for preventing such catastrophe gave raise to protest and mobilization moods (claims).

In activation of Russian civil society the IT had played the key role. SM's activists and associated volunteers rendered the assistance in mitigation of disaster by the creation of the internet-forums which carried out a multiple functions: social (creation of groups which were capable to render material and medical help), material, psychological aid, logistics, etc, but science is just one of many competing forces in the public arena;

It should be stressed that though for the first time the evidences of local eye-witnesses were collected, processed and submitted to the federal government, unfortunately with no constructive response up to now, their self-organization had emerged and extinguish so speedy that sociologists could not follow them to fix their activity accurately and in full. Nevertheless, these internet-forums allowed to local people to compare information about the catastrophe given by the state media with what they have seen as eye-witnesses. This comparison declined the trust in these media and raise the trust to the civil society forums, accounts, reports, etc.

The participants of the mitigation of the consequences of the catastrophe were clearly divided in two parts: those who work in epicenter of it, and

those who act in a distance. But they were not by-standers and did not avoid the participation in rescue operations. On the contrary, they had played the important role as the core organizers joining people by means of internet-forums and blogs, searching various specialists urgently needed in a situ and distributing the material aid, garments, medicine, etc. gathered by volunteers and ordinary people; Internet and other IT devices became for grassroots a powerful means for self-organization. It turned out that internet plus mobile phone-set are powerful means for information and self-organization, irrespectively to the state command and its intricate and often contradictory instructions. Direct communication between civil rescuers and suffering local people have begun to rehabilitate the *trust* between scientists and local people, between residents of capital cities and of small towns in province. There were a third very small group who consider their participation in disaster mitigation as a kind of extreme tourism or a means of getting an additional portion of adrenaline.

All in all, I call this particular mobilization as *ecological* because of its integrative and multifunctional character with not definite margins, whereas the aid rendered by state's emergency rescuers has operated in instructive, one-sided and time-limited way. State rescuers has a definite set of responsibilities and zones defined by their instructions, whereas civil activists felt themselves responsible for all related to fire and its victims.

Summer fires in provinces and Autumn street disturbances of football-fans in Moscow finally defined the preferences of power bodies: they like fans and dislike environmentalists and defenders of human rights. It is indicative that some fun organization called themselves '*Opora*', that means the support of existing regime. It turned out that not all dwellers of small towns and large cities were infected by individualism and consumerism. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that civil society organizations are 'always better' in coping with the disasters than the state ones. 'For NGOs, accountability is often upwards to donors than downwards to beneficiaries. In large part because of a concern to attract future funding. NGOs and UN agencies typically put a positive gloss on the impact of their own operations' (Keen, 2008: 157).

In the final analysis, the set of natural disasters in Summer 2010 mobilized Russian civil society, made it more stronger and well organized, attracted to them more resources as well as backers and sympathizers, and showed to the

state officials that in some cases civil organizations were more efficient than the state's rescuers.