

dership consist of preventing this decline from occurring' (Murphy, 2010: 243).

(9) The disaster favored various forms of self-organization. Activists were forced to act regardless official instructions, sometimes coming into collision with strict instructions of federal forces, that is, of the state rescuers and local administration.

(10) it is indicative that during the struggle with fire and then rendering assistance to injured or psychologically depressed there were no one conflict between people of different nationalities. All involved, be it volunteers or local residents, worked (and suffered) equally.

(11) their motivation and at the same time mobilizing frame was 'we are needed!', that is, their activity was claiming and necessary for others. In other words, their collective efforts aimed at the protection of a common good were again claimed by the society.

(12) the most important result of this hot Russian summer was the exposition of absolutely useless of the new Forestry Code adopted in 2005 and some other laws related to forestry and forestry business in particular.

(13) looking more widely, we agree with our western partners that 'the internet is an efficient tool in terms of the diffusion of protest (Della Porta et al., 1999) and the consistency of protest, in order to achieve a 'consensual mobilization' (Olitrault, 2001: 124, quotation from: Win de Donk et al., 2004: 171).

7. Political and scientific and institutions

Surprisingly, but the critical situation under review had for a long time no any response from the part of central, regional and local authorities. Fires quickly expanded, smog covered Moscow, its residents suffocated, but it seemed that politicians of all levels and ranks have heard nothing about all this including the President's administration and former Moscow mayor. No measures were taken in order to alleviate the sufferings of sick and old. The situation were worse than in New Orleans. Nevertheless, official media reported that 'All under control'. There are some explanations of this alienation, but the key of them meant that it was one more confirmation that power encapsulated and did not want to show its interest to lay people's fatigue

even in critical circumstances. All warnings made in advance by research institutes and monitoring organizations were disregarded. Besides alienation mentioned above, there is one more explanation of weakness of power. ‘Organizations that had been rational and efficient under normal dynamics of nature were now having great difficulty coping with its extreme movements. The severe weather exposed modern society as fragile. Previously, nature has seemed reduced to benign recreation, but now it appeared threatening and filled with danger’. (Murphy, 2010: 88-89). Only some kind of businesses celebrated because the prices for all could make cool – ventilators, conditioners, sun-screens and the like – jumping up every day.

As to academics, they divided in two parts. A majority of professors and instructors of high schools (with their children and relatives) simply run away from zones of fire and smog, and calmly continued their relaxation abroad. Only by the command from the top some of them as well as regional and local executives were forced to return to suffering cities and towns. On the contrary, the minority of academics, mainly involved in nature protection, took part in aid and rescue operations at once. They worked not only as consultants or experts, but did any rescue work which was needed in a particular place. As I confirmed empirically, the old tradition of Russian scientists *khozdenie v narod* (going to people) had been revitalized (Yanitsky, 2005). But there is another explanation of their activity: many of them had bought dachas (shale) in devastated rural villages, and therefore they defended from fires not only a common good but their private property.

8. On shortcomings of rescue operations

Since we, sociologists, had been insiders and practiced bottom—up view, some deficits and mistakes of official organizations responsible for rescue became clearly seen. Firstly, the impact on political and economic processes underline a disaster had been not investigated (for example, a local administration functions or building materials). Rescue organizers first looking at the aid operation itself. Then, the rescuers has no a rehabilitation program. Their operations were restricted by prevention fire of houses of local inhabitants, only. There were no programs of their further security, food supply, etc. They did not know the state of art of targeted population *before* the beginning of disaster and aid intervention. Neither municipal authorities nor rescuers did not know how many people were actually needed in aid and medi-